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the ineffectual inheritors of Classical Roman law, this dissertation argues that legal experts neither wholly
joined the Roman bureaucratic administration nor found themselves suffering from a mass intellectual
decline. Rather, legal experts developed and utilized a contextually significant mode of legal
argumentation in order to convince their contemporaries about the legal validity of their claims. By
adapting a Critical Legal Pluralism approach to the late Roman legal expert, we can come to appreciate
the multiple and powerful forms of the creation of legal meaning in the Empire. The Critical Legal Pluralist
approach moves us away from a legal positivist or statist model of law and toward a model of law that
values and analyzes legal meaning as it is operative in its local contexts. This dissertation builds on
scholarship of the social world of Roman jurists and on newer actor-based approaches to legal history.
The scholarship on Roman jurists has focused primarily on early imperial jurists and has approached
legal history through a prosopographical methodology. The actor-based approaches to legal history focus
on the role of the emperor in the creation of law and on the role of litigants in the processes of creating
arguments. The actor-based approaches employ a methodology that aims at being more illuminative than
exhaustive; this methodology reveals the wide range of strategies for navigating the law. The actor-based
approaches, however, overlook the legal experts assisting, complicating, and hindering all forms of social
legal practice. This dissertation reveals the integral role late Roman legal experts played in the empirewide phenomenon of law by focusing on how the legal expert created persuasive arguments in law, what
forms of compensation were given for legal expertise, and how legal practice varied over the
heterogenous landscape of the Roman Empire. The “little men of law” filled the spaces of the Empire with
individuals who were recognized as being capable and adept to creating legal meaning for their local
communities.
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ABSTRACT
THE LITTLE MEN OF LAW: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE LATE ROMAN JURIST
Ryan Pilipow
Cam Grey
Legal experts in the late Roman Empire were ubiquitous, persuasive, and influential creators of
legal meaning. Contrary to the traditional scholarly narrative that posits that legal experts of the period
were the ineffectual inheritors of Classical Roman law, this dissertation argues that legal experts neither
wholly joined the Roman bureaucratic administration nor found themselves suffering from a mass
intellectual decline. Rather, legal experts developed and utilized a contextually significant mode of legal
argumentation in order to convince their contemporaries about the legal validity of their claims. By
adapting a Critical Legal Pluralism approach to the late Roman legal expert, we can come to appreciate the
multiple and powerful forms of the creation of legal meaning in the Empire. The Critical Legal Pluralist
approach moves us away from a legal positivist or statist model of law and toward a model of law that
values and analyzes legal meaning as it is operative in its local contexts. This dissertation builds on
scholarship of the social world of Roman jurists and on newer actor-based approaches to legal history. The
scholarship on Roman jurists has focused primarily on early imperial jurists and has approached legal
history through a prosopographical methodology. The actor-based approaches to legal history focus on the
role of the emperor in the creation of law and on the role of litigants in the processes of creating arguments.
The actor-based approaches employ a methodology that aims at being more illuminative than exhaustive;
this methodology reveals the wide range of strategies for navigating the law. The actor-based approaches,
however, overlook the legal experts assisting, complicating, and hindering all forms of social legal practice.
This dissertation reveals the integral role late Roman legal experts played in the empire-wide phenomenon
of law by focusing on how the legal expert created persuasive arguments in law, what forms of
compensation were given for legal expertise, and how legal practice varied over the heterogenous
landscape of the Roman Empire. The “little men of law” filled the spaces of the Empire with individuals
who were recognized as being capable and adept to creating legal meaning for their local communities.
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Introduction
A composite image of the late Roman legal expert from ancient literary evidence
would be that of a pale, deliberately obfuscating, greedy, and immoral man. An image
derived from contemporary scholarship of the same expert would be that of a bureaucrat
enabling an imperial will or the ur-scholar locked in an ivory tower, puzzling out the
differences of minute legal quandaries in order to make humble contributions to the
impressive castle that is Roman legal doctrine. These “big men” of law have traditionally
been assumed to have ordered Roman legal practice and doctrine in a top-down manner:
the ancient evidence depicts a man immorally wielding power, the two modern images
present the expert as manipulating law through state force or legal doctrine. Although
these images undeniably capture aspects of late Roman legal experts, they focus on a
single type of elite expert. Another type of legal expert, however, has gone
unappreciated. This type of legal expert created a communal and contemporary
understanding of what constituted law. The creation of immediate legal meaning was a
social practice of law that reached more than emperors and doctrinaire jurists. Rather, law
was created as a social phenomenon in a plethora of late Roman communities, in which
individuals interpreted and re-interpreted their understandings of what constituted law
and justice. These interpretations came in many forms such as mundane legal documents,
arguments made in Roman judicial fora, texts rereading and reappropriating older juristic
works or imperial constitutions, letters between friends and colleagues, and in popular
demonstrations. The alternate legal experts facilitated all of these moments of the
creation of legal meaning. These are the “little men” of Roman law. Their stories, their
1

arguments, and their methodologies are indicative of law in the late Roman world and its
culture.
In order to investigate the late Roman legal expert, in this introduction, I first
describe the chronological basis and parameters for my interests in the late Roman legal
expert. The description—largely drawn from the standard, though at times problematic
scholarly narrative of the late Roman jurist—helps situate the reader into the broader
chronology of Roman legal history and explain why this research is pertinent. With an
understanding of the broad outlines of Roman legal history, I turn both to the theoretical
research, which acts as the foundation of this dissertation, and to the way it affects how I
handle material of late Roman legal experts. The central theoretical apparatus informing
this dissertation is “Critical Legal Pluralism.” Critical legal pluralism focuses on an
individual’s capacity for the creation of legal meaning. When we focus on how
individuals create legal meaning rather than on the creation of law at the top of the legal
world, the late Roman Empire becomes a place not of legal chaos, which it has been
accused of, but a place of legal potential. The application of critical legal pluralism
focuses the investigation into the late Roman legal expert by allowing for the analysis of
the legal meaning created everywhere and by everyone. I conclude the discussion of
critical legal pluralism with a broad overview of the evidentiary basis of my research.
Armed with the analytical tools of critical legal pluralism, I present three bodies of
scholarship according to their main objects of study: jurists, emperors, and litigants. The
specific clusters of themes and topics that each of these bodies of scholarship uses are
indicative of their epistemology of Roman legal history. I follow the scholarship section
with an outline of the dissertation in order to demonstrate how each chapter intervenes in
2

and contributes to the scholarly discourse and the ways that the chapters contribute to a
holistic view of the legal expert, law, and the legal culture of the late Roman world.

1. The Chronology and Periodization of the Late Roman Legal
Expert
The standard narrative of Roman legal chronology as found in Roman legal
histories1, the Cambridge Ancient History series2, and modern handbooks to Roman law3
divide legal history of the Roman Empire into three periods: the classical period (roughly
from Augustus in 27 BCE to Diocletian in 285 CE), the bureaucratic or Dominate period
(285 CE-529 CE), and the Justinianic period (529 CE and forward). In what follows, I
discuss the classical period as it is constructed in the standard narrative of Roman legal
history. This discussion demonstrates how the late Roman legal expert, specifically the
expert of the bureaucratic or Dominate period, differed from what proceeded. Then I
discuss how much of the chronology of the bureaucratic period is predicated on a faulty
narrative of decline and crisis of the late Roman Empire. Finally, I argue how Justinian’s
legal program has shaped all of Roman legal history and the scholarship on it, in effect

1

For instance, Fritz Schulz, History of Roman Legal Science (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1946), H.F. Jolowicz and Barry Nicholas, The Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), and Olga Tellegen-Couperus, A Short History of
Roman Law (London: Routledge, 1993).
2
David Ibbetson, “High Classical Law,” in The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 12, ed. by Alan
Bowman, Averil Cameron, and Peter Garnsey, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
184-199, David Johnston, “Epiclassical Law,” in The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 12, ed. by
Alan Bowman, Averil Cameron, and Peter Garnsey, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005), 200-207, and Detlef Liebs, “Roman Law,” in The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 14, ed.
By Averil Cameron, Bryan Ward-Perkins, and Michael Whitby (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), 238-259.
3
Paul du Plessis, Borkowski’s Textbook on Roman Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
3

creating the standard periodization of Roman legal history. The standard narrative of
Roman legal history offers a useful set of parameters for the study of the late Roman
legal expert because the attention scholars have given to the classical and the Justinianic
periods has led to a fundamental mischaracterization of the intervening period. It is
between these two poles that I base my study. The dynamic landscape between the end of
the classical age and the rise of Justinian, though complex, offers a more continuous
narrative of legal culture and practice than previously appreciated.
The classical period of Roman legal history is defined by two axes: senatorialequestrian and amateur-professional. Put simply, the standard characterization of the
Roman jurist at the beginning of this period is an amateur man usually from a senatorial
background who works on explicating Roman legal issues through massive
commentaries, treatises, and monographs. By the end of the period, jurists will be
predominantly from the equestrian order and work in the imperial administration. The
unifying characteristic of the entire classical period, however, is the textual production of
its jurists: by the time of Justinian, about three million lines of legal text still existed
mostly produced in the classical period.4 Jurists of the classical period produced legal
texts in their own name and mostly through their own explicit reasoning as opposed to
the bureaucratic period when texts were produced either pseudographically, by
compilation, or in the Emperor’s name.
The first axis defining the classical period is the senatorial-equestrian transition.
At the beginning of the classical period, the jurists who created classical jurisprudence

4

Const. Omn. 1.
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were few in number and were, for the most part, members of the social elite, the
senatorial order. Their elite position was maintained in three ways. First, prestigious
families produced luminaries of the legal world during the classical age.5 The quasiinheritance of legal expertise speaks to the parochial nature of juristic culture at the time.
Secondly, the method of education, which was ostensibly open to all, in reality was
available to elite young men. This method of education, constituted by elite young men
following, listening, questioning, and copying older, more experienced legal experts,
served to confine legal expertise or juristic mastery within the elite social class.6 Third,
the historically problematic ius respondendi, which supposedly arose under Augustus,
would have singled out individuals from the age of Augustus to Hadrian as the most
authoritative legal experts of their period.7 These three aspects of their elite standing
allowed select jurists to deliver definitive legal opinions based on their own
understanding and authority. The elite standing of jurists marked them as radically
different from the following period of the late Roman Empire.
The second axis defining the classical period, the amateur-professional, saw a
trend away from the amateur work of jurists who were interested in explicating law in
their free time and toward jurists working primarily for the imperial administration. Much

5

For instance, the Labeos and the Scaevolas.
Andrew Riggsby, “Roman Legal Education,” in A Companion to Ancient Education, ed. By W.
Martin Bloomer (Chichester, West Sussex, United Kingdom : Wiley-Blackwell, 2015), 444-451;
Detlef Liebs, “Rechtsschulen und Rechtsunterricht im Prinzipat,” Aufstieg und Niedergang der
römischen Welt, vol. 15, (1976): 197-286; Jan Kodrebski, “Der Rechtsunterricht am Ausgang der
Republik und zu Beginn des Prinzipats,” Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, vol. 15,
(1976): 177-196.
7
Kaius Tuori, “The ius respondendi and the Freedom of Roman Jurisprudence,” Revue
Internationale des droits de l’Antiquité, LI (2004): 295-337.
5
6

of the narrative of the amateur nature of the classical period is derived from the suspect
fragment in the Digest of Pomponius’s Enchirodion, which catalogues jurists in the form
of a lineage of famous teachers.8 The teachers in Pomponius’s list worked mostly as
private advisers and independent philosophers of law. Antistius Labeo serves as an
example: “Labeo declined to accept office when Augustus made him an offer of the
consulship whereby he would have become consul suffectus (interim consul). Instead, he
applied himself with the greatest firmness to his studies, and he used to divide up whole
years on the principle that he spent six months at Rome with his students, and for six
months he retired from the city and concentrated on writing books.”9 Firstly, Labeo
denied Augustus’s offer, which preserves his standing as an amateur. Secondly, by
dedicating half the year to teaching, Labeo maintained a practice of taking requests for
legal help and modeling his interpretation for young men who attended his public
audiences.10 Thirdly, in the other half of the year, away from the city, he expounded on
the law in legal treatises and commentaries. Labeo serves as a good example of an early

8

The fragment is problematic not only because of the state of the manuscript tradition, but also
because the Enchirodion is unlike any other fragment or example of Roman juristic literature. In
fact, the work seems to share more with its contemporary second sophistic literature than it does
with preceding juristic writing. I suspect both aspects of the text have influenced its reception
among legal historians. Compare Richard Lim’s discussion of dialogue in antiquity in Richard
Lim, “Christian, Dialogue, and Patterns of Sociability in Late Antiquity,” in The End of Dialogue
in Antiquity, ed. By Simon Goldhill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 151-172 in
which Lim argues that the entire debate about dialogue in antiquity is an attempt at composing a
hierarchy of civilizations. We could consider juristic texts and transgressive juristic texts
similarly.
9
Dig. 1.2.2.47 trans. Watson; on the text see Tuori, “The ius respondendi,” contra R.A. Bauman,
Lawyers and Politics in the Early Roman Empire (München: Beck, 1989).
10
Kathleen Atkinson, “The Education of the Lawyer in Ancient Roman,” South African Journal
of Law, vol. 87 (1970): 31-59.
6

classical jurist as depicted in the ancient classical and modern scholarly imagination:
elite, amateur, and dedicated to writing.
Toward the end of the classical age, there was a shift away from the amateur labor
of jurists and toward the holding of high office while still producing expansive juristic
texts. The Severan jurists, such as Papinian, Paul, and Ulpian, in particular are
emblematic of this shift.11 Each held the position of Praetorian Prefect as the final stop in
a decorated career serving the imperial administration. Each also wrote expansive
commentaries particularly on specific legal institutions, particularly on the Edict, and
casuistic literature based on questions and detailed responses.12 Jurists during this period
produced the most famous juristic texts of the Roman world; these texts make up a clear
majority of the Digest. For comparison, Paul and Ulpian alone constitute about half of the
text of the Digest.13 While these administrative jurists are fascinating case studies
because they have left us so much evidence, not only of their legal philosophies but also
of their lives, they tend to overshadow other jurists who likewise made important impacts
in the study of law during the period, though we know less about them. The most
important jurist from the period about whom we know little is Gaius, whose Institutes, an
introductory Roman legal text, was the form upon which Justinian’s Institutes was
designed.14 Although Gaius was undoubtedly influential, his powerful contemporaries

11

On Papinian, see Ulrike Babusiaux, Papinians Quaestiones, (München: Beck, 2011). On
Ulpian, see Tony Honoré, Ulpian, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
12
Ibbetson, “High Classical Law,” 188-190.
13
Wolfgang Kaiser, “Justinian and the Corpus Iuris Civilis,” in The Cambridge Companion to
Roman Law, ed. By David Johnston, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 119-148,
here at 125.
14
Tony Honoré, Gaius, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).
7

colored much of the end of the classical period by holding high office and producing
juristic texts.
The traditional narrative of the beginning of the bureaucratic period emphasizes
two aspects: first, the cessation of the production of juristic texts and second, the
expansion of legal experts working in the imperial administration. The rest of this
dissertation offers criticism of the characterizations of the bureaucratic period and argues
for an alternate model of Roman legal history that values late Roman legal practice
according to its own terms. As such, we will not dwell here on the periodization except to
point out that in the changing historiographic landscape of late antiquity, nearly every
other aspect of history has undergone critical reappraisal. Scholarship of late antiquity in
general has gone from a Gibbonesque criticism to a more measured approach of valuing
the continuity and change of the period.15 I suggest that legal history, as a branch of late
Roman history in general, is ripe for a similar reappraisal.
The cessation of juristic texts was a multiply determined phenomenon. Three
select factors that led at least to the appearance of the cessation are (1) the creation of the
Digest of Justinian, (2) the solidification of a juristic canon, and (3) the general rising
preference for compilatory productions. The perception of the end of the classical era of
Roman jurists was in part created by the codificatory practice of Justinian, who insisted
on retaining only select, classical works.16 The juristic works chosen for inclusion were

15

The approach began most clearly in Peter Brown, The World of Late Antiquity, AD 150-750,
(New York: Norton, 1971). For a discussion of the stakes, history of the criteria employed, and
the nuance required to write late antique history, see Clifford Ando, "Decline, Fall, and
Transformation," Journal of Late Antiquity, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 31-60.
16
Deo Auctore.
8

edited so that the texts emphasize the appearance of a coherent and systematic juristic
doctrine dating from the archaic period until Justinian’s own time. The works excluded
by Justinian’s compilers were ordered to be destroyed. It is questionable how effective
this order would have been, but the positive creation of a central text, the Digest, has led
scholars to consider works derived nearly exclusively from Justinian’s program,
contributing to the perception of a sharp and sudden change in legal textual production.17
The solidification of a juristic canon can be seen in the developing preference for the
jurists mentioned in the lex citandi, the law of citations of 426 CE, which dictated which
jurists would be considered authoritative on legal questions.18 This law originally
addressed problems arising from wills, but its inclusion in the Theodosian Code suggests
that it was more widely interpreted.19 This law aside, it does seem to have been the case
that individuals prioritized readings derived from Ulpian, Gaius, Paul, Papinian, and
Modestinus.20 Scholars have interpreted the cessation of juristic textual production as the
result of a dearth of legal intellect after the third century.21 This dissertation pushes
against such an interpretation and argues instead for an appraisal that focuses on the
preferred techniques of legal argument. As is argued in the first chapter, the bureaucratic
period saw the development of a method of legal argumentation that privileged the works
of classical jurists. Instead of writing new juristic treatises, legal texts were composed by

17

Gaius’s institutes are a rare exception, but only because they survived as a palimpsest. The
Institutes were discovered in 1816.
18
A. J. B. Sirks The Theodosian Code (Friedrichsdorf: Éditions Tortuga, 2007): 117-190.
19
Caroline Humfress, Orthodoxy and the Courts in Late Antiquity, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007): 76.
20
Based on the fact that texts like the Collatio Legum Mosaicarum et Romanarum draw
exclusively from those jurists.
21
Ibbetson, “High Classical Law,” 198-199.
9

excerpting and juxtaposing older texts in complicated ways. A more neutral—and
perhaps more effective—mode of analysis would describe the phenomenon of
disappearance of juristic commentaries, treatises, and monographs not as intellectual
decay but rather as evidence of different modes of legal creativity.
Support for the shift in analytical language about the changing bureaucratic period
is also found in the second aspect of the traditional narrative of Roman legal history, the
expansion of legal experts working in the imperial administration. As discussed above, by
the end of the classical period, Roman jurists held high office. This trend continued in the
third, fourth, and fifth centuries as legal experts seem to have become essential to the
functioning of Roman bureaucracy.22 Officials, such as the magister a libellis and the
quaestor, assisted the Emperor and his administration carry out justice by composing
imperial constitutions, writing replies to legal questions, and generally advising on legal
matters.23 The traditional narrative of late Roman legal history posits that most of the
legal expertise of the period was invested in ensuring that an imperial will was
successfully manifested. That is, Roman legal experts, in light of the autocratic rule of the
late Roman Empire, manipulated Roman legal practice to accommodate imperial
commands and punishments. Throughout the dissertation, I hope to show that the focus

22

Schulz, History of Roman Legal Science, 262-267.
Tony Honoré, Emperors and Lawyers (London: Duckworth, 1981), Tony Honoré, Law in the
Crisis of Empire, 379-455 AD (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Tony Honoré, “The Making of
the Theodosian Code,” Zeitschrift Der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte- Romanistische
Abteilung I, 104 (1986): 133-222; See also the eminently clear article, Jill Harries, ‘The Roman
Imperial Quaestor from Constantine to Theodosius II,” The Journal of Roman Studies, 78 (1988):
148-172.
10
23

on bureaucratic legal experts misrepresents the pervasive practice of legal experts in the
late Roman Empire.
The final aspect of the bureaucratic period that should be addressed is the
relationship of historiographical narratives of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire
and the characterization of Roman legal practice. One of the principle assumptions that
connects the histories of the Roman Empire and legal practice is the notion that law, even
in antiquity, was the prerogative of the state. The declining state would result in declining
law. If we refrain from the assumption that the Roman state was the only or primary
controller of law, then we can challenge the negative characterization of the bureaucratic
period as too closely corresponding to the decline and fall narratives. If legal experts now
only labored to please autocratic emperors, we would find it difficult to explain the
complex and dynamic practice of law in the period. I am not arguing that law must
necessarily be analyzed separately from politics or discussions of state, but I suggest that
careful examination of late Roman legal evidence is required so that any modern
assumption of the connection between law and state is not unnecessarily imposed on our
history of the period. We should not assume that political turmoil necessarily results in
declining legal practice.
The final period of Roman legal history considered is the Justinianic. In 529 CE,
Justinian ordered the creation of his Code, a collection of imperial constitutions, that
served as the beginning of his legal program. Other works in the program included the
Digest (also called in Greek the Pandects), the Institutes, and the Novels. Each of these
works was developed in order to displace and restructure Roman legal practice around
the Emperor Justinian. As mentioned above, the Emperor was at least somewhat
11

successful in reshaping legal history, creating the illusion of a dark age of Roman legal
intellect.
The supposed extinction of the classical jurist and the rise of Justinian’s legal
program act as the two chronological limits of this dissertation. In part, this research will
offer a new reading of Roman legal practice and legal expertise that reveals the pervasive
resilience of Roman legal experts throughout the bureaucratic period. In addition, I hope
to demonstrate that legal historians are not obligated to write history through Justinian,
but instead can focus on the small, ubiquitous creations of legal meaning populating the
late Roman Empire.

2. Critical Legal Pluralism and Methodology
One method to prevent the assumption of the dependent relationship between
Roman state and law is to employ critical legal pluralism. Critical legal pluralism fuses
the branches of Critical Legal Studies and Legal Pluralism in order to investigate how
individuals create law by drawing on multiple discourses. This scholarship radically
emphasizes the jurisgenerative capacity—that is the ability to make law—of individuals
in an attempt to move away from an understanding of law as an exogenous, reified
object. For critical legal pluralism, legal orders do not exist prior to an individual
constructing them; in a sense there is no prior law, no institutional law, no state law
before each subject narrates it for him or herself. By denying state law the primary role in
defining law, critical legal pluralism privileges the ways that individuals create legal
orders, obligations, protections, and ideas—that is, legal meaning—in all facets of their
12

lives. Critical legal pluralism offers a useful theoretical apparatus for investigating the
late Roman legal world because it encourages an analysis of law that prioritizes how
individuals on the ground construct legal meaning from a multitude of sources, which
may include discourses outside of any notion of the Roman government. In what follows,
I describe four propositions derived from critical legal pluralism and how they influence
my investigation into Roman legal history. I then define the terms “legal expertise” and
“legal expert” in light of my exposition of critical legal pluralism and discuss the
evidentiary basis for a critical legal pluralistic study of both of these terms.
The four relevant propositions derived from critical legal pluralism are (1) the
fundamental position of the individual in the creation of law, (2) the law as a mode of
describing the world, (3) the narrative and pluralistic form of legal meaning, and (4)
emancipatory potential of critical legal pluralism. In short, critical legal pluralism
prioritizes any individual—regardless of state or doctrinal standing—as creating law
whenever they describe the world as it should be. This description is understood as part
of the construction of legal meaning whereby the stories told about the world come to
signify how things should be done. These stories can be derived from any source and, in
fact, most of the world ordering stories that create legal meaning are composed of
discourses outside of state law. By focusing on individuals in the act of creating legal
meaning, critical legal pluralism offers an emancipatory potential, moving law away from
state discourse and instead moving toward recognizing legal meaning in a variety of new
places populated by potentially disenfranchised individuals.
A critical legal pluralism approach to law dictates that individuals produce law
when they narrate a conception of what the world should be. When individuals narrate
13

their conception of what the world should be, they generate normativity as legal
knowledge. This legal “knowledge is a process of creating and maintaining myths about
reality,” and hence bears a strong relationship with normativity.24 Even when individuals
recognize and respond to the legal knowledge of others, they have to conceive of how
they fit into and, in a way, create their relationship with someone else’s conception of
normativity. In critical legal pluralism, legal knowledge is the province of every
individual, not just judges, jurists, and lawyers. Law is constructed by the imaginative
power of individuals, who—with their capacity to create legal meaning—try to
communicate their imagined worlds to their communities. Their communities can consist
of Empires, networks of scholars, schools of jurists, hierarchies of judges, neighbors,
peers, subjects, and citizen—and even, God; in short, everyone or, in a strange way, no
one. Jurisgenerative individuals, that is all individuals, create law. Their capacity for
legal meaning gives rise to and perpetuates legal rituals, objects, practices, and
institutions. This is to say that law does not appear out of the soil, waiting for someone to
turn it on, nor is it simply handed down. Instead, the creation of law happens radically
with each individual who conceives of law to which they and/or their neighbors should be
subject.
When individuals create legal meaning, they describe the world as it should be.
Law is constituted of two separate but complementary modalities: one modality is
complaining about the way things are in the hopes of moving to the way they should be;
the other is offering safeguards for protecting against the world slipping from the way it
24
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should be to the way it should not be. The law creates the world as it should be, in the
sense of an imagined construction, but law can also affect the world as a lived reality. In
Robert Cover’s formulation, “law may be viewed as a system of tension or a bridge
linking a concept of a reality to an imagined alternative.”25 Cover’s formulation shows
that law must be anchored in both reality and alternity. This notion of legal alternity
envelopes discussions of the nature of justice, ideas of law and order, constructions of
utopia, and imagined dystopias. From a historical and anthropological prospective, law is
filled with meaning about both the individual constructing it and the communities which
that individual inhabits.26 So, while individuals construct law, they do so in a dialectic
nature with their lived reality. But the relationship between reality and alternity is
staggeringly complex.27
The complexity of the relationship between reality and alternity is, to some
degree, instantiated and explained by the fact that narrative is the primary technique for
constructing law. When individuals narrate their conceptions of the law, they give their
world legal meaning. But the techniques of narration are not confined to traditionally
extra-legal actors unable to communicate legal meaning in technical legalese. Rather,
broadly conceived, the scholarship on legal hermeneutics can be understand as a subset of
legal narration. Scholars following Ronald Dworkin have conceived of the law as the
interpretive domain of judges, who through their specific hermeneutics apply their legal
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reading to cases.28 Nonetheless, we can understand even the most positivistic interpreters
of law as narrating their distinct conceptions of the world as it should be in the specific
language of statute law.29 When individuals narrate their conceptions of how the world
should be outside of the traditional state law language, they create legal meaning just as
much as the positivistic interpreters. Critical legal pluralism places emphasis on the
individual creating the law thereby acknowledging all of the sources individuals use in
their narrations.30 Legal meaning is not dependent on state legal language. This means
that the language of law and the systems of law can come from many places. Individuals
can construct legal meaning in multiple communities and discourses. For instance, in
divorce cases in the United States, much of the dispute resolution happens outside of a
court and without the official language of state law.31 Even further afield, consider
homeowners associations, hospitals, and colleges.32 Each of these social institutions has
its own distinct form of legal sensibility that can bleed into state legal understanding.33 A
critical legal pluralist approach values the individual conception of law regardless of its
social arena or the material used for constructing legal meaning.
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The final proposition derived from critical legal pluralism that must be discussed
is the role it plays in understanding power dynamics. By rejecting exogenous state law,
critical legal pluralism privileges legal capacity over social position or category.34 So, the
legal meaning created by a judge or a manual laborer would have equal standing in a
critical legal pluralist approach. The social mechanisms of state violence or communal
discontent do not invalidate any one form of legal meaning. That being said, individuals
can incorporate external social and cultural structures into their creative enterprise to give
them new legal meaning. This new meaning may position the traditional hierarchies in
such a way that the individual can be seen to resist, manipulate, or even coopt others
conceptions of law.35 Critical legal pluralism brightly illuminates these narratives of
small legal powers by recognizing them as legitimate legal narratives with their own
world creating potential.
Critical legal pluralism was developed to address modern legal concerns and, as
such, has to be adapted for any application in the ancient world. My adaptation of this
theoretical approach manifests mostly clearly in my terms “legal expertise” and “legal
expert.” Although critical legal pluralism denies any greater importance to “traditional
legal experts” such as lawyers and state legislators and to classical legal genres such as
state law, my analysis of the late Roman legal world focuses on these two topics but
greatly widens the frames of reference and materials investigated. I have chosen to retain
legal expertise and expert because these terms offer discretionary criteria that help narrow
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the focus of my study. However, once I have those subjects, I analyze every aspect of
their legal meaning making. I do not exclude actors, arguments, or actions as “non-legal,”
but rather view the totality of attempts to make legal meaning. One could argue that this
approach will lead to the criticism that philosophical, theological, dramatic, comedic,
poetic, or any other genre could count as law. I am willing to consider the notion that
even far-flung texts should be brought into analysis of what constitutes law, because the
notion that law is an embedded phenomenon suggests that it could be instantiated in
multiple discourses. My investigation into late Roman legal history imports the
techniques and modes of analysis developed in studies of critical legal pluralism and
employs them to evaluate the wide range of discourses and actions in the Roman legal
world.
In my definition of legal expertise, legal meaning and expertise are closely
related. If legal meaning is created by individuals conceiving of normative beliefs and
behaviors, then legal expertise is the cultural knowledge of how to construct arguments or
narratives about the way the world should be. Expertise can include knowledge of
traditional legal texts, such as juristic writings or imperial constitutions, but it also
extends to other discourses of justice and normativity. I use the term expertise also to
include the rhetorical positioning and framing of an argument. These rhetorical materials
are not extra-legal but are actually integral to the creation of a legal argument. As I
discuss in my first chapter and as critical legal pluralism posits, legal expertise with its
attendant discourses and rhetorics used in arguments varies from situation to situation. As
such, we have to allow for a dynamic understanding of what constitutes the techniques
and material of Roman legal argumentation. We are on solid ground defining legal
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material as the juristic writings, imperial rescripts, senatus consulta, and plebiscites. But,
as I argue, Romans employed many more sources for material in the construction of legal
argumentation. Therefore, legal expertise has to be defined not by any generic constraints
but instead by argumentative contexts, which are in turn defined by individuals claiming
what-should-be or safeguarding against what-should-not-be.
If legal arguments arise from disparate material, then any coherent definition of
legal expert must likewise be flexible. I am interested in legal experts as a class of
individuals who most frequently created legal arguments and who were familiar with the
practice of creating legal meaning. Previous scholarship has employed strict definitions
of legal expert by looking for titles associated with intensive legal training, such as iuris
prudens, iuris consultus, iuris interprens, or νομικός. Scholars used these titles to identify
legal experts, but if we focus on the function of the title, we realize that each of these
terms broadly signifies a person known for his knowledge and ability to create legal
meaning. The men known by such title were, for their communities, sources of legal
expertise. They were the sort of individual one could rely on for legal arguments. In a
sense, they were the "middle men" of law rather than just the little men, because they
operated as an important hinge between imperial, cosmopolitan, and doctrinaire sources
and discourses of law and any immediate, local conceptions of justice. The middle men
were recognized by their communities as an important resource in the formation and
resolution of arguments.
The communal sentiment or recognition is operative in my understanding of legal
experts. If law is found in jurisgenerative individuals, then the individuals valued for their
perceived capacity for law must too be considered as legal experts. Here, I suggest that
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we must go beyond the strict definitions employed by previous scholarship to look for
evidence of the middle-man behavior where individuals (whom I will call expert) assisted
others in forming legal arguments. A difficulty arises because not everyone who was
known for making legal arguments was called by their contemporaries the traditional
identifiers associated with intensive legal training. The absence of such terminology
could come about because the person lacked formal legal education or because those who
did have legal education in some capacity chose to operate in a sphere not primarily
associated with legal argumentation. Indeed, what about the individuals who made legal
arguments but were categorically uninitiated in legal texts? In a legal pluralist sense, even
these people would count as a legal actor with the ability to create legal meaning and
perhaps even as legal expert to some degree. To limit my study, however, I define the
legal expert as one who created legal arguments in an institutional setting (as
jurisconsults), in an administrative setting (as advisers to judges and composers of legal
texts), and in communal settings where individuals approached the putative expert for
aid. In each of these settings, the defining features are the community’s recognition of an
individual’s legal ability and that person’s ability to compose arguments from legal
material and with legal effects. So, legal experts, in a sense are the middle men of law in
that they assisted individuals with their demands on law and, because they are not the
famous creators of juristic texts as their predecessors were, they are also the little men of
law. My focus on the expert differs from the truly emancipatory potential of critical legal
pluralism, but I posit that the tools developed in critical legal pluralism offer unique
insight into the practice of even the experts themselves.
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Following these definitions, it is necessary to explain that a critical legal pluralist
approach to law affects my methodology in two primary ways. First, one cannot simply
deal with juristic writing or rescripts as the sole objects of law. Instead, I try to look at
evidence of arguments holistically, by which I mean I consider all of the material in a
legal argument such as the speeches before legal material or the evidence of actions and
reactions before and after a trial. The second effect is evident in how I handle traditional
legal evidence. For instance, I, for the most part, avoid treating imperial rescripts or
juristic writing outside of their original context without considering their legislative and
historical contexts. The treatment of context gives a thick description of legal practice
and also mitigates any impression that law is exclusively a state phenomenon. My legal
pluralist approach to the late Roman legal expert may seem to suggest that I am not
actually interested in the Roman jurists of the late Roman Empire but rather in wider,
more diffuse legal culture. While I certainly am interested in the culture of law, my
approach focuses on the specific embodiment of legal expertise in individuals, namely
experts, because it was by these experts that law is most frequently defined, constituted,
destroyed, and lived. Therefore, I hope to use the late Roman legal expert as a lens
through which to view the rest of the legal culture of the late Roman Empire, how law
was an embedded and emergent feature of the Roman social world.
With the preceding exposition of my theoretical position, it may now be useful to
describe what evidence is available for a critical study of the late Roman legal expert and
how I analyze that evidence. Taking a large-scale view, I use five categories of evidence.
I will discuss them in ascending order of how significant they are for my project. First,
epigraphic. There is a surprisingly robust body of epigraphic evidence that has been
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studied especially by scholars who are interested in taking an exhaustive,
prosopographical approach to legal experts. By this, I mean the scholars who identify
legal experts by those who describe themselves or are described by others as iuris peritus,
iuris prudens, iuris consultus, and assessor. In Greek, the epigraphic data is selected first
by the term nomikos, which is used as a translation of most of the Latin signifiers. I use
epigraphic data sparingly and primarily to show when I think other scholars have done
over-readings such as assuming that any of these titles could be read as guarantees of
juristic education. I hesitate to endorse those readings, because they often imply a robust
system of institutional accreditation, for which we have nearly no evidence in the ancient
world.
Secondly, I use papyri in select places. The study of juristic papyrology is a
massive undertaking especially in Poland by the students of Rafal Taubenschlag.36 The
papyri are useful for cataloging petitions, lawsuits, and imperial decisions, but legal
experts do not stand out in this data. There are only a few explicit references to the kinds
of legal experts mentioned in the epigraphic data. This area of study raises the question of
the extent can we identify legally complex papyri as evidence of legal experts.
I primarily use the final three categories of evidence, but--as I will explain below-I try to bring a new lens to this material thereby avoiding repeating much of the previous
scholarship. The third category is juristic evidence. Not only do I use, with a great deal of
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circumspection, the Digest of Justinian, but I also analyze a series of late Roman juristic
collections from the Western Roman Empire now published in a volume called FIRAFontes Iuris Romani Anteiustiniani.37 The juristic evidence in FIRA is mostly derived
from manuscript evidence, but the existence of these manuscripts suggests that juristic
material was copied and distributed throughout the late Roman Empire.
Next, I use imperial constitutions. These are drawn primarily from the multiple
codes of the late Roman Empire. The main two codes, the Theodosian and the
Justinianic, provide us with a significant body of evidence.38 However, we have to be
careful when handling this material because of what we might call the legislative process
of the late Roman Empire.39 The Theodosian Code and the Justinianic code following it
claim to collect “General Laws.” The only problem is that the concept of general law is
absolutely discombobulating. First of all, most of the “laws” more properly called
constitutions come about in one of two ways. First, someone has approached the
Emperor’s consistory either through an appeals process or by direct application to the
Emperor and the emperor gives a case specific response. Following this decision, other
inhabitants of the Roman Empire will cite this response as justification in a case, though
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it might be argued in response that the decision was case specific and not applicable. The
second way these constitutions are made is by imperial decree. This becomes popular
under Constantine and is used by subsequent emperors like Theodosius. Like the casespecific responses given to individuals, the vast majority of these constitutions are either
written to a specific city or even more defined to a specific magistrate in the city, which
raises questions about their general applicability. Throughout the dissertation, I use
constitutions at most as evidence of imperial discourse though even this must be seen in
light of contextual data.
Finally, for the study of legal practice I rely on literary evidence. The problems of
the relationship between literature and history are legion. But one should pause to reflect
that there is a significant literary production in the late Roman Empire so we would
ignore them at our own peril. When we look at the literary data against the traditional
legal data, I argue throughout that we see striking similarities of thought, arrangement,
and disposition. That being said, as with most of ancient literary history, the literary data
speaks primarily from an elite perspective. While I do not provide an extended meditation
on how elite practices radiate throughout the society, I suspect that even the elite voices
capture a horizon of possibilities and behaviors that could be practiced by individuals
everywhere in the late Roman socio-economic spectrum. This is to say, by labeling the
literary evidence as elite, I am not assuming that it can only speak to elite practices;
rather, it represents a shared culture of legal knowledge and practice.
In summation, critical legal pluralism enables scholars to analyze how law as a
practice is constructed through multiple discourses and behaviors. The evidence for these
discourses and behaviors are scattered throughout every society so direct study of only
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"traditional" legal evidence will necessary provide only a partial view of law in society.
By inverting the legal paradigm and focusing on individuals as they create legal meaning,
we can capture a fuller picture of law in the late Roman world. While the resulting image
is fuller, it is at times less concise because it presents a wider range of possibilities than
previous countenanced. I endeavor to focus the fuller image of the late Roman legal
world by analyzing the legal expert. This expert is found in multiple evidentiary corpora
so must be obliquely studied and defined, but such an approach reveals the power of the
legal expert in the ubiquitous legal potential of the late Roman world.

3. Scholarship of Late Roman Legal History
This dissertation intersects with three major groups of scholarship on late Roman
legal history. The groups consist of scholars who are primarily interested in Roman
jurists, those who are interested in Roman emperors, and finally those who are interested
in litigants in the Roman legal world. Each of these groups treats their specific object of
study as particularly representative of the legal world in some way. As I will demonstrate,
the changing landscape of scholarship on Roman legal history has already been shown to
be receptive to critical legal studies, especially in the scholarship on litigants. I argue that
a critical legal pluralist approach can illuminate the other actors in the late Roman world
as well. Each scholar in these groups chooses his or her subject based on their
epistemology of Roman legal history. Scholars who focus on jurists argue that these legal
experts signified and constructed a complex web of meaning that in turn affected the rest
of their world. Often, focus on the jurist is accompanied by the belief that legal doctrine
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has at least some power to change legal practice throughout the Roman world. For
scholars focusing on emperors, law is the language of imperial will. Scholars in this
group argue that emperors, as “the center” of the Roman legal world, emanate legal
power that spreads throughout the Empire. Finally, scholars who take litigants as their
object of study often argue that law is a constructed phenomenon, which can be
manipulated to address immediate, local problems. In the late Roman Empire especially,
scholarly groups that focus on emperors and litigants dominate. By further developing
some of the critical legal tools used in the investigations of litigants, I hope to counter the
scholarly arguments that emperors were de facto the ultimate creators of law in the late
Roman Empire and I also hope to show that legal experts were still conversant in the
construction of legal meaning, though perhaps in new ways overlooked by scholars of
Roman legal history.
The first group of scholarship we have to consider focuses on jurists in the Roman
world. Jurists, as the ur-legal experts, only came to the fore in scholarship on Roman
legal history as a vector into the social world and practice of law in 1967 with the
publication of Wolfgang Kunkel’s Die römischen Juristen: Herkunft and soziale
Stellung.40 Kunkel identified a noticeable gap in the scholarship on Roman law: Roman
legal historians were mostly uninterested in the social position of jurists, preferring
instead to focus on the dogmatic aspects of their writing.41 Kunkel found this gap
disturbing because it could so easily be remedied, especially in the imperial period, which
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was home to numerous inscriptions, literary references, and prosopographical research
that could revolutionize our understanding of Roman jurists by giving us a fine-grained
history of the jurists’ lives. Kunkel’s main goal, as his title suggests, was to reveal the
origin and social position of jurists from the Republican period through the classical age.
He argued that jurists and legal knowledge experienced an extreme elevation in social
power and political influence in the classical period. This power became more
widespread as individuals in the provinces began to recognize the power and social
mobility legal knowledge could offer them. The recognition led to a proliferation of legal
expertise, opening of legal educational institutions, and senatorial influence on
jurisprudence being replaced by equestrian and provincial jurists.42
Kunkel argued that it would be impossible to write a social history of jurists in the
late Roman Empire, but Detlef Liebs has proven, conclusively in my opinion, that Roman
legal histories can be written about jurists from individual provinces of the late Roman
Empire. Liebs argued against an orientalist-occidentalist debate that tried to locate
bastions of legal knowledge in the late Roman World. This debate centered on whether or
not only the Eastern Roman Empire could be considered the continuator of Roman legal
study since the East was home to the law school at Beirut, the legal productions of
Justinian, and remained relatively unscathed during the late antique period.43 Liebs
investigated three Western regions, Italy, Gaul, and Africa in order to show a vibrant
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legal culture in each area, with their own regional variations and legal productions.44
Liebs employed a similar method to Kunkel’s; he catalogued both individuals known for
their legal expertise and legal texts produced in each region. Liebs focused on legal
experts who were known for obtaining a specifically legal education, or who were called
some form of legal expert by their contemporaries. Both Kunkel’s and Liebs’s method of
identifying legal experts on the one hand allows them to focus exclusively on high value
productions and practice of law, but, on the other hand, it can give an overly restrictive
notion of legal expertise. The practice of categorizing legal experts according to
definitive criteria, such as attending law school, may discount other, culturally embedded
methods of obtaining and signaling legal expertise.
Two other approaches to the Roman jurist bear on our discussion of Roman legal
history. The first approach considers jurists as representative of an “autonomous law” in
the Roman Empire and the second uses legal experts as a proxy for “the Rule of law” in
the Roman Empire. Scholars who value the autonomous law approach have developed
tools for looking at juristic literature in its original contexts to try to elicit the concerns,
thoughts, and philosophies individual jurists had and how they were perceived in the real
world. Bruce Frier—the founder of this approach—forged a new historical method of
juristic research.45 Frier argued that in the first century BCE, the jurists developed from
individual consultants of relatively minor importance into a professional class of
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individuals capable of reading and constructing arguments in an “autonomous law.” Frier
defined “autonomous law,” as law that is not reliant on political or social factors but has
its own rationale. The rise of the jurist and his autonomous law was a historically
contingent phenomenon that arose because of three main factors of influence: first, the
enfranchisement of Italians after the Social Wars, second, the increase in wealth and
commerce in the late Republic, and third, the political instability of the period.46 Frier’s
argument is in many ways radical and can be useful when considering the late Roman
Empire because his argument separates law and legal practice from the political system in
which they operate. Even though the formation of the principate may have influenced the
legal system, it did not determine its operation--a lesson we could well consider for the
rest of the Imperial period.
The second approach to the jurist is interested most clearly in legal experts as
representatives of the “Rule of Law” in the late Roman Empire. Scholars such as Tony
Honoré, Jill Harries, and Michael Peachin seek to define the role legal experts played in
late Roman administration in part to estimate to what extent there could be said to have
existed a culture of the “rule of law.”47 The concept of the “rule of law,” while
undoubtedly a foundation of western political philosophy, is consonant with Frier’s
notion of autonomous law because both assume or imply that legal experts would be
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more systematic in their application of law because they rationally understood it.48 In
this approach, lawyers are the backbone to a functioning bureaucracy.
This approach revives the Orientalist-Occidentalist debate, albeit in a much more
persuasive way. Honoré, in particular, was interested in defining the legal cultures of the
Eastern and Western Roman Empire by analyzing imperial rescripts and looking for
distinct literary styles.49 He argued that different styles would roughly represent different
quaestors, who were officials responsible for writing laws in a tone that matched the
majesty of the emperor. He argued based on his stylistic analysis of law during the
Theodosian period that the East had a greater number of legally trained individuals acting
as quaestor than the West had, which was indicative of a stronger rule of law. Following
Voss, he also argued that the style of laws seemed unique and likely stemmed from
rhetorical training, which had legal components so that individuals trained only in
rhetoric still had a rudimentary grasp of law.50 In order to differentiate the rhetorically
trained from the true “lawyers,” Honoré selected criteria, such as general knowledge of
laws, fine application of legal reasoning, and references to jurists, that allowed him to
privilege a form of legal expertise that he reasoned would only be available to people
trained explicitly in the legal classics, like the writing of certain classical jurists and
imperial rescripts.
Scholarship on the legal power of emperors reads imperial constitutions as
representative of law. This body of scholarship has investigated implications the “Rule of
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Law” approach to jurists, specifically the idea that legal experts acted as buffers between
emperors and law. By retaining a coherence in Roman law and at the same time ensuring
that imperial constitutions were the product of the emperor’s will, legal experts acted as
insulators protecting all legal practice.51 This body of scholarship is adept at focusing on
Roman emperors who presented themselves as either legal innovators or explicitly as
legal conservatives. Augustus, Diocletian, Constantine, Julian, Valentinian, and
Theodosius have been subject to intense investigation because they used laws in the form
of responsa and edicts to develop unique and powerful ways of communicating their
imperial power. In their legislation, emperors like Constantine and Theodosius
revolutionized imperial forms of legal communication, employing legislation to
communicate their political and legal agenda to the inhabitants of the Empire. On the
other hand, emperors like Augustus and Julian presented themselves in legislation as
returning to a more conservative form of governance. Imperial constitutions, when read
as products of the emperor’s command, become less indicative of law on the ground and
rather more indicative of a particular emperor's style in his governance of the Empire.
A significant insight developed in scholarship on law and the emperor concerns
the extent to which law can be used as a criterion for judging an emperor.52 Good and bad
emperors were not only judged by their contemporaries in their legislative efforts but also
on the basis of their judicial responsibilities. Inhabitants of the Roman Empire generally
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felt that administrators, governors, and even emperors were compelled to listen to
complaints, hear cases, and respond to their concerns. If an emperor showed a lackluster
interest in cases or failed to live up to contemporary notions of justice, he was ridiculed
as being a “bad emperor.” Scholarship has focused on emperors and law in these two
aspects, legislative and judicial, in order to write a legal history that emanates out from
the emperor and down to his subjects.
The final group of scholars focuses on litigants. This new wave of scholars
challenges legal histories written both on Roman jurists and on emperors by asking what
constitutes a legal actor. The luminary of this group is Caroline Humfress who wrote
expansively on legal culture and discourse in the late Empire and Christian Church.
Humfress employed a “bottom-up” approach by investigating how individuals accessed
and manipulated Roman legal concepts in their everyday activity and, especially, in the
formation of notions of heresy.53 In her book, Orthodoxy and the Courts in Late
Antiquity, Humfress investigates judges, jurisconsults, and advocates in order to describe
a vibrant legal culture, contrary to the arguments of earlier scholars who posited a decline
in legal ability in the late Roman Empire.54 Humfress then argues for a close connection
between these legally significant individuals and members of the Church in order to
argue that the legal resonance of charges of heresy were not accidental but were in fact
manifestations of a form of power discourse that leaders of the Church were familiar
with. Humfress’s approach to legal history is unique because it prioritizes the ways
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individuals create legal arguments through a multitude of materials and genres. No longer
is a legal expert simply the individual who went to law school or studied the jurists.
Rather law was the creation of individuals fashioning persuasive legal arguments.
As will be apparent throughout my dissertation, my approach to Roman legal
history owes much to Humfress’s work, but I am not the only one. Following Humfress,
scholars such as Ari Bryen, Serena Connolly, and Kim Czajkowski employed an actor- or
litigant-based approach to Roman legal history in order to understand how the Roman
legal world operated: who could access it, how were claims made, and what effect did
these claims have.55 These works showed that the legal world was much more malleable
than previous dogmatic research would suggest. People of surprisingly little means made
complaints in courts of being harassed, provincials employed complex legal strategies
without any identifiable help, and people addressed the highest judge of the land with a
persistent expectation that he was required to respond to them. Roman legal history can
no longer be written solely from the perspective of elite jurists but must consider the
realities of complex dispute resolution strategies when thinking about what constitutes
“law” for inhabitants of the late Roman Empire.
In the scholarly landscape of Roman legal history, legal experts are becoming an
overlooked and under-analyzed subject of study. Caught between the eccentric and
domineering personages of emperors and the everyday interests of squabbling neighbors,
legal experts seem to have lost their capacity to provide probative insight into the practice
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of law in the late Roman world. I endeavor to investigate the late Roman legal expert, the
little men of law, by employing the tools developed by critical legal pluralism and
utilized in the litigant-focused scholarship.

4. Chapter Outlines
To investigate the late Roman legal expert, in the first chapter I look at the
techniques of legal argument in traditional sources of law. I consider these techniques
within a framework I call “disputatious practice.” Disputatious practice is the practice of
the compiling of authoritative legal references and the framing of those references. This
chapter argues that even in institutional settings, a legal pluralist approach can illuminate
how legal experts created arguments with “extra” legal material, that is the framing
devices used to guide a reading of the authoritative references. By considering both the
compilation of materials and the way they are presented as “legal,” we move away from
an understanding of legal practice as something that is rote or dogmatic and instead move
toward an understanding of practice as an imaginative, even artistic, deployment of
references. In this chapter, I draw on the critical legal studies of James Boyd White.56
White’s work helps us understand how legal arguments correspond to specific cultural
aesthetics. The imaginative use of references and framing material corresponds closely
with recent scholarship on late Roman literary and material aesthetics, especially
stemming from research on the “Jeweled Style.”57 The reflection of the Jeweled Style in
late Roman legal arguments helps us to understand how legal experts were persuasive in
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the late Roman world when they were using techniques that modern scholarship has
dismissed as unintelligent.
The art of disputatious practice is prevalent in late Roman legal texts from the
third to sixth century. The second analytical goal of this chapter, in light of the continuity
of disputatious practice, is to consider how legal expertise was perpetuated: what
methods of education were used and in what sort of setting can we imagine legal
education occurring. The Western Roman Empire preserved a surprising density of legal
texts from this period, especially of texts not edited for Justinian’s legal program. These
Western texts and the absence of law schools like that at Beirut suggest that we need to
reconsider what constituted a center of legal education in the Late Roman Empire. The
chapter concludes by analyzing the popular reception and reflection of disputatious
practice in order to show that legal experts were perceived as being particularly adept at
creating legal arguments through the reference to legal texts and through an influential
framework for interpretation.
In the second chapter, I turn from the treatment of the legal expert’s
argumentation and toward his compensation. The pluralist approach to Roman law invites
us to consider the diversity of the employment of legal expertise throughout the Empire
and how that employment was compensated. In this chapter, I draw on the social and
economic work of Pierre Bourdieu in his “Forms of Capital” and theory of “Symbolic
Capital.”58 Bourdieu’s work is useful for thinking about why evidence of compensation
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for late Roman legal experts is only sparsely preserved. Legal expertise in the late Roman
world was compensated through complex forms of capital, which are difficult to track let
alone analyze. Compensation in complex forms of capital is a phenomenon that arose, for
the Romans, to help legal experts maintain the appearance of being averse to economic
compensation. Nonetheless, if we investigate the late Roman world for evidence of
modes of compensation, we uncover at least three distinct forms: economic (or financial),
cultural, and social. Using these forms as a basic structure, we can see from the Price
Edict of Diocletian, papyrological data, and literary references that legal experts could be
imagined as being compensated financially according to how much labor they invested in
a case. Legal experts were also compensated with cultural capital. The experts who
worked in public facing tasks, such as teachers of law and assessors, accrued the respect
of their contemporaries for presumably making sure justice was carried out fairly.
Finally, legal experts also received exclusive social capital. Experts in the highest
echelons of late Roman society traded their expertise in an elite social economy. I
analyze one example from the letters of the late Roman Gallic bishop, Sidonius
Apollinaris, as an example of how legal expertise operated as a commodity in the
exchanges of elite society. I argue that the multiple forms of compensation suggest that
legal expertise was a powerful mode of discourse in the late Roman world and this power
helps explain why individuals chose to master and create legal meaning.
In the final chapter, I investigate how legal practice varied across the Empire to
such a degree that it manifested landscapes that exemplified distinct aspects of law. This
chapter is a response to Lauren Benton’s A Search for Sovereignty, in which Benton
argues that in the early modern period, even though there were multiple legal empires
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(for example, the British, the Spanish and the Portuguese), there was an overarching legal
order.59 Legal practice in this order was defined more by the particular landscape
individuals inhabited than by their particular imperial identity. This chapter has the
strongest endorsement of legal pluralism because it rejects that state law—either imperial
constitutions or classical juristic texts—had the only or even primary claim to the practice
of law in the late Roman Empire. I investigate four landscapes and their distinct legal
aspects. The first is law schools, which become hubs for travel and for the production of
legal experts with their unique understanding of legal texts. Second is imperial capitals.
In this section, I analyze how social standing influenced the practice of law to such a
degree that being in places with a high density of social elites effectively bent the gravity
of law. Elites were accorded unique privileges at law that were usually only recognized
when the elite went well outside of the bounds of appropriate behavior. The third
landscape is a metaphorical island. In places that pose difficulty for travel, communities
experimented with alternate forms of adjudication. The imperial administration
sometimes recognized these alternate forms of adjudication, but it becomes apparent that
on these real or imagined islands, the practice of law is constrained by the close-knit
nature of a community. What was one to do if he or she did not trust the governor or
judge in an area? This concern about the practice of law leads to questions and arguments
about how to procure justice. The final landscape I consider is provincial towns. In
provincial settings, imperial, cosmopolitan notions of justice encounter local, popular
notions of justice. The notions clash as individuals argue about what made up right and
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wrong, justice and injustice, legal and illegal. In each of these landscapes with their
particular concerns of law, we must imagine that masterful legal experts learned to
harness the legal aspects of their particular surroundings. It is reasonable to assume that
in places defined by law schools, individuals would make arguments based on their
textual understanding of law. In imperial capitals, experts probably invoked their clients’
or their own social standing to navigate cases. On “islands,” legal experts probably made
arguments for native adjudicative structures when it favored their position or against
them when they were opposed. Finally, in provincial towns, legal experts argued for local
notions of justice in the face of imperial notions of law. In these landscapes we can see
nearly the opposite of Benton’s thesis stands as well: even though Roman law was an
imperial legal order, local landscapes of law created legal heterogeneity.
In this dissertation, I hope to show that legal experts and legal expertise were
defining features of the late Roman world. Rather than having declined into oblivion,
legal expertise took on an ubiquitous character and the masters of legal argument became
everyday features of the Roman social world. Individuals were valued or feared,
appreciated or derided for their ability to create persuasive legal arguments. Instead of
being the pale, greedy, and conniving bureaucrat, the late Roman legal expert was an
integral representative of law and a powerful creator of legal meaning.
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Chapter 1: Disputatious Practice in Late
Roman Legal Education
In this chapter, I argue that late Roman legal experts produced persuasive
arguments by compiling authoritative references and by framing those compilations with
material that interpreted the argument for the audience. I call these two strategies,
compilation and framing, “disputatious practice,” because together they operate to inhibit
dispute or disagreement about the relative standing of the expert’s argument. Whether the
expert’s argument is right or not depends not on the application of any dogmatic legal
apparatus but rather on the expert’s ability to persuade his audience that the argument he
has crafted is supported by his interpretation of legal material. The prevalence and
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ubiquity of evidence for disputatious practice suggests that legal experts learned these
strategies at some time in their formation as legal experts. For the late Roman legal
expert, it was more important to know how to construct arguments persuasively than it
was to memorize encyclopedically the multitude of authoritative legal texts.
My argument proceeds by sketching first what sorts of sources of law the expert
could draw upon to compose his argument. Next, I lay out the history of the scholarship
on legal education; this scholarship focuses on how legal experts learned the materials
used in argumentation. I explain how the proposed methods of education are tightly
bound up with historical interpretations of the activity of legal experts. In short,
scholarship employs a circular reasoning by arguing that the bureaucratic or academic
nature of the expert is found in his education and his education is used to explain the
bureaucratic and academic nature of the expert’s practice. To escape the circular
reasoning, I turn to James Boyd White who offers us a dynamic model of law, which I
use as a heuristic framework for understanding how legal experts operated in the late
Roman world. Next, I analyze late Roman perceptions of disputatious practice and
complaints about its occasionally mystifying side effects. White's model and the
complaints about legal practice suggest that Roman legal education must have been more
complicated than simply memorizing sources of law. In fact, two strategies of
disputatious practice are so recurrent in late Roman legal evidence, that legal experts
must have acquired them as necessary techniques of legal practice. In the first part, we
will see that experts compiled legal references according to distinct logics in order to
persuade their audiences. The second aspect of disputatious practice that we have to
consider is the use of framing material, which consisted of distinct tones and select
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phrases, in order to manipulate the audience’s reception of the expert’s argument. Finally,
while disputatious practice could appear to outsiders or losing parties as a dizzying or
even underhanded manipulation of the legal system, it was also recognized as an effective
tool for creating legal arguments and was characteristic of a legal expert’s work. Legal
experts of the late Roman Empire not only mastered texts from which they derived
arguments or law, but they also learned to construct arguments and present them
effectively.
Before we can see how an expert wove together references to law, we need to
consider what texts or sites of authority he could choose from. A legal expert would
undoubtedly need to know which texts were considered possible sources of legal
authority. Ancient authors generally agreed on what constituted law. Gaius summarized
the sources of the law of the Roman people as: leges, plebiscites, senatus consulta,
imperial constitutions, edicts, and the responsa prudentium, or juristic writings.60
Justinian’s Institutes, written more than three centuries later, contains a similar list.61
Additionally, plaintiffs freely offered past court cases (precedents) along with their
petitions, which suggests that, to some plaintiffs, precedents constituted a source law.
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These plaintiffs believed that precedent should predict the same or at least a similar
outcome for the case at hand.62 We know that there was some attempt at controlling these
sources by regulating and regularizing archives, juristic writing, and constitutions. 63
These attempts at control reinforce the notion that the various sources of law were
powerful sites of authority and contestation.
The material of Roman legal authority existed both diffusely across the world, in
multiple discourses, but also in concentrated collections of constitutions, juristic texts,
and other forms of archives. While the imperial judicial administration may have had an
interest in creating and maintaining collections of legal material, especially constitutions,
these collections enabled a new practice of compilative legal argument like never
before.64 Large scale collections, such as the codes of Hermogenianus, Gregorianus,
Theodosius, and Justinian, were part of a literary field populated with smaller, less welltraveled collections.65 These collections had a significant impact in the Empire-wide
practice of law.
Scholarship on legal education has focused on how legal experts learned the
various sources of law through the meticulous study of texts. Much of this scholarship
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has focused on law schools, like the schools at Beirut or Constantinople, as important
sites for teaching authoritative legal texts. The two studies that have investigated the
teaching style of these schools in depth are H.J. Scheltema’s L’Enseignement de Droit
des Antécesseurs and Kathleen McNamee’s “Another Chapter in the History of Scholia.”
Scheltema argues that the dominant method employed in late Roman legal education was
the professor of law reading a legal text aloud and explaining difficult passages.66 The
professor’s explanation could occasion questions from the students, translations from
Latin into Greek (as Greek was the lingua franca of the Eastern half of the Empire), and
the dissection of complex passages for greater comprehension.67 McNamee comes to a
similar conclusion by looking at legal papyri. She finds that in the fourth and fifth
centuries there was a growing number of indices, Greek translations of Roman legal
texts, and more widespread use of παραγραφαί, commentaries that “provide glosses of
unfamiliar words, give notice of the contents of a passage, highlight parallels in other
legal sources and provide cross-references.”68 McNamee’s contribution is especially
important here because she notes a papyrological trend whereby the viva voce tendencies
of translating and explaining Latin legal texts found their way into professionally copied
editions, which were probably created at the request of the law professor for his students’
use. Legal educational documents had grown beyond a core text to include lengthy
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marginal notes.69 In both Scheltema’s and McNamee’s formulations, legal education
entailed meticulous study of texts.
Purely textual study, however does not account for the wide ranging practice of
legal experts in the late Roman world. In his foundational book A History of Education in
Antiquity, Henri Marrou notes that, from Cicero onward, “the teaching of law […] was
evolving on the same lines as the function of the jurisconsult, with which it remained
closely connected.”70 Marrou is commenting on formulation of jurisprudence from the
late Republic and the increasing importance of jurists in the Roman world. But his
comment emphasizes the close relationship between education and its resulting practice.
There are at least two possible consequences that follow from the kind of education
Scheltema and McNamee envisage. The first possible consequence is the production of a
legal expert as a bureaucrat. Such a result fits well with Fritz Schulz’s argument about the
bureaucratization of Roman jurisprudence. Schulz argues that a bureaucratic tendency in
Roman legal practice led to the codification of Roman legal science.71 In Schulz’s model,
Roman law had been reduced to dogma: fixed questions with fixed answers.72 The
solidification of legal dogma would lead to the formation of bureaucrats with an
unimaginative idea of what constitutes law and how to use it.73 A second consequence
can be found for the exclusive emphasis on texts in education. The meticulous,
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philological study of law led to the creation of a class of academic jurists. These jurists
were removed from the problems and solutions of the late Roman world. Instead of
solving real life issues, the academic jurist was busy philosophizing and mastering the
minutia of legal texts.74 The notion of the academic jurist is raised by Scheltema when he
says that the teaching style of Justinian’s jurists seems eerily close to the style he uses
when he teaches law in Holland.75 In this instance, Scheltema is referring to the difficulty
of teaching Roman law to those without a robust understanding of Latin, but his point
more broadly is that one could surmise that legal experts spent all of their time clarifying
the meaning and forms of dense Latin legalese. The image of legal education as the
meticulous textual study analyzed by Scheltema and McNamee is only part of a wider
picture. Another part of that picture is disputatious practice, which Roman legal experts
also trained in and displayed in order to operate in their legal world.
Here, it is useful to pause and consider the relationship among the terms
persuasion, rhetoric and law. While one can think of law as a collection of rules, such a
narrow definition elides many of the intervening and accessory texts, acts, and processes
of law. 76 J.B. White’s theory of law posits that law is a species of what he calls
“constitutive rhetoric.” He defines constitutive rhetoric as “the central art by which
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culture and community are established, maintained, and transformed.”77 Constitutive
rhetoric creates a community through speech, binding speaker and listeners together into
a single body. White’s definition of rhetoric allows us to avoid searching for a connection
between rhetoric and law in Roman thought.78 Rhetoric ceases to be a separate practice or
an appendage of law and becomes integral to law as a process. Rhetoric consists of the
various strategies and skills speakers use when they are making legal arguments. The
successful end product of the rhetorical-legal process is persuasion, the ultimate goal of
the legal actor, speaker, or writer. An appreciation of the persuasive aspect of law helps
us to clarify our understanding of disputatious practice and, by extension, legal education.
If the legal actor strives for persuasion through constitutive rhetoric, then the ideal legal
education will teach one to be persuasive. White’s theory of law allows us to include the
rhetorical or persuasive attributes of legal texts as part an expansive understanding of
law. Within our Roman contexts, these attributes can be grouped together under the term
disputatious practice.
White’s definition of law has three important aspects that are derived from the
work of a modern, American lawyer. The first is that law is culture-specific in the sense
that it is formulated according to what audience is the target of the persuasion. In White’s
example, this means speaking in technical legal language to other lawyers and in
“ordinary English” to jurors, clients or the public.79 Secondly, law is something that is
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malleable. Again for a modern American lawyer, this means adding emphasis or
distinction where necessary for the sake of making any legal language argumentatively
relevant.80 Thirdly, as discussed above, law is socially constitutive in the sense that one
speaking or doing law is striving to create a community.81
If we think about Roman law as a genre in which Romans debated the contours
and make-up of their society, we can conclude that Roman law was also concerned with
creating communities. As such, White’s definition of law can likewise account for the
phenomenon of disputatious practice. Disputatious practice corresponds to the first two
aspects of White’s definition of law. First, the culture-specific language of Roman law
can be seen in the deployment of Roman legal texts. When legal experts compile and
arrange legal material, they are speaking in a specific dialect by quoting imperial
rescripts, senatus consulta, leges, and juristic texts. Second, the malleability of Roman
law can be seen in the placement of framing material. Roman legal experts couched their
arguments in phraseology that would influence an audience’s reception of a text and
secure the agreement of that audience. To appreciate the extent of disputatious practice in
the late Roman Empire, we need to turn to how it was perceived by the wider Roman
community.

1. Perception of Practice
Disputatious practice of legal expertise was so effective and ubiquitous in the later
Roman Empire that it contributed to a series of complaints about the disorganized and
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confusing state of law. These complaints arose from the legal expert’s audiences. One
place where legal experts had an audience was in legal cases. For the most part, legal
cases were composed of at least one litigant who could hire an advocate to plead his or
her case and a jurisconsult, someone who professed to have expansive knowledge of
Roman law.82 The jurisconsult either advised the litigant on how he or she should have
the case presented or gave the litigant a responsum—a jurist’s reasoning on the case—as
evidence of the legal arguments supporting the litigant. Usually, the only people who
professed legal expertise in cases were the jurisconsult and, perhaps, the judge’s
assessors—a kind of legal assistant—if the judge had them.83 So, for the most part, the
court was populated by individuals who relied on their native understandings of right and
wrong to transact and administer justice.84 To those unfamiliar with the techniques of
juristic reasoning, legal experts seemed to sow confusion as they twined legal references
and coercively insisted on their meanings. Let us turn to some complaints of the Roman
legal world to see how the practice of legal experts was perceived.
The most public complaint came from the emperor Theodosius II in the
proclamation (Theodosian Novel 1) validating the Codex Theodosianus (438 CE). In this
law, the emperor complains of the foreboding confusion, crassa caligo, thick fog, created
by the masses of imperial edicts and rescripts. Playing on a theme of darkness, which is
associated with obscurity and ignorance, and light, conversely associated with simplicity
and knowledge, the emperor announces his grand codification. Theodosius II proclaims:
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“In order that this matter may not be further discussed by anyone with zealous ambiguity,
as there occurs to Our minds the boundless multitude of books, the diversity of actions
and the difficulty of cases, and finally the mass of imperial constitutions which shut off
from human ingenuity a knowledge of themselves by a wall, as though they were
submerged in a thick fog of obscurity, We have completed a true undertaking of Our
time; We have dispelled the darkness and given the light of brevity to the laws by means
of a compendium.”85 The Emperor compares the immensity and confusion of the law to
darkness, revealing a perception of legal processes as utterly opaque.
Theodosius II’s reasoning for creating the Code was that law was confusing, but
we should hesitate to take him at his word. The codification was not a selfless endeavor.
First of all, the promulgation of the code asserted a unity between the East and West in
438 CE that had been elusive since the death of Theodosius I in 395, the last emperor to
rule both halves of the Empire.86 Not only does Theodosius II cast his authority into the
West, augmenting his rule geographically, but he also appropriates the authority of the
emperors from Constantine up to himself. When his legal experts edit and republish
imperial rescripts, they do so in his Code. Theodosius II, of course, protests against this
interpretation: “their own immortality has not been taken away from any of the previous
Emperors, the name of no lawgiver has perished; rather, their laws have been changed by
the clarification of Our jurisconsults for the sake of lucidity, and they are joined with Us
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in an august fellowship.”87 Nonetheless, the code—as he admits—will be a testament of
his rule for a long time.88 Theodosius II rearranges both the legal past and future around
himself as he compiles the legal history of imperial constitutions and requires that people,
from the time of his promulgation, go to his Code to make their case in court.89
One way in which Theodosius II mitigated any impression of usurping the
authority of his august predecessors was by utilizing the plaintive discourse about law.
The De Rebus Bellicis—a short treatise on military craft that ends in the request for the
emperor to reform the legal system—exemplifies the plaintive discourse about law.90 The
anonymous fourth century author first describes the legal culture as “civil pains”
(ciuilium curarum) and asks for the remedy from the emperor. The author beseeches the
emperor to “to illuminate the confused and contrary opinions of law (sententias
legum).”91 The anonymous author was not alone in his complaints as has been discussed
by Dieter Nörr, who has shown that complaints about the confused state of law are often
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coupled with imperial legal enterprises.92 By taking part in the plaintive discourse,
Theodosius II mitigates the accusation of usurpation because he can be seen responding
to the cries of his subjects. The complaints about law become the rhetorical basis for the
Emperor’s codification. The Emperor’s response to these complaints means that there
was a common enough perception of the law as needlessly confusing and immense such
that his codification seemed like a reasonable course of action.
The Emperor’s complaint compares the seemingly gargantuan collection of
imperial constitutions to a tangible darkness that separates men from knowledge, but this
darkness is the result of the practice of legal experts.93 The law as both a tangible and
menacing darkness extends beyond the metaphor when the emperor claims that “so few
and infrequent persons have existed who were fully enriched by a knowledge of the Civil
Law, and in such a great and somber pallor that is produced by their nocturnal studies,
scarcely one or two have attained the completeness of perfected learning.”94 Such a
monumental effort is required to master the law thoroughly that these pale jurists spend
their lives in both the real and metaphorical darkness. The master jurists, however, are
not the only ones laboring in that darkness. Rather, they stand at the top of an entire class
of experts who learned to wield claims of law effectively, and, to the laymen,
confusingly. The complaints about law give a layman’s impression of the practice of
legal experts in the late Roman Empire. If we turn to the documents attesting legal
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practice, we can see the sophisticated deployment of persuasive strategies that could, to a
losing party, seem confusing and even underhanded.

2. Disputatious Practice: Legal Compilation as Culturally
Specific Argument
The public perception of law as disorganized and confusing arose from Roman
jurists’ habit of weaving different laws together. When a legal expert composed a legal
argument, he would marshal different genres of law (usually imperial constitutions and
jurisprudential writing), selecting and combining them in order to create persuasive and
culturally specific justifications for his positions. We find proof of this weaving in papyri,
in imperial correspondence, and in late antique legal collections.95 This compilatory
practice constitutes part of the culturally specific aspect that White stipulates in his
definition of law. As White’s definition of law suggests, the expert communicates in a
culturally specific, technical language. The language in the Roman compilations happens
to be citations and references. The expert gathers and arranges these citations to conform
to a narrative or an argument he is pursuing.96 The culturally specific language, here
derived from various genres of law, asserts the expert’s place in the justice-seeking
discourse, since it is proof that he knows the requirements and conventions of that
discourse.97 The expert knows not only which legal texts to use, but also how to make an
argument out of them.
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Let us focus on two aspects of the collection of legal texts. The two aspects are
divided according to the reasoning behind the compilation of material; in short, how the
expert created his argument with culturally specific language. On the one hand, we can
see collections of legal data where one citation leads logically into another. I shall call
this constructive because it uses legal material to build toward an end or argument. On
the other hand, we also can see a practice of repetitive citation. In the latter kind, there
seems to be no logical progression or connection between the laws. The laws simply
seem to repeat the same jurisprudential notion again and again. Nevertheless, while
repetitive citation may seem illogical or redundant, recent scholarship on the jeweled
style allows us to reassess these texts as a collection of impressive and perhaps even
dazzling references.98 The legal expert used these styles to compile legal arguments in the
language of Roman legal discourse.
One under-appreciated example of legal compilation is the Collatio Legum
Mosaicarum et Romanarum. The Collatio is a fourth century CE text from the Western
Roman Empire.99 It is composed of 16 titles or sections, each of which usually opens
with a biblical citation followed by a battery of Roman legal references. The sections
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roughly follow the first half of the Ten Commandments.100 Critics have found fault with
the Collatio’s legal and biblical aspects.101 Likewise scholars have debated about the
author’s identity: was he Christian or Jewish?102 For our present purposes, however, what
is of most interest is the fact that the Collatio is a powerful example of legal expertise
since it compiles and frames legal material persuasively.103 As such, the Collatio is
indicative of the kind of skill a legal expert must learn to navigate the breadth of legal
material and to recompose legal data to fit persuasive or disputatious ends.
An example of constructive compilation can be found in Collatio 1.1-4, in the title
On Assassins and Intentional or Accidental Murderers. The section serves as a useful
example because the title is divided in two: the first four chapters concern the definition
of murder and the rest (5-13) focus on describing culpability in cases of intentional and
accidental homicide. We can tell that the Collator is making a division in this title
because passage 5 (Coll. 1.5) is a second biblical citation. The Collator does not often cite
biblical material after an initial citation at the beginning of each title. In fact, other than
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this example, the Collator only cites biblical material within a title in one other place, in
title 6, concerning incestuous marriages. As such, we can use the four chapters as a
succinct example of the Collator’s technique.
In our first example of legal compilation, the Collator uses legal references to
create an expansive definition of murder. This definition is representative of the
constructive style of legal praxis. The Collator cites four passages, each of which
gradually adds nuance and builds on the previous passage. The four passages in order are
from the book of Numbers, Paul’s Opinions, Ulpian’s Concerning the Office of
Proconsul, and, again, Paul’s Opinions. In the first passage, the Collator provides a
limited definition of murder by quoting Numbers and by the end of our example, when
we get to the final reference to Paul’s Opinions, the definition of murder will have
bloomed into a capacious designation.
The Collator opens the title thus:
1.1.1 Moses, priest of God, says this: If someone strikes a person with an iron
weapon and kills him, let him die. 2. Moreover, if someone strikes a person by
hand with a stone by which he might die and he dies, he is a murderer: let him die.
3 And if through hostility (per inimicitiam) someone strikes him or throws an
implement at him from an ambush and he dies, 4. or strikes him by hand through
anger (per iram) and he dies, let him die.104
The passage (Num. 35: 16-17 and 20-21) seems purposefully truncated because it leaves
out verses 18 and 19.105 If we assume that the Collator’s biblical text was not missing
these verses, then he may have omitted them because they were incongruent with the
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following Roman legal material.106 Nonetheless, in the quotation from Numbers, we have
four criteria for murder: the use of an iron weapon, striking someone with a handheld
rock, striking someone from an ambush with a weapon, and striking barehanded someone
out of anger. These criteria appear to be a diverse assortment, but, as we shall see, they
are each highly specific.
In the second passage (1.2.1), the Collator supplies an excerpt from Paul that
discusses the Cornelian Law of Poisoners and Assassins, which stipulates that one is
liable under this law who walks with a weapon for the sake of committing murder or
theft, has poison for the purpose of killing someone, gives false witness that results in
someone’s death, or one who kills indirectly.107 The last criterion is represented in the
Latin as mortisve causam praestiterit and has been discussed by Dieter Nörr. He argues
that the juristic notion of causam mortis praebere (or praestare) is meant to complement
a notion of directly killing, which is signified by the verb occidere.108 The difference
between the direct and indirect killing, Nörr suggests, would be the difference between
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killing someone with a sword (direct) or starving a person to death by locking him in a
room (indirect).109 The possibility of indirect murder—which was absent from the
citation from Numbers—is added to the Collator’s definition of murder by the addition of
this quotation from Paul.
In the third passage (1.3.1), the Collator inserts passages from Ulpian, which
likewise discuss the lex Cornelia.110 Ulpian describes three acts that engender liability
under the law. The first act is if someone walks with a weapon for the sake of killing a
man or committing theft. The second is if someone kills a man; here using the direct
terminology of occidere: hominemve occiderit. Finally, Ulpian introduces a new criterion
for the Collator’s definition of murder: id dolo malo factum erit, if the deed was done
with bad intent. While the emotional state of the murderer was introduced in the Numbers
passage (both inimicitia and ira are mentioned), the notion of dolus malus, or bad intent,
defines murder as an intentional act.111 Now the Collator’s definition includes examples
of direct killing from Numbers, indirect killing from Paul, and the notion of intent from
Ulpian.
In the final passage, the Collator again inserts a passage from Paul, which has a
capacious and straightforward definition of murder: a murderer is he who has killed a
man with any kind of weapon (aliquot genere teli) or has provided the cause of death
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(mortisve causam praestitit).112 Paul’s indeterminate description of the kind of weapon
allows the Collator to include any kind of weapon in his own growing definition.
The Collator’s construction of a definition of murder is a short example of
constructive compilation. The description of the direct murder discussed by Numbers,
Paul and Ulpian has grown from specific weapons to include any kind of weapon.
Additionally, the Collator’s definition of murder includes indirect murders spanning from
false testimony to furnishing the cause of death. The only notion left out of this
encompassing definition in the final passage (Coll. 1.4.1) is the idea of intent as
mentioned previously in the phrase dolus malus, and this will be covered in the following
sections of the title (Coll 1.5-13). For now, the Collator has constructed an encompassing
definition of murder, thereby showing how legal experts learned to deploy legal material
for an argument.
Constructive compilation was only one of the ways the Collator could compile
legal material to create a persuasive argument. Another way the Collator structured legal
material was in a barrage of references that all said nearly the exact same thing. Whereas
constructive compilation could arrange material from general to specific or vice versa,
repetitive compilation arranged legal material so that the audience would feel compelled
to agree with the legal expert’s point. Repetitive compilation is also in line with the late
antique aesthetic, termed the “jeweled style,” as discussed by Michael Roberts.113
According to Roberts, arts of the late antique world displayed a fascination with small,
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paratactically arranged units. Late Roman legal texts, when seen in their cultural
contexts, display similar aesthetic tendencies. In the same way, for instance, that Proba
composed poetry by arranging select quotations from Vergil into a biblical narrative, we
can see legal experts rearranging and recomposing authoritative quotations from legal
texts.114 By thinking of repetitive compilation as the instantiation of the jeweled style in
law, we can appreciate how legal experts compiled texts in a way that was congruent with
the cultural expectations of the period. An expert employed repetitive compilation to
create a series of citations, each of which argued his central thesis. These citations could
act as a dazzling array of authoritative texts that coaxed or forced the text’s audience into
concurring with the expert’s argument.
An example of repetitive compilation can be found in the Collatio. In title 12, On
Arsonists, the Collator provides seven citations. These citations are not arranged so that
they build up to an encompassing definition of arson nor do they refine down to a specific
point. Instead, these citations all play on the same theme, outlining different punishments
for arson. Each citation reiterates the central thesis against arson and adds a measure of
authority to the Collator as a legal expert. The Collator displays mastery over Roman
legal texts by having them all sing the same tune.
Title 12 draws on material from Exodus, Paul’s Sententiae, Ulpian’s On the Office
of Proconsul, and Ulpian’s Ad Edictum. The first six passages are relatively short. The
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first is from Exodus 22:6; it stipulates that damage done by fire should be compensated
according to the estimated value of the things destroyed.115 The second passage is from
Paul’s Sententiae. It stipulates the punishment for burning down a home on account of
hostility and that accidental fires, which burn down agricultural land, should be
recompensed according to an estimate of the damages. The third passage is from Paul,
and is concerned with the varied punishments of different personal statuses: slaves can be
surrendered, humiliores condemned to the mines, and honestiores relegated to an island.
The fourth passage is again from Paul and it warns that deliberate arson in a town for the
sake of robbery is a capital offense. The fifth passage is from Ulpian On the Office of the
Proconsul and likewise notes that fires are punished according to where they are set,
whether they are intentional or not, and according to the status of the person who set the
fire. Interestingly, Ulpian admits that accidental fires can be forgiven. The sixth passage
is again from Paul. It discusses again how purposeful, predatory arson is a capital
offense, but accidental fires are more lightly punished. In Paul’s opinion, accidental fires
can simply be satisfied with the payment of restitution. These six passages all discuss the
different punishments for arson and they all agree that deliberate arson is a greater
offense than accidental and so should be reflected in the punishment.
The succession of legal references and their lack of explicit connection makes
each citation a unit of authority. These units are aggregated in order to give the
impression of completeness or totality. In fact, in other genres of late antique prose
literature, such an arrangement could elicit the effect of appearing all-encompassing or
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totalizing by its representation.116 If we view late Roman legal compilations in this way,
it becomes apparent that the same aesthetic phenomenon appearing in late Roman poetry,
prose, and material arts is operative in legal texts as well. The Collator exemplifies this
phenomenon when he arranges juristic texts and imperial constitutions.
In addition to the six short passages, the Collator concludes the title on arson with
a long, allusive citation (12.7.1-10). Whereas the first six citations are evidence of a legal
expert arranging univocal material, the final citation includes multiple legal references.
Within the final citation, which is taken from Ulpian’s Ad Edictum, eight different legal
authors are mentioned: Labeo, Celsus, Septimius Severus, Neratius, Vivianus, Proculus,
Urseius, and Sabinus. Some of the legal authors are repeated with the result that, within
this passage, Ulpian refers to external legal authority 14 times.117 Whereas the previous
six citations were single, and perhaps even simple demonstrations of the varied
punishments for arson, the final passage is a veritable explosion of the reference to legal
authority. In one passage (Coll 12.7.9), in a meta-study of legal reference, the Collator
cites Ulpian citing Urseius citing Sabinus. The passage is a discussion of who is liable if
a tenant’s slaves burn down an apartment building: can the master be sued or simply the
slaves? “Ulpian in the eighteenth book of Concerning the Edict:... Moreover, if some
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slaves burn down an apartment house, in the tenth book of Urseius relates that
Sabinus responded that the master is to be sued in the name of the slaves for a noxal
judgment by the Aquilian law.”118 This is a reference that proudly displays its connection
to a long juristic history and uses that history to act as the capstone of the Collator’s
argument against arson. While most scholarship on this passage has focused on the
editorial history of Ulpian by asking whether the passage is really classical or displays
signs of post-classical editing, the passage stands out for its abundant referentiality and as
evidence for how legal experts arranged material purposefully.119
We have seen that Roman legal experts could arrange material constructively or
repetitively. The logic behind the compilation of legal material was not haphazard, but
was calculated to persuade an audience. Experts compiled legal material because
jurisprudential writing and imperial rescripts constituted their culturally specific
language. The syntax of this language could build up a legal expert’s argument or it could
repeat a point over and over. The repetitive compilation was not a sign of jurisprudential
decline, because it was the instantiation of the pervasive jeweled style. When seen in its
late antique contexts, repetitive compilation seems like a fashionable and compelling
method to make an argument.
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3. Disputatious Practice: Framing Material as Legal
Malleability
Experts employed framing material to help audiences successfully interpret their
compilations. Framing material could consist of the use of distinct tones or registers and
other strategies all so that the audience knew to interpret the legal material in the
“correct” way—that is, according to the expert’s argument. Again, White’s theory of law
accounts for this phenomenon. In White’s formulation, lawyers have to offer
interpretation of legal texts so that their arguments seem coherent with the audience’s
understanding of law and justice.120 The problem that confronts both the American and
Roman legal expert is that the technical language of law is widely interpretable.121 In the
face of a multitude of interpretative possibilities, the Roman expert assured his audience
that the proper way to read the law was according to the argument he was making. The
expert used framing material to create a coherence between his argument and the
audience’s expectations of justice.
To achieve such interpretative force, the legal expert could assume a severe tone,
a pious tone, or sound wary of the reliability of other legal experts. These tones
effectively created a literary persona for the expert thereby augmenting his authority. In
that persona, the expert insisted that his interpretation of the law was correct.
Additionally, the legal expert could prepare his audience for counter-arguments so that
they both would be ready to respond to contradiction and would get the impression that
the legal expert had considered every angle of the issue. The use of framing material
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suggests that legal experts manipulated arguments to secure the agreement of their
audiences.
An excellent example of this aspect of disputatious practice, the use of framing
material, can be found in the Consultatio Veteris Cuiusdam Iurisconsulti. This document
was created in the latter half of the fifth century.122 The text most likely comes from
somewhere in Gaul though efforts to pinpoint its origin have arrived at no conclusive
answer.123 Nonetheless, scholarship on the legal culture of late Roman Gaul has shown
that legal practice and expertise were common enough throughout the area that many
urban areas, especially in what is now southern France, are suitable candidates for the
creation of the Consultatio.124 The difficulty in discerning an exact origin of the
document, both the time of its creation and the geographic details of its author, suggests
that rather than the Consultatio being indeterminate, it is a good example of legal practice
in late Roman Empire because it could very well have come from any city in Gaul.
The Consultatio is composed of ten chapters. The chapters are traditionally
divided into three groups of three; scholarship usually leaves the last chapter out because
it has a different form than the preceding chapters.125 The form of each chapter is
composed of a short introduction to a legal problem and a prefatory response or direction,
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i.e. legal advice. The introduction is then followed by a compilation of legal materials,
specifically quotations from Paul’s Sententiae and imperial constitutions. The
introductions have served as the primary criterion for the division of the document
because they are so unique and characterized by distinct tones. The first three chapters (1,
2, and 3) have introductions that employ a severe tone. The second three (4, 5, and 6) use
a pious tone by referring to God. The final three (7, 7a, and 8) are characterized by a
concern for the unreliability of bad actors in the legal system. It is the introductions that
interest us here because they are evidence of how legal experts would frame material to
alter the reception of their text.
The Consultatio is a rich example of disputatious practice in its display of how
legal experts used tones to frame their material so as to control its reception. I am not
arguing that these tones were the only methods of framing legal material nor that legal
materials had to be framed in this way, but rather that the Consultatio is indicative of
some of the possible strategies legal experts employ. Each section or group of three
chapters displays a different tone, as mentioned above. Now I will describe each tone and
explain how it could prejudice the reception of the text.
The first tone found in the Consultatio (chs. 1-3) is severe. One might reasonably
describe the tone struck in these chapters as harsh. The harsh tone is found explicitly in
Cons. 1.4, 2.4, and 3.3.
1.4: Who will there be so destitute of wisdom or so deprived of intellect,
such that he would say that this agreement ought to be strong and valid,
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which the wife endorsed under the compulsion of fear of the husband, and
thus is not thought to have had free will and her own judgement?126
2.4: Add that the husband is said to have divided (the wife’s possessions)
without the awareness of the wife, what sort of virtue could it have? Or
what will be valid, as soon as the wife decides to oppose it?127
3.3: What can be more miserable? What more abject? What more
contrary to the laws, so that that one could approach the audience with its
sitting judges and could have no firm basis and intends vain actions falling
short of the solemnity of the law?128
While each example is only a sentence long, the introductory sections of chapters
one through three are just five sentences long, so these rhetorically colored sentences
contribute a considerable amount to the impression of the introductions. These
introductions are so harsh that Wieacker and Liebs thought that this first group must have
come from a jurist berating an advocate.129 While it is reasonable to assume that a
jurisconsult could become annoyed with advocates not understanding legal material
properly, it is also possible that legal experts learned that a pointed introduction could
shape how persuasive their legal opinions appeared to their audience. The severity,
whether real or pretended, could buttress the expert’s argument by emphasizing his
expertise. By asking what could be more contrary to the law, the author is emphasizing
that he knows what constitutes the law and what does not. Also, the condescending tone
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suggests to the audience that it would be foolhardy to question the opinions of the
Consultatio. The audience who hears the phrase “who will there be so destitute of
wisdom or so deprived of intellect” is discouraged from probing the Consultatio lest he
be labelled the one destitute of wisdom or deprived of intellect. The rhetorical strategy
employed in this section of the Consultatio appears elsewhere in the late Roman world as
well. Sidonius Apollinaris, a Gallic bishop, likewise uses the strategy in his letter to
Explicius in the latter half of the fifth century. Sidonius asks Explicius to arbitrate a case
because he is so well respected for his sense of justice. Sidonius compliments Explicius
by asking who could be so stupid as to disagree with him: “your repute is such that the
loser can never be so stupid as to impugn your verdict, or the winner so over-subtle as to
deride it.”130 The author of the Consultatio and Sidonius Apollinaris both position their
arguments by rhetorically asking who could be so foolish as to disagree with the legal
expert. The plain—and hoped for—answer is: no one.
The second tone displayed in the Consultatio is pious. In each of the chapters four
through six, God is invoked in the first sentence.
4.1: In the name of God, what ought to be done or observed, whenever
pacts between parties have been issued, if stipulations are placed among
them conform neither to the laws nor to reason.131
5.1: In the name of God, what ought to be done, whenever an opponent
intends to demand back some things that were snatched away from him
when the proposed action has been removed.132
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6.1: With God’s aid, what ought to be done against one, who says that he
is the heir to someone or that he thinks that the inheritance of some person
is able to belong to him.133
As a rhetorical strategy, the pious invocations do a few things for the audience. First, the
invocation puts the author in a moralizing role, orienting the author and audience in a
prospective shared religious ideology. Secondly, the invocation invites conflation of civil
and religious authority. I am not suggesting that such conflation was abhorrent or
uncommon, but it is a marked change when compared to the other chapters of the
Consultatio and classical Roman jurisprudence. We can imagine that the pious tone could
easily operate within the same discourse in which religious elites ask for legal aid or
discuss legal problems, a phenomenon well attested in the epistles of late Roman bishops
like Augustine and Sidonius Apollinaris.134
The final rhetorical strategy is found in chapters 7, 7a, and 8. The author of the
Consultatio expresses concern about the power of persuasion in the courts. The relevant
sentences are:
7.1: Truly the cleverness of the speaker is discovered not to have
possessed prudence.135
7a.1: (You have asked) if a maternal grandfather is known to have
conferred some goods upon the grandson, whether they ought to remain in
his power, or whether they ought to be attributed to the mother, as a
partner, in her own possession by slippery persuasion…136
8.1: Add also, while the concern of your apprehension brought forward,
that, concerning burglars caught in an obvious crime, the sentence which
the judge ought to pass, the page of our tract declares…”137
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We can see a marked concern about the role of cleverness or persuasion in these
examples. This is an old trope in Greco-Roman thought about the role rhetoric plays in
the pursuit or miscarriage of justice.138 Nevertheless, the fact that it is a trope does not
mean that it is devoid of significance. Rather, the references to cleverness and persuasion
could be useful in persuading an audience that shares similar concerns for the ability of
rhetoric to manipulate or circumvent the law governing their nomocratic society. The
protestations against rhetoric are aimed at opponents whose arguments are a little too
convincing for comfort. The tone of the author encourages an anxiety about being duped.
The author’s approach complements the complaints about the confusing state of law in
the late Roman Empire, as we saw in the Theodosian Novel 1.
Additional correspondence can be found in Ammianus Marcellinus’s late fourth
century satirical digression. In his digression he complains of four different kinds of bad
lawyers. The first group commits the kind of crimes the Consultatio tries to caution its
audience against. Ammianus twice warns that these wicked legal Cretans “draw the
dagger of their talent to lead astray by crafty speeches the good faith of the judges, whose
title is derived from justice.”139 Mistrust of legal experts, perhaps an unintended
consequence of their mastery of disputatious practice, could be capitalized on by cunning
legal experts to persuade their audience. If the audience is predisposed to mistrust the
manipulation of legal material, then creating and appealing to a shared sense of suspicion
could be an effective tool for creating a persuasive legal argument.
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The purpose of the introduction is persuasion. Tone is one tool that a legal expert
could use in the interest of persuasion, but there are other means available as well. In the
Consultatio, we can see two other persuasive techniques employed: one is the constant
reference to the authority of the legal compilation following the introduction, which
suggests that the compilation is likewise legally persuasive as we discussed above, and
the other is the mitigation of possible counter-arguments. Both of these techniques
suggest that the ultimate goal of the author of the Consultatio, and of Roman legal
experts in general, was convincing an audience—that is, creating a shared sense of what
constituted the law and their community.
Throughout the introductions in the Consultatio, the author promises his reader
that his argument is actually reinforced by legal texts. In other words, the author argues
that his interpretation is simply plain law. There are, by my count, 17 instances where the
author of the Consultatio tells his audience that his opinion is derived correctly from the
law and that can be seen by reading the legal compilation he provides.140 Phrases like
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“the law written below declares in an obvious reading” operate, along with the use of the
tones, to convince the audience that the law has been made apparent.141 With these
phrases, the legal expert reinforces his authority by joining his argument to the following
legal material, to the words of respected jurists and to the words of emperors.
The final use of framing material we shall discuss is the anticipation of possible
counter-arguments. The author of the Consultatio mentions three objections to his
argument.142 These objections are quickly dealt with so that the audience is prepared for
pushback practically or at least intellectually. Consider chapter II, for instance. The
problem discussed in this chapter is whether or not a husband can rightfully divide up his
wife’s goods without her knowledge or unfairly. The author’s position is that the
husband’s division should not stand. The author foresees the defense’s position when he
says
“It is noted that even if it were contended that the wife had authorized it,
both the division would be able to be shown to be fraudulent or less than
fair and it would especially remain void and inane. Add to that that the
husband is said to have made the division without the knowledge of the
wife, what sort of standing could he have? Or what will be valid,
whenever the wife wants to break the thing up? But, lest he by chance say
‘you endorsed the division and agreed to the divided goods,’ it must be
responded legally and it must especially be considered on behalf of all
truth, that even among persons of age and those legally competent if a
division should be considered fraudulent, it is rescinded by law…”143

141
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The author of the Consultatio is informing his audience that he has considered counterarguments and has even prepared for them. It would seem that the only legally viable
course for the audience is to follow the advice of the legal expert. The appearance of
authority, of correctness is the result of a considerable display of disputatious practice.
We have seen in the Consultatio that legal experts of the late Roman Empire were
concerned with how an audience would interpret legal material. This concern could be
mitigated by correctly framing an argument and disposing the audience to respond to the
argument favorably. Framing could consist of deploying a distinct tone which could
capitalize on a persona of authority. Legal experts could sound exasperated with silly
questions. While a severe tone may actually be the result of an expert growing tired of
misunderstanding, it also predisposes the audiences to rely on the authority of the expert.
If the intended audience were to identify as Christian or Jewish, a legal expert could
utilize a pious tone that makes both the author and the audience part of a single, Godfearing discourse. Finally, if the audience identified more with the sorts of complaints the
Emperor Theodosius II had about the confused state of law, appealing to their suspicion
could effectively persuade the audience that this legal expert in particular really was
reliable. When legal experts talked about law and introduced their opinions, they could
also weave together their arguments with their legal material. This resulted in a mutually
reinforcing relationship where the opinion of the jurist was supported by the words of
emperors and jurists and where the writings of emperors and jurists were found to concur
with the legal expert. Finally, a legal expert could discuss a legal problem by preempting
contradiction. If the legal expert nullified an opponent’s argument before he or she even
made it, then he might come across as prepared and perspicacious.
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4. The Power of Disputatious Practice
Imperial complaints about the complexity or disarray of the legal system make
sense when seen in the light of disputatious practice. Compilations of legal material were
constructed to make arguments about legal issues, as we saw with the Collator’s
definition of murder, and this construction could appear overwhelming. Indeed, citations
could seem like a torrent. It is reasonable to imagine that an opposing party could be
caught off-guard by the domineering authority of a legal expert. Likewise, to the layman,
framing material could appear convincingly considered or perhaps unnecessarily
bombastic, depending on one’s point of view. While complaints about law seem to
abound, it is useful to note that some found disputatious practice a powerful tool in
navigating the legal world of the Roman Empire.
The power of disputatious practice can be seen in the late antique comedy,
Querolus, which is about the eponymous youth coming into his inheritance.144 Querolus’s
father, Euclio, lies dying while abroad and has to devise a method for delivering the
inheritance so that it would not be stolen. Euclio promises the classic parasite,
Mandrogerus, a portion of the inheritance if he honestly delivers it to the son. Before
going abroad, Euclio cleverly or miserly had hidden his fortune in a funerary urn and
pretended that the urn was his father’s ashes. Euclio, however, does not tell Mandrogerus
about the trick. Mandrogerus tries to steal Querolus’s inheritance but is fooled by
Euclio’s trick. After finding the urn but failing to recognize its contents, Mandrogerus

144

Rosemary O’Donnell, “The ‘Querolus’” (PhD Diss., University of London, London, 1980): 123-153.
Latin text taken from Querolus, ed. By Catherine Jacquemard-Le Saos (Paris: Les Belles Letters, 1994)

73

plans to toss the urn, ashes, and disguised gold into Querolus’s house, frightening
Querolus and avenging his wasted energies. When he tosses in the urn, it shatters
revealing the inheritance to the delight of Querolus. Mandrogerus hears of Querolus’s
celebration and returns to claim a portion of the inheritance, as Euclio had promised.
Mandrogerus and Querolus argue before a judge, named Arbiter, about whether or not
Mandogerus has a legitimate claim on the inheritance.
In the case before Arbiter, Mandrogerus produces the codicil claiming a share of
the inheritance. To Mandrogerus, this tactic seems like enough evidence to prove that he
is entitled to a share of the gold. Mandrogerus cites evidence of his position in the same
way a legal expert might cite legal material supporting his argument. Querolus is
accustomed to courtroom disputes and thus is more versed in creating a legally
persuasive case. Querolus argues that the codicil dictates that Mandrogerus is to show
him the treasure sine fraude, without duplicity (Quer.XIII. 96), but, since Mandrogerus
threw the urn into the house ignorant of its valuable contents, he did not actually deliver
the inheritance in good faith. Here, we can see Querolus deploying counter-arguments to
Mandrogerus’s citation. Querolus prepares the case in the same way that we saw the
author of the Consultatio prepare his audience. Querolus pretends to be ignorant of the
gold, leading Mandrogerus to make a series of confessions until finally Querolus sums up
his charges: “You stole the treasure, violated a tomb, you scoundrel! Not only have you
pillaged my house, but you also polluted it, you impious wretch!”145 After this barrage of
charges, Mandrogerus begs for mercy and realizes he has been tied in legal knots: if he
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admits to returning the gold, he must first admit to stealing it. Querolus piles up legal
accusations just as a legal expert compiles legal references. Mandrogerus concedes; he is
utterly mystified by the argument. The appearance of mystification is the result of
Mandrogerus exhausting his own supply of legal expertise. He has no legal recourse left
to convince his opponent. Querolus has successfully convinced his audience that he has
the upper hand.
In the end, the Arbiter suggests to Querolus that he should take Mandrogerus as a
friend and servant. Querolus considers it and asks him if he can learn to master the laws,
presumably to be useful in a courtroom. In an ironic twist, Mandrogerus boasts of all the
laws he has memorized: the Porcian, Caninian, Furian, and Fufian laws. The Arbiter
remarks that Mandrogerus is a valuable person because he is so well-versed in law: “Men
usually seek such a person at a great price.”146 As the reference to the codicil shows,
Mandrogerus was familiar with the legal practice of referring to texts to make an
argument. While Mandrogerus may know the law, Querolus knows how to use it. In the
final act of the play, Querolus and Mandrogerus embody the two aspects legal education
in antiquity: Mandrogerus shows the legal knowledge one would expect from an expert
and Querolus show the ability to create an effective legal argument. The Querolus may
not be a legal document but it shows how the tools of persuasion were marshalled by
legal experts. Disputatious practice was so prevalent that it was represented in the final
debate between Querolus and Mandrogerus as characteristic of legal practice in the late
Roman Empire.
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While scholars have shown that legal experts meticulously studied legal texts, a
purely textual method of education alone would make for an ineffective operator of the
legal system. Legal experts had to learn how to use authoritative texts to make an
argument. As the complaints about the state of law suggest, law was perceived to be
confusing. To the layman, disputatious practice would seem like a forceful barrage of
legal evidence. First, legal experts learned to compile legal data to create arguments. The
arguments could be created by citing legal material that became more and more specific;
this technique could show that the issue in question was specifically discussed in legal
texts. Alternatively, legal compilations could work from the specific to the general, which
would show the audience that the issue not only was discussed explicitly but was
considered in the broader sense of the law, perhaps even in the spirit of law. Another way
a legal expert might compile legal material was by bringing together citations that made
essentially the same point. While this might seem simple to modern audiences, one can
imagine that it created an unrelenting barrage of support for an argument. In the second
aspect of disputatious practice, legal experts could embroider or frame their arguments by
assuming different tones. These tones, if deployed in the appropriate circumstances,
could help insure a positive reception of one’s argument. Relatedly, legal experts could
insist to their audience that their arguments were stemming from the plain words of
classical jurists and emperors. This technique bolstered the expert’s argument by tying
the authority of the expert to those sources of law. Finally, experts could include in their
arguments preparation for counter-arguments. The signs of preparation show that an
expert has prepared a case extensively and they encouraged the audience to rely on the
expert’s knowledge. In these ways, we can see disputatious practice was common
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throughout the late Roman Empire: emperors commented on it, legal texts preserve it,
and comedies satirize it. The ubiquity of the practice suggests that a fuller understanding
of legal education must have had some elements of disputatious practice in order to
prepare experts to navigate the Roman legal world.
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Chapter 2: Compensation for Labor in Law
Legal experts deployed their legal expertise in order to receive multiple forms of
compensation. The compensation included cash, kind, public honor, and exclusive social
prestige. The notion that legal experts performed labor for compensation is contentious
for two reasons. First, scholarship has focused almost exclusively on compensation owed
to advocates, court officials, and the effects law has on economic activity rather than on
legal experts. Second, the culture built up around Roman legal expertise discouraged
experts from asking for financial compensation. The opaque relationship between legal
experts and finances invites us to consider other forms of compensation a legal expert
could have received. These forms of compensation, although some seem ephemeral, were
still valuable. The alternate forms of compensation reveal that recompense was closely
bound up with status and money, and experts throughout the Empire skillfully deployed
their expertise in order to bolster both their income and their standing. In order to
understand a legal expert’s compensation, we have to ask what sort of work, labor,
activity, or practice experts performed that merited recognition in any form. When we
begin to recognize the protean forms of compensation and labor, we come to appreciate
how pervasive legal expertise was throughout the Empire.
To introduce the relationship between the legal expert’s labor and compensation, I
will first outline the scholarship around these topics in order to sample the methods of
addressing transactions at law. This outline establishes the immediate necessity of
considering compensation in the history of late Roman legal experts. Next, I focus on
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evidence of legal experts who received financial compensation in order to show two
things. First, a pervasive cultural disposition attempted to elevate legal expertise above
economic considerations. Second, even in the face of this cultural disposition, there was
still a common practice of paying experts for legal aid. In the next section, I discuss
Bourdieu’s notion of “Symbolic Capital,” which can help us conceive of the attempted
elevation as integral to other forms of economic activity. Symbolic capital is Bourdieu’s
term for objects or practices that have not immediately recognizable financial value or
that represented economic capital in such a way as to hide economic interest. Symbolic
capital helps us realize that individuals can transact in a multitude of ways other than
financial. To illuminate the ways that compensation for experts was a mixture of public
honor and money, we will consider first teachers of law and second assessors. These two
kinds of legal expert represent a broad swath of persons employed by the imperial
administration, because they ostensibly required a convincing mastery of the law to
perform their roles. Next, we will turn to legal experts who were paid in an exclusive
form of social capital. Individuals in the elite social class advised others about Roman
law with no obvious form of compensation. Rather, legal experts advised other elites for
social capital. The elite social capital transactions offer insight into why social elites
assisted others in meticulous legal matters. I conclude by arguing that even though
compensation for labor in law was often a disguised phenomenon, the transactions of
cash, kind, public honor, and social prestige shed light on some key motivators for legal
experts to obtain their mastery of Roman law.
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1. History of the Scholarship
The history of the scholarship on the compensation of legal experts and their labor
can be divided into three approaches. The first approach is prosopographical, which
means that scholars in this tradition have studied every identifiable legal expert and their
position in society. While this approach is undoubtedly useful for revealing select experts
in fine-grained detail, prosopography tends to overlook non-elites. The second approach
is papyrological. Scholars who study legal experts on the basis of papyri have highlighted
evidence that is highly suggestive of legal expert activity. They, however, also caution
that there are few conclusive marks in the data. Papyri seem like they would be a useful
source for uncovering information about non-elite legal experts because they retain
evidence of a wide range of economic activities distributed across a broad social
spectrum. Nonetheless, identifying individual experts in the papyri is remarkably
difficult. The final approach to legal experts, their labor, and compensation investigates
legal experts by focusing on discrete administrative or bureaucratic roles an expert could
play. The scholars who use this approach argue that legal experts staffed much of the
imperial bureaucracy and that their professional activities in turn influenced the
production of late Roman juristics. Each of these approaches to legal experts is useful for
uncovering how legal experts labored and how they were compensated for their labor.
The most important contributions to the prosopographical approach to late Roman
legal experts are Die römischen Juristen: Herkunft und soziale Stellung by Wolfgang
Kunkel and the province-specific studies by Detlef Liebs.147 Kunkel’s primary aim was to
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map out the social position and power of Roman legal experts in order to understand their
role both in Rome and in the provinces. Kunkel’s principal conclusions were that jurists
in the second and third century moved into the provinces primarily from first senatorial
then equestrian backgrounds.148 Kunkel argues that after Commodus (early third century),
those practicing Roman law were much more diverse in their racial backgrounds, classes,
and geographical origins than had previously been the case. The increase, in Kunkel’s
argument, corresponded to the opening of law schools throughout the provinces and, as a
result, to the emergence of a greater number of more legally trained individuals who used
legal education as a mode for social advancement. For these arguments, Kunkel relied on
inscriptional evidence, especially on grave inscriptions and papyri in which individuals
claimed to be iuris consulti, iuris periti, iuris studiosi, magistri iuris, and νομικοί.149
Kunkel was hesitant to accept these claims as somehow representing the equals of great
jurists like Ulpian, Julian, and Paul, and warned his readers that a system-wide danger
Roman legal expertise confronted was the lack of any sort of institutional supervision or
regulatory control.150 The image Kunkel leaves for us of the late third century is a Roman
legal world that was dominated by fewer and fewer famous legal experts (the individuals
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recorded in the Digest and other legal compilations) surrounded by a sea of lower class
individuals who lacked the jurisprudential genius of the classical age.151 Kunkel,
however, adds nuance to that pessimistic reading by saying that we actually are not
looking at a demise of legal expertise, but rather at a return to a normal practice of law
and legal science by individuals who never disappeared. These individuals were glossed
over in favor of the classical jurists. Kunkel ends his study of the Roman jurists by
positing that it is impossible to do a social history of the late Roman jurist, because of the
lack of sufficient prosopographical data from the late Roman Empire.
Liebs’s primary aim was to push back on scholars like Collinet and Weiacker who
argued that the Western Empire suffered a decline in Roman legal science.152 To make
his argument, Liebs focused on individual provinces in the West (Italy, Gaul, and Africa)
and catalogued their identifiable legal experts, their legal literary creations, and the
historical significance of legal expertise in the provinces that he studied. In Italy, Liebs
identified about 30 individual legal experts and inferred the existence of at least 10 others
from anonymous legal texts composed in late Roman Italy.153 In addition to these experts,
Liebs argued that there must have been hundreds more because of the administrative
roles in which legal experts could serve either as administrators themselves or as
assistants. Legal experts in Italy could be seen working as administrative advisers, private
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legal counsel, and even bishops. In Gaul, Liebs identified 26 legal experts from the 2nd to
the 8th century.154 These experts worked as advisers, advocates, teachers, assessors,
bishops, and in the imperial service. Liebs’s study on Gaul also shows how pervasive the
mode of Roman legal discourse was throughout the Roman, Gothic, Burgundian, and
Frankish periods.155 And, finally, in Africa, Liebs identified 12 (possibly 13) legal experts
from the second to early fifth century.156 Although he identified fewer experts in Africa
in this period, Liebs argued that the Sententiae of Paul, arguably the most influential late
Roman juristic work, was created in Africa; the creation of the Sententiae proves the
existence of a thriving legal practice in late Roman Africa.157 In total, Liebs’s works
show in fine-grained detail the unique legal terrain of Italy, Gaul, and Africa by focusing
on individual named legal experts. As in Kunkel’s work, Liebs leaves us with an image
of experts of social elite standing who operated mostly for an elite clientele. The image of
elite jurists makes studying compensation difficult because these elites tended to refrain
from discussing compensation in an easily identifiable way.
Scholars who look for legal experts in papyri aim to find non-elite legal experts,
because papyri retain a multitude of stories, complaints, and traces of ordinary lives in the
late Roman World. The founder of this mode of scholarship, Mitteis, in the 19th century,
argued that there must have been an army of legal experts throughout the Empire.158
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Although Mitteis struggled to find individuals known for their legal expertise in the
provinces, he noted how the complexity of legal documents suggested that experts must
have helped draft contracts, write legal documents, and make arguments.159 Mitteis
argued that these unnamed experts probably filled roles such as tabelliones, notarii,
grammateis, and performed other scribal functions.160 Although these roles did not
strictly require legal expertise, one could gain a functional legal expertise by working as a
scribe in some fashion. Additionally, the scribes could have obtained their expertise from
studying Roman law books (like formularies) which allowed them to memorize legal
formulae. The autodidactic nature of the scribes’ legal education would explain why,
when they employed formulae, they often applied the formulae incorrectly or in the
wrong inappropriate settings. The scribal legal experts failed to comprehend correctly the
formulae they were applying.161 These failures led to Mitteis’s outdated-sounding term
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“vulgarization” of law, by which he meant that provincials repurposed Roman formulae
to fit their immediate legal needs.162 Mitteis’s argument leads us to question the criteria
we use when searching for a legal expert because if we apply strict terms of what
constitutes a legal expert, we may fail to recognize the multiple forms of legal expertise
operative in the late Roman world. If we cannot identify who was providing legal
expertise, then we cannot know how much and what sort of compensation these non-elite
experts received.
Papyrologists have shown that the “everyday” sort of legal experts, the kind that
is invisible in Codes and Digests, is difficult to track; however, the profusion of technical
legal documents throughout the papyrological record suggests that expertise was
available to inhabitants of the late Roman world. By looking for the non-elite legal
experts, we resist the picture of legal practice as one dominated by, or at least reserved
for, elites in the Roman world. One step we can take to illuminate the non-elite experts is
to look for signs of their compensation in the late Roman world.
The final scholarly approach we will consider focuses on the distinct roles legal
experts could play. The roles could be either private—such as iurisconsulti—or public—

tutelae, which Babatha may have intended to use to get more money to raise her son. The copies
of the formula in Babatha’s possession show evidence of a legal expert because on the one hand,
the copies were presumably made by a scribe since Babatha is referred to elsewhere in the archive
as illiterate, and on the other hand, they are precise replicas of the formula in Gaius’s Institutes,
which shows that Babatha or her scribe did not approximate the formula. In short, the copies
show Babatha working with someone who could write exact legal formula. As such, Babatha
must have had access to some form of Roman legal expertise. Czajkowski highlights that a
fruitful line of questioning may be instead of looking for legal experts as we define them rather
looking for “perceived” sources of legal expertise.
162
Mitteis, Reichsrecht und Volksrecht, Part III on the particularity of Eastern Roman provinces
and individual, private legal Institutions in the Imperial Era.
85

examples include the quaestor, magister a libellis, and assessor. Many of the examples of
this scholarship have specifically addressed compensation. In Caroline Humfress’s
remarks on the private advising of legal experts, she notes how a iurisconsultus was often
paid for advice alongside an advocate to present a case.163 The jurisconsult was expected
to offer advice about a case while the advocate was expected to make the argument
before a judge. Public positions such as the assessor, quaestor, and other administrative
roles were all forms of work for a legal expert. Hitzig’s 1893 monograph sketches out a
list of known assessors, who acted as adviser or secretary to a judge, and their probable
legal education.164 Honoré studied the administrative roles of the quaestor and the
magister a libellis—a secretary in the imperial service in charge of responding to letters
from private citizens—and argued that much of the work performed in these roles was to
advise emperors and compose responses for them on legal matters.165 The most prevalent
discussion of compensation for these public roles centers on whether or not the role was
compensated with a salary. I hope to show below that a salary was only one part of a
diverse system of compensation.
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Where does this survey of older scholarship leave us? First, the prosopographical
scholarship has richly illuminated the lives of individual legal experts, but, possibly
because of their elite social standing, these legal experts leave little trace of compensation
conventionally conceived (money). Second, the quantity and sophistication of legal
formula in papyri have led scholars to surmise that legal experts must be operating in a
way that is difficult to see and that the prosopographical approach misses a great deal of
the non-elite experts whose work stands out in the papyri. Finally, the scholarship that
focuses on distinct roles for experts has limned out some of the avenues of work experts
could perform, but the constrained definition of compensation has sequestered their
discussions primarily to arguing over if and when experts were awarded salaries. Each of
these lines of argument border on the compensation of legal experts because each depicts
legal practice as a form of complex labor requiring time and significant education. In
addition to manifesting as a form of labor, legal expertise became a vehicle by which
experts could expect to gain wealth and social status. To understand how experts gained
these things, we will turn to the compensation for labor in law.

2. Philosophers, Teachers, and Lawyers: Financial
Categorization
In this section, we consider the evidence of legal experts receiving financial
compensation. I first argue that there was a pervasive cultural disposition that tried to
disassociate legal experts from financial compensation. This aversion can be seen in
Ammianus Marcellinus’s satirical digression on lawyers in the Eastern Empire (Amm.
30.4) that excoriates experts for turning to their tools of justice, legal expertise, to enrich
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themselves and their immoral clients. The aversion extends beyond satire to categorize
legal experts as a profession similar to teachers. In fact, teachers of law handle the most
hallowed form of knowledge according to the third century jurist, Ulpian. Ulpian’s
discussion of legal experts and their expertise places experts in an elite constellation of
individuals who should be uninterested in compensation. After we have conceptualized
the cultural aversion, we turn to the evidence of legal experts receiving financial
compensation for their aid. The evidence of financial compensation bears out three
significant trends: 1) broadly, experts received financial compensation for their labor, 2)
that compensation was given according to how much perceived labor was required, and
3) legal experts created, perpetuated, and relied on reputations of legal competence both
to attract clients and to enforce their documents. The final trend is consonant with my
earlier argument of disputatious practice because the evidence of financial compensation
displays individuals using techniques of legal persuasion to create an authoritative legal
object.

A. Cultural Disposition: Filthy Lucre
The force of the cultural aversion to money animates Ammianus Marcellinus’s
late fourth century satirical digression on legal experts. The digression manipulates a rich
literary tradition with references to Roman satire and the oratorical tradition and, as such,
we should be hesitant to read the digression as an objective representation of late Roman
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legal culture.166 Instead, the digression operates, that is it derives its humor, from the fact
that it animates the normative discourse that legal experts ought to be above money.
The digression begins by incriminating the Emperor Valens for withdrawing from
judicial responsibilities.167 By withdrawing, Ammianus tells us, Valens “opened the
doors to theft” and allowed thievery to grow rampant as judges sold the cases of poor folk
to military judges or high officials in the hopes of obtaining wealth and honor.168 Once
Ammianus described his aim of critiquing Valens, he continued to lament the downfall of
forensic oratory, citing Plato and Epicurus as equally condemnatory of the influence
rhetoric had on the day to day practice of justice. What makes Ammianus’s time
irredeemable is that the honorable advocates, like Demosthenes and Cicero, had gone

166

On the literary aspects see, Álvaro Sánchez-Ostiz, “Ammianus on Eastern Lawyers (30.4):
Literary Allusions and the Decline of Forensic Oratory,” in Beginning and End From Ammianus
Marcellinus to Eusebius of Caesarea, ed. By Álvaro Sánchez-Ostiz (Huelva: Universidad de
Huelva, 2016), 207-224 and on the satiric elements of Ammianus generally, see Roger Rees,
“Ammianus Satiricus,” in The Late Roman World and Its Historian, ed. By Jan Willem Drijvers
and David Hunt (London: Routledge, 1999) 141-155. Daniel den Hengst, “Literary Aspects of
Ammianus’ Second Digression on Rome,” in Ammianus After Julian ed. By J. Den Boeft, J.W.
Drijvers, D. den Hengst and H.C. Teitler (Leiden: Brill, 2007) 159-179. For the reading as decline
of legal culture, see Roger Pack, “The Roman Digressions of Ammianus Marcellinus,” in
Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, vol 84 (1953), 181-189
and John Matthews, The Roman Empire of Ammianus (Ann Arbor: Michigan Classics Press,
2007), 261 and throughout 253-279. See also John Matthews, “Ammianus on Roman Law and
Lawyers,” in Cognito Gestorum the Historiographic Art of Ammianus Marcellinus, ed. By J. Den
Boeft, D. Den Hengst, and H.C. Teitler (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1992), 47-57.
167
See Boeft, Drijvers, Hengst, and Teitler Philological and Historical Commentary on
Ammianus Marcellinus XXX (Leiden: Brill, 2015) 59-99.
168
Amm. 30.4.2: (Sc. Valens) laxavitque rapinarum fores, quae roborabantur in dies iudicum
advocatorumque pravitate sentientium paria, qui tenuiorum negotia militaris rei rectoribus vel
intra palatium validis venditantes, aut opes aut honores quaesivere praeclaros. “He (Valens)
opened the doors of theft, which was growing stronger everyday in the equally depraved
decisions of advocates and judges, who by selling off the cases of poor people to military judges
and strong men in the imperial service, hoped for either riches or honors.”
89

extinct.169 Ammianus paints the precipitous decline of the court as the fault of Valens, but
the rest of his digression lambasts legal experts for being greedy.
The legal practitioners of Ammianus’s time can be divided into four greedy types.
The first hounds the doors of widows and the childless trying to stir up controversies
between friends and family. Once lawyers of this kind start a case, “Poor even among the
insatiable thefts, they draw the dagger of their talent for the sake of perverting the faith of
the judges, whose name is derived from justice, with clever speeches.”170 By an empty
flow of eloquence, justice is perverted and the lawyer has come into a new inheritance as
he charges more and more. The second class of lawyers claim to be experts in law, citing
ancient statutes that existed before Evander’s mother. Ammianus says that these lawyers
are so money-hungry that “even if you suppose that you willingly murdered your own
mother, they will promise you that many obscure readings secure you absolution, if they
perceived that you are a moneyed man.”171 The third group knows how to draw out a case
with all kinds of inquisitions. Their cases take years to resolve: “In which (sc. pits) if
anyone falls in captured, he will not crawl out for many years until the point that he has
been sucked dry of his very marrow.”172 The final kind of lawyer urges all kinds of
people into vain litigation. Once in litigation, they simply howl and curse their opponents
for lack of any more effective or knowledgeable approach. Ammianus goes as far as to
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say that they are so ignorant of the law that they cannot recall if they have ever owned a
textbook. If an ancient author is mentioned in their presence, they are at such a loss they
assume the name is a kind of delicacy or a new kind of fish. Though these experts seem
ignorant, they still demand payment for their work.173 The types of lawyer, each more
and more outrageous, are all depicted as being motivated by their love of money.
The satirical digression exemplifies the pervasive cultural disposition around legal
experts by describing all of the legal experts as thieves. Ammianus derives humor from
this premise by making the legal experts stoop lower and lower for money. The
fundamental problem for Ammianus is that these experts ask for money at all. The
digression weaves together his critique of Valens and Ammianus’s description of the
ideal Roman legal culture in which men of law are unwilling to defend immorality and
they pursue justice regardless of the income it garners them.
To flesh out the satirical presentation of legal experts and their financial
compensation, let us turn to Ulpian, who likewise discourages payment to legal experts
albeit in a specific, less satiric way. In the fragment recorded in Dig. 50.13, Ulpian lists
the professions whose practitioners are able to seek a governor’s aid in procuring their
pay. Ulpian’s list starts with a rubric: the governor only settles pay for “teachers of liberal
pursuits.”174 Ulpian further specifies that teachers of liberal pursuits included rhetors,
grammarians, and geometricians. Ulpian expands this list by way of analogy. First
doctors are like teachers “since they take care of men’s health, and the teachers care of
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their studies.”175 Obstetricians are included since they “seem to practice a sort of
medicine.”176 Further definition is required: doctors can also be ear doctors, throat
doctors, and dentists but not those who use incantations or exorcisms.177 Philosophers,
however, Ulpian says, are not to be accepted in a governor’s court to procure payment
because “they above all ought to profess to spurn mercenary activity.”178 Next, Ulpian
includes teachers of civil law. Governors should not accept their claims because
“knowledge of civil law is indeed a most sacred thing, and something which is not to be
valued in terms of money or dishonored while seeking in court a payment which should
have been offered voluntarily at the outset of the affair.179 For even though these [sc.
payments] could be honorably accepted, nevertheless they are dishonorably
demanded.”180 Ulpian describes the study of both philosophy and law as revered:
philosophy is religiosa and law is sanctissima. Those who study and teach these
disciplines ought to be above economic interests. For Ulpian, philosophy and law stand at
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the top of a professional and intellectual hierarchy with the implication that both should
be done with only the faintest concern for their economic benefit. Professors of law
should handle payment discreetly, out of the public’s gaze in the governor’s court. While
Ulpian’s focus is on teaching, he forms his consideration of legal instruction not on the
act of teaching, which varied in respectability, but on the thing taught. Since law itself
was sanctissima, knowledge of law should be given regardless of finances, honorably by
teachers and, perhaps, by legal experts in general.
The culture built up around legal experts imagined that the ideal legal expert was
above financial considerations. Ammianus Marcellinus’s satirical digression condemned
Valens as a bad emperor by claiming that he was responsible for the existence of greedy
lawyers. To Ammianus, good legal experts should not stoop to protecting immoral men
for money. Ulpian’s discussion of teaching law describes legal knowledge as sanctissima;
law’s hallowed status requires that legal experts avoid publicly petitioning the governor
for unpaid fees. In both of these authors, legal experts are meant to be disinterested in
financial compensation, but, as I will discuss below, legal experts normally could expect
remuneration for their labor.

B. Financial Compensation
Although ideal legal experts were supposed to be disinterested in financial
compensation, there is much evidence that legal experts were compensated financially.
When we review this evidence, it becomes apparent that legal experts were financially
compensated according a logic that dictated that compensation should correspond to how
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much work a case required. In addition, we will also see that legal experts used their
cultural capital to garner payment, by attracting business and validating legal documents.
This can be seen in the papyrological fragments that mention payments to experts. In fact,
in two of the papyri, we have evidence of legal experts using their status as experts to
make their legal documents more authoritative.
The rationale of payment to legal experts can be seen in Diocletian’s Price Edict.
In the Edict, Diocletian presented a maximum price for advocates and jurisconsults. The
Price Edict imagines a fragmented world of goods and labor and their value in economic
and moral terms.181 By announcing how much the goods and services listed in the Edict
should cost, Diocletian presented a world view of the proper and reasonable economic
interactions of the inhabitants of the Empire. Diocletian projected his view across the
entire Empire, as is evident from the well over forty copies that are preserved from the
Empire. Most of the copies were found in the East and in Greek, but there is one extant
fragment in the West and in Latin, which suggests the Edict may have had an Empire
wide effect.182
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The Edict categorizes the legal experts—and therefore their labor—together with
teachers. The legal expert is mentioned at the end of the 7th chapter, “on wages.” And at
the beginning of the chapter, furthest away from the legal experts, are manual workers
like laborers and bakers. At the end of the chapter, Diocletian’s Edict lists teachers: a
gymnastic instructor, pedagogue, elementary teacher, teacher of arithmetic, teacher of
shorthand, teacher of calligraphy, teacher of literature and geometry, teacher of
rhetoric.183 Only after the list of different kinds of teachers does the Edict list legal
experts. After the legal experts, the Edict continues with teachers, listing a teacher of
architecture. The legal expert stood in a matrix of educators and, as such, the expert’s
labor was considered a learned endeavor similar to that performed by those educators.
The inclusion of legal experts in the Edict suggests that legal experts were
compensated for their work across the Empire. If legal experts were not compensated,
Diocletian’s Edict would have seemed discordant, because the act of prescribing a
payment for a service no one typically purchased would have seemed incoherent
especially in light of the wide distribution of the edict. Further evidence that legal experts
were paid is provided by Augustine in a letter to Macedonius, the vicar of Africa.184 The
letter is part of a dossier of correspondence between the vicar and bishop. Letters 152155 contain a discussion between the two men about a bishop’s responsibility to
intercede on behalf of individuals in court. Macedonius essentially asks whether
episcopal intercession will result in the laws becoming meaningless because bad men
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would no longer fear or suffer punishment if all crimes were forgiven as Augustine
suggests. Augustine’s response intertwines notions of human and divine justice, crime
and sin, in order to explain to Macedonius that forgiveness is an essential part of doing
justice. In his explanation, Augustine introduces a complicated notion of just and unjust
theft. The bishop asks if a person is owed wages and has to steal those wages from his
employer, is that theft unjust? Augustine says no, because it would be unjust if he did not
receive his wages. Next Augustine wonders—pointedly in a letter to a high judge—
whether judges should take payment for their decisions. Augustine says that even though
it is right that “the advocate sells a just defense, and the legal expert sound advice” this
does not mean a judge should take payment because the advocate and expert represent
one side, while the judge sits between both parties.185 For a judge to take payments—or
in more ethically pointed language, bribes—the judge would forsake any notion of
impartiality, resulting in thanks and favor being owed to one party and not the other.
Augustine uses the payment to legal experts as an example in his argument against on the
one hand withheld wages and, on the other, judicial corruption. That both Augustine and
Diocletian’s Edict could imagine payment to legal experts suggests that compensation to
legal experts was a generally well-known phenomenon and that Diocletian’s Edict
described a real transactional relationship between a legal expert and a client.
It is interesting to note the tension between on the one hand Augustine’s and the
Price Edict’s depictions and on the other hand Ulpian’s and Ammianus’s arguments that
legal experts should not pursue payment. First, Augustine and the Price Edict suggest a
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learned class of individuals who transact their business, leveraging their cultural capital
to sell their services for financial compensation across the Empire. Ulpian and
Ammianus, however, seem ardently opposed to experts boisterously pursuing
compensation to the point that the experts appear to be more interested in money than an
ethereal concept of justice. It is within these two poles that legal experts must operate.
The Edict not only categorizes the legal expert’s labor as similar to a teacher’s, it
also employs a more specific logic of compensation for the expert’s labor by announcing
prices for distinct steps in a case. In Table I below, I have excerpted the relevant lines
from the Price Edict.
Table I. Diocletian’s Edict of Maximum Prices 7.72-73 from Giacchero 1974
72. Advocato sive iuris perito
mercedis in postulatione

Ducentos quinquaginta

δικολόγῳ ἤτοι νομικῷ μισθὸν σν’
ἐντεύξεως

73. In cognitione

Mille

διαγνώσεως

The Edict presents a gradation of the legal expert’s economic transaction. The advocate
or jurisconsult was theoretically permitted to be paid up to 250 denarii for a postulatio,
which either was the filing of a case with the judge or was the request for permission to
use a judge’s authority to procure evidence.186 In the next line of the Edict, a further
transaction is imagined, the cognitio for which the advocate or consult could be
compensated up to 1,000 denarii.187 The cognitio was the portion of a case in which all
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parties were required to come before the judge. The only scholarly publication on legal
experts in the Edict is by Tomulescu, who points out that the two fees—the postulatio at
250 denarii and the cognitio at 1,000—were not presented as the only ones an expert or
advocate could charge. In fact, by way of analogy, Tomulescu points out that the fee limit
for advocates discussed throughout the Roman Empire was significantly higher: first
10,000 sesterces then later 100 aurei. If the advocate or the consult only charged for the
two procedures listed on the edict, it would fall far below the higher cap discussed
elsewhere. Tomulescu’s argument is that the advocate must have been paid more for
other activities. Since both the advocate and consult were presented in Diocletian’s Edict,
we may suppose that the consult similarly could be imagined to charge for more than just
the postulatio and the cognitio. The logic employed in the Price Edict suggests that legal
experts were paid according to the steps or amount of labor required for a case so that,
while the Edict only lists two stages of a trial, we can surmise that there were also other
unmentioned steps as well that may have been tied to fees.
Thus far we have seen a complex relationship between legal experts and
compensation. Ulpian presents legal expertise as an elite form of knowledge that makes
professors of law an elevated form of teacher. While law professors may receive
compensation, they should not pursue it in court. Since Ulpian’s reasoning is based on the
kind of knowledge and not the activity of teaching, we are left to wonder just how he
imagined other forms of compensation for legal experts. We know that legal experts were
financially compensated in the late Roman Empire both from Diocletian’s Edict and from
Augustine’s letter. Diocletian’s edict even suggests a logic of compensation for discrete
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legal tasks. Diocletian’s edict and Augustine’s letter, though they both depict a legal
expert selling or being paid for services, do not contradict Ulpian’s depiction of legal
knowledge— and therefore legal practice as well— as being something above pecuniary
squabbles. Legal experts seem to be a sort of individual who could be paid, but had to
seem above pecuniary interests.
As elevated as a legal expert’s interests were supposed to be, papyrological
evidence records legal experts receiving payment. The identification of the experts as
“experts” in these payments suggest that individuals employed their authority in a
recognizable way within the community with the result that they obtained compensation.
Put another way, the papyri record payments to individuals identified as legal experts
because of their persistent use of legal expertise so that they could be recognized as
experts and not with some other identifier such as “the scarred man,” “the notary,” or
“the centurion.” By searching the papyrological database, papyri.info, for νομικοί, I
found ten papyri fragments that record various payments to individuals labelled as
νομικοί from the third century CE to the sixth, presented in Table II. I chose the term
νομικός because it was a standard Greek term for describing legal experts in other
discourses of law and I wanted to see if individuals were identified as νομικοί in
connection with documented instances of compensation for legal work.
Table II. Papyri Recording Payments to νομικοί
Papyrus

Date

Amout

P. 0xy 14 1730

400-499 CE

600 μυρίοι
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Papyrus

Date

Amout

P. Oxy 56 3874

345-346 CE

1 talent τῷ νομικῷ ὑ(πὲρ) μισθοῦ βιβλίων
(τάλαντον) α

P. Oxy 64 4436

208 CE or 176 CE

12 drachmai (?) fragmentary

SB 22 15317

442-447 CE

Measure (μέτρον) of public grain

SB 26 16528

208 CE or 176 CE

Artabai amount unknown

SB 26 16750

324-325 CE

Drachma amount unknown

SPP 10 8

400-499 CE

50 artabai (?)

SPP 20 96

338 CE

11 carats

O. Wilck 1606

301-699 CE

11 carats

P. Ryl 4 627

300-325 CE

1 talent

These papyri usually contain lists of names and values without much elaborating detail,
which means that we cannot tell why the νομικός in P.Oxy 14 1730, for instance, was
paid 600 μυρίοι. The currencies used in the papyri vary. While some use monetary
currency, as suggested by μυρίοι, talents, drachmas, and carats, others use in kind
payments like artabai of goods or grain.188 The only example of the reasoning behind the
payment is found in P.Oxy 56 3874, which records the payment of one talent to a νομικός
for the purchase of books. The variability present in the papyri—the act for which the
expert is paid, the amount paid, the currency—stands in contrast to the persistent
identification of the legal expert as a νομικός.

188

A particularly interesting early example is a legal expert is paid in wine for writing a birth
certificate SB XVI 12764, II 4.
100

The papyrological evidence also shows that the legal expert, as an occupation,
was a powerful form of identification in late Roman Egypt and could be used to secure
payments. Table II shows that individuals identified as νομικοί were paid and that legal
experts employed the culturally significant occupational title as a method of
identification.189 Although the evidence is not conclusive that they were paid for their
expertise, their occupational titles suggest some role for the cultural capital of legal
expertise. The identification of an individual as a νομικός suggests that the individual
employed the title as more than just a generic functional descriptor. The identifier
νομικός was more significant than common descriptive identifiers such as the mention of
scars.190 Rather the legal expert was identified in this way because his work relied on the
construction of an authoritative persona for which he was known in his social contexts.
When someone paid a legal expert identified as a νομικός, they recognized the
authoritative and culturally significant knowledge the legal expert possessed.
How the expert used his legal knowledge is indicative of why he was
compensated. While Augustine tells us that the expert “sells” (vendit) his “true advice”
(verum consilium), the Price Edict suggests that compensation was rationalized according
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to the steps in the legal process. The papyri add a third dimension to the work of the legal
expert in the form of document creation and translation. There are two examples of
experts deploying their knowledge to create authoritative legal documents. The two
examples are the will of Gaius Longinus Castor created in 189 CE and a petition for
recognition in an inheritance (in Roman legal terminology, agnitio bonorum possesionis)
of 249 CE.191 We will look at the later document, the petition, and analyze how the legal
expert composed and authorized the document with his expertise.
The petition is recorded in two copies, SB 1 1010 and SB 6 9298.192 The pertinent
difference between the two is that the former is partially translated into Latin. The
petition was written to the Prefect of Egypt, Aurelius Appius Sabinus, and asked him to
grant Marcus Aurelius Didymus the right to inherit from his mother, Aurelia
Ammonilla.193 The bottom six lines of the petition state that Aurelius Aiguptos is a
Roman νομικός who translated a copy of the petition and guarantees that the translation
agrees with the original, which he has deposited in the registry.
SB I 1010. 24-29
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Αὐρήλιος Αἴγυπτος καὶ ὡς χρη-

Aurelius Aiguptos and as I am

ματίζω νομικὸς Ῥωμαϊκὸς

known Roman νομικός

ἑρμήνευσα τὸ π[ροκ(είμενον) ἀντίγρ(αφον)]

translated the aforementioned copy

καὶ ἔστιν σύμφω̣[νον τοῖς]

and it is in agreement with

ἐν καταχωρισμῷ [αὐθεντι-]

the originals in the registry

κοῖς καὶ διʼ ἐμοῦ τετ[ελευτημένοις]

which have been completed by me.

The expert, Aurelius Aiguptos, performed important actions in this papyrus. First, he
translated a copy, which essentially means that he made a new copy. Second, he attested
that the copy was in agreement with the originals, which means that he swore to their
reliability. Thirdly, he also wrote that he “completed” the originals held in the registry.
These three actions have an agglomerative effect on the reliability of the document: it
was reliable because he made the originals and therefore was in the best position to claim
that the copies matched the original. In addition to this effect, Aurelius Aiguptos signed
the document with his occupational title, Roman νομικός. By employing this phrase,
Aurelius claimed to be an expert in Roman law who ensured the validity of this
document. Both this petition and the will of Gaius Castor Longinus employ the same
phrase νομικὸς Ῥωμαϊκός in order to lend legal authority to the document of their
creation.194 These legal experts were not only employing their legal expertise to create the
documents, they were also using their cultural capital, in the form of claimed professional
credentials, to validate the documents as authoritative legal objects. The use of these legal
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objects could have occasioned the creation of receipts similar to those collected in Table
II. The translated documents and their attendant receipts then reflect the strategies of
creating and deploying legal authority.
When we view the contracts alongside the receipts, we are left with the
impression that the actions that the legal expert used to validate legal objects were the
same ones that led to his community identifying him as a legal expert in the receipts. This
means that, although most of the receipts do not tell us what the experts were paid for,
their use of the title νομικός suggests the successful employment of strategies of authority
seen in the contracts. These actions and strategies amounted to a legal expert’s labor for
which we can see in the Price Edict and Augustine that he was compensated financially.
Furthermore, the Edict even suggests that legal experts were thought to be akin to
teachers and that their payment should increase according to what stage the case they
were helping with was in. While Ulpian and Ammianus suggest that overt interest in
finances may have been shameful, neither argue that legal experts should not be
compensated at all. In fact, when we look for financial compensation for legal experts,
we see that it was a regular phenomenon in the late Roman Empire.

3. Honor and Office as Salary
Money and goods are only one part of the heterogeneous phenomenon of
compensation for legal services. Take, for instance, being the President of the United
States. The $400,000 annual salary while in office and the $207,800 annual pension after
office are relatively unimportant when compared to the other forms of compensation
104

presidents are awarded. To think through other forms of compensation, we will discuss
Bourdieu’s notion of “symbolic capital.” Symbolic capital is Bourdieu’s description of
traditionally conceived non-economic objects and practices that have high value in their
respective societies and that can be converted to—or at least understood in—their
economic form. The term invites us to consider the strategies of capital conversion
employed by late Roman legal experts; that is, the other, non-pecuniary ways in which
legal experts were compensated. In this section, we will turn to what is often considered
the most important aspect of the legal expert’s occupation: working for the imperial
administration. Scholarship has considered bureaucracy to be the animating force of
jurisprudence of this period and has attempted to identify the lawyers surrounding the
emperor in the administration.195 I hope to add to this discussion by making two points.
First, working for the imperial administration in any fashion garnered some degree of
social standing, a form of symbolic capital: the bureaucrats or employees of the state
were compensated in a mixed form of social prestige and financial compensation through
a salary. Secondly, although legal experts could and did work for the imperial
administration, similar sorts of practices were performed outside of any administrative
overview in a non-official social structure and therefore to understand legal experts as
solely operating within the imperial administration would miss the diverse cast of legal
experts operating outside of the administration’s remit. To make my argument, I focus on
two representative occupations: teaching law and serving as assessor. These occupations
represent the wider world of official positions for those with legal expertise, because they
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are positions most strongly associated with traditional legal education. We will find that
there was no system of verifying or guaranteeing legal expertise even in these official
capacities, so legal experts had to rely on similar strategies of authority creation and
maintenance as those seen in the papyrological material. In this section, we see
individuals deploying legal expertise for status and salary.

A. Bourdieu’s Symbolic Capital
Bourdieu’s work on capital is particularly helpful for thinking about the
relationship of economic capital to complex social dynamics and strategies. At base,
every form of capital is either an extrapolation of or potential for labor.196 When capital is
defined this way, one can conceptualize economic capital as the ability to purchase
objects or someone else’s labor. Bourdieu delineates three primary forms of capital. First,
economic capital can be money or it can take the institutionalized form of property rights.
Second, cultural capital relates to one’s knowledge and affects one’s disposition—i.e. the
decisions one makes.197 We can think of cultural capital as the ability to perform highly
exclusive tasks like creating legal documents. Cultural capital can take many related
species such as the embodied (which is the learned disposition or acquired knowledge),
the objectified (examples can include books or pieces of art; these objects speak to the
embodied form of cultural capital because one requires the embodied form to appreciate
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what has become fully objectified), and finally the institutionalized (such as university
degrees that are intended to guarantee one’s embodied capital). Third, social capital can
be thought of as the ability to convince friends to support you in an endeavor or the
amount power one holds in a group. Social capital is important for reproducing and
maintaining social relationships and networks. The multiple forms of capital are related
in a diffuse economy of practices.198
The forms of capital are all convertible, which means that an individual is able to
convert one form of capital into another. The conversion of capital is a vital strategy for
maintaining capital in a society because, by converting one’s capital, one is able to hide
its labor value thereby emphasizing other values (such as prioritizing social connections
over wealth) and activating that hidden labor value for other tasks. Bourdieu’s example of
the specific value can be seen in his example of a French mason, who decided to forgo a
traditional dinner in his honor after finishing building a house. The mason demanded
money in place of the meal to the shock of his community. Even though the meal had a
defined economic value--in this case the mason had asked for 200 francs in place of the
meal--the meal’s value as social capital was irreducible.199 The mason’s mistake was to
devalue the symbolic capital of the meal and to prefer it in an immediate economic form.
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Bourdieu’s interest is not in the calculus of conversion of all forms of capital
throughout a given society. Rather, his point is that traditionally non-economic activities
and objects can be seen through an economic lens. To achieve this view, one must
understand the more complicated forms of capital as “symbolic capital.” For instance,
arranged marriages are a kind of strategy that can transfer symbolic capital (masked
economic capital) between families. The families are able to transact their social capital
by creating bonds between them while transferring significant economic capital.200
Arguably, the most important aspect of capital is symbolic capital because it is a socially
masked form that allows for the conveyance and accumulation of capital beyond what
simple economic capital will allow. The masking of symbolic capital reveals the
complicated system of valuation that is hidden when one only looks for economic capital.
Bourdieu’s notion of capital suggests that when we see individuals transacting in other
forms of capital, we should see such activity as integral to the strategies of capital in a
given society.
The mechanisms for enforcing the need for symbolic capital in the late Roman
world are prevalent in the discussion of Ammianus Marcellinus and Ulpian’s presentation
of the cultural disposition that discourages an overt interest in money. Instead of an
interest in economic capital, i.e. money, legal experts are socially conditioned to conduct
their transactions in alternate forms of capital. Bourdieu argues that certain professions—
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like those in medicine and law—are particularly interested in symbolic capital because
they must be above displaying their interest in economic capital too openly lest they risk
their credibility. A loss in credibility could result in accusations of corruption, which in
turn could negatively affect one’s professional practice and economic income.
I place my discussion of Bourdieu’s capital at this point in the chapter, because
we will now turn to more complex forms of capital in the compensation of legal experts.
Like Bourdieu, however, I will not dwell on the conversion of the forms of capital.
Rather, I employ the notion of symbolic capital as an analytical device for understanding
the relationship between labor and compensation.

B. Teachers of Law
In this section, we will investigate the teachers of law and their compensation.
There were three kinds of teachers of law in the late Roman Empire: imperial professors,
private teachers, and municipal teachers. Each kind of teacher was compensated in a
slightly different way, but in each case, the financial aspect of their compensation was
complemented by other forms such as public honor and private gifts. I hope to show that
even though imperial professors have received most of the scholarly attention in this
field, they inhabited a landscape together with many other kinds of legal educators.
Ulpian presents teaching law as a prestigious endeavor. The most prestigious form
of teaching was in law schools that were imperially endorsed or founded. We know of at
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least three imperially recognized schools: Beirut, Rome, and Constantinople.201 Beirut
was unique because it was the only school in the Empire that seems to have been devoted
exclusively to legal education, whereas the schools at Rome and Constantinople also
housed faculties of oratory and grammar.202 We have evidence of only one school that
was founded by an imperial edict: the school in Constantinople. On February 27, 425
Theodosius II founded a school in Constantinople and staffed it with 3 orators, 10 Latin
grammarians, 5 Greek sophists, 10 Greek grammarians, 1 professor of philosophy, and 2
professors of law.203 The edict stipulates that only officially sanctioned teachers are
allowed to teach publicly in the auditoria. The edict threatens that if someone else tried to
teach in the auditoria, he would suffer infamy and be expelled from the city; this threat
demarcated the dishonored teacher from the honorable. The professors of law were also
entitled to exclusive teaching facilities at public expense, which presented their work as
publicly sanctioned and endorsed. Appointment to this professorship also probably
entailed an imperial salary just as other imperially sponsored professorships did.204 A few
days after the foundation edict, another constitution awarded professors with a rank equal
to that of a former vicar.205 Appointment to these teaching posts would have elevated a
legal expert into the highest class of teachers in the Empire and would have separated the
appointed teacher from others by explicitly denying privileges to other teachers. In
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addition, the appointment would have given the teacher an imperial salary, and finally
would have granted him the title of former vicar, which would have elevated him above
most governors of the Empire. The compensation for imperially endorsed professors of
law was composed of multiple benefits, most of which were more pronounced than the
financial aspect of the compensation.
The prestige of teaching law extended beyond imperially endorsed teachers to
include non-imperially endorsed teachers as well. There were two options for those
teaching law without imperial support: teaching privately and teaching publicly in a
position supported by a municipality. We have already seen evidence of private teachers
in Theodosius II’s foundation edict. The edict opens by censuring those who would teach
as both a public professor and in private quarters. Theodosius goes on to specify that
teachers could be one or the other. In his edict, he specifies that private teachers are
welcome to continue their work as long as they stick to tutoring in private quarters.206
Theodosius did not try to preclude all legal education outside of that sanctioned by the
state, but rather wanted to divide public professorships from private instruction.
Furthermore, those who were appointed to public positions should not also teach in
private homes.207 For Theodosius, the aim was to separate public and private teachers.
206
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Theodosius’s motivation for such a separation may have been an attempt to ensure that
the public benefits of teaching law in the auditorium were focused exclusively on his
endorsed teachers, presumably because if any other teachers were or could use the
auditorium, the social value of teaching there would be more diffuse and, therefore, less
meaningful.
Public professors teaching in private quarters may have been a common
occurrence, which suggests that their activities may not have been not radically different.
Rather, the difference between the teachers was instantiated in the importance of the
location of their teaching. Evidence for public teachers working in private quarters is
explicit in Eumenius’s speech. In Gaul in the late third century, Eumenius gave a speech
in which, as the imperially appointed professor of rhetoric, he asked the governor to
redirect his teaching salary toward the reconstruction of the school known as the
Maenianae. Eumenius complained that because the school had been destroyed,
instruction had to take place in private homes. Eumenius’s argument that the school
should be restored does not aim at any diminution of private teaching rather at the public
glory the school would bring the emperors. Eumenius tells the governor that it is proper
that education intended to honor the emperors should take place not in private dwellings,
but proudly in the center of the city.208 Private teaching then was not ignoble, but lacked
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the additional honor that public teaching carried, which was an essential component of
the imperial law professor’s compensation.
Private teachers were compensated financially by individual student fees and
gifts. While we don’t know how much individual teachers of law charged per student, the
scholarly consensus suggests that it was comparatively high since more specialized
teachers charged more for instruction than elementary teachers.209 The fees and gifts
private teachers of law received were probably comparable to those paid to teachers of
rhetoric and grammar. For these teachers, fees could be as high as one solidus per year
per student.210 This could result in a handsome income, but ancient teachers often
complained that students and their parents dodged fees.211 Fees, when they were paid,
could also be complemented by gifts. As Cribiore eloquently argues, the student-teacher
relationship was animated by “subtle norms of reciprocity” and “a complex web of
gratitude” that further sustained a teacher’s endeavor.212 Gifts to Libanius, for instance, a
famous teacher of rhetoric in Antioch included wine, olive oil, and expensive favors.213 It
is likely that all teachers, regardless of their position or subject matter, benefited from this
complex web of gratitude.
The final kind of law teacher we will consider is the public teacher outside of the
imperial administration, a municipal teacher. Town councils (either a βουλή or curia)
could vote to endow a professorship in their city. Municipal teachers of grammar and
209
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rhetoric are attested. They received a salary from their town, although sometimes the
salary was not entirely reliable. The case of a municipal grammarian from Oxyrhynchus,
Lollianus, serves as a good example.214 Lollianus was entitled to a salary of 500 denarii a
year, but he complained that it was not regularly paid and, when it was paid, sometimes it
was paid in rotten goods.215 The money for these positions was not always good, but
could be offset by the considerable prestige associated with public teaching. Take, for
instance, the famous example of Libanius, who taught rhetoric in Antioch. Libanius had
served as a private teacher in Constantinople then moved to Antioch to take a public
teaching post where he spent the rest of his career. Libanius may have made less money
in Antioch, but he gained valuable relationships and honor in the public post.216
Municipal teachers were compensated similarly to the imperial teachers, although
perhaps on a smaller scale: they received salaries, student fees, gifts, and honor from the
public position.
Unlike municipal teachers of grammar and rhetoric, there is no direct evidence for
municipal teachers of law, although they probably took up minor posts throughout the
Empire.217 Libanius tried to attract a teacher of law to his municipal school.218 His failure
to secure a teacher of law in Antioch suggests at least that there were municipal teachers
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of law even if they are not well attested. Another suggestive piece of evidence comes
from the juristic discussions of exemptions from various duties like tutelage or
curatorship, which entailed the stewardship of property and legal aid for a person who
was deemed incapable of fully making decisions alone. Modestinus, a mid-third century
jurist, when discussing the individuals who received exemption from tutelage said that
“law teachers teaching in the provinces do not have exemption, but those teaching in
Rome are exempt.”219 Modestinus’s statement is contradicted to some extent by a
fragment of Ulpian in the fourth century text, the Fragmenta Vaticana (FV). In FV 150,
Ulpian asserts that “neither geometricians nor those who teach civil law are excused from
tutelage.”220 Neither Modestinus nor Ulpian specify what sort of law teacher they are
referring to, but it would be unlikely that all of the teachers were imperial teachers,
especially since we only have record of two imperial law teachers from Constantinople
and both Modestinus and Ulpian predate evidence of imperially financed chairs. It seems
likely that Modestinus and Ulpian were disagreeing about municipal teachers because
private teachers of law requesting exemption would probably have presented a weaker
case than municipal teachers. The difficult case, whether or not municipal teachers
deserved exemptions, may have required significant argument to come to a conclusion.
As such, it is likely that the third century juristic debate about law teachers’ exemption
circled around municipally employed teachers of law.
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We now have a sufficiently complicated picture of teachers of law and their
compensation. Individuals could teach law in an imperially sanctioned school, they could
teach privately, they could teach in a municipal setting, and they could sometimes mix
these teaching strategies, bearing in mind that imperially endorsed teachers may have
been barred in certain locations and at certain times from teaching privately. All teachers
probably benefited from gifts and fees, but teachers with official positions received
salaries from the state, either from the imperial fisc or the town council. The financial
income of the teachers, however, fails to capture the whole picture of compensation
because teachers of law also garnered social standing by teaching in public spaces and
strengthening social bonds with both students and their parents. The prestige of teaching
in an exclusive public venue and the gifts from pupils were instantiations of the symbolic
capital teachers of law accrued for their labor. Since teachers of law often taught
alongside teachers of rhetoric, we can assume that the two probably shared much in terms
of social networks and compensation. These teachers built networks of trust and
competence that helped them attract students and an income. The mosaic of teaching
strategies suggests that we should not look only to official law schools to comprehend
how law was taught; we must also consider the private teachers, municipal professors,
and adjunct teachers filling the interstices of the Roman legal educational world.

C. Assessors
The second representative occupation a legal expert could hold for the imperial
administration is the assessorship. We noted in the first section that legal experts could be
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paid to advise on cases or create documents. The Roman imperial administration also
required legal advising because Roman administrators in their judicial roles were not
selected for their legal knowledge. The judges of the Roman world required some form of
advice to manage complex cases.221 One official who assisted Roman judges was the
assessor. The assessor was often, although not always, an individual trained in law. The
assessor deployed his legal expertise for the sake of constructing an authoritative legal
persona in order to garner the respect and credibility necessary to advise judges. The
techniques the assessor used were the same sorts of practices that we saw in the private
legal experts—the jurisconsults and the document creators. In the following, we will first
situate the assessor’s work in its several contexts and then investigate two aspects of his
compensation: a salary and public honor.
The work of the assessor was similar to that performed by another form of judicial
or administrative adviser, an individual in consilio (the consilarius) who usually advised
on non-legal matters presumably without any financial compensation. The adviser in the
early Empire was an individual whom a paterfamilias, governor, and even emperor
would consult before making important decision.222 These advisers were chosen based on
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their connections, patronage, ambition and, for the most part, regardless of their degree of
legal knowledge.223 It is for this reason that Wolfgang Kunkel argued that the two
positions, consilium and assessor, were not the same although they were related.224
Sometime in the second or third century CE, the role of the assessor became more sharply
defined away from that of the consilarius.225
A fragment of the jurist Paul from the Digest records a succinct definition of the
assessor. The fragment is derived from a single book Paul wrote on the office of
assessores; it has been posited that the book operated as a handbook for new assessores
on how to do their jobs.226 The fragment from the Digest first defines the assessor as a
iuris studiosus and as someone who helped in trials, opening proceedings, edicts, decrees,
and letters.227 The title iuris studiosus denotes some form of legal training, though the
range of legal education probably varied as much as the kinds of teachers that were
available.228 We should not assume that the position of assessor and the title of iuris
studiosus referred to a young man directly from law school.229 Instead, we should be open
to a wide range of kinds of familiarity with legal practice; a range which reflects the
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heterogeneous nature of Roman legal practice. First of all, the amalgamation of the
studiosus and the assessor does not necessarily signify a youth, but rather speaks to an
individual choosing to connote for themselves some form of legal knowledge. We have
one inscription for a man, Caius Calpurnius, whose tombstone describes him as a iuris
studiosus who died at 39 years old.230 This Caius (or the person who composed his
gravestone) found the phrase a fitting description of Caius’s life even when he was nearly
40. Likewise, the number of inscriptions with other legal signifiers, like peritus or
prudens, raise serious questions about the meaning of these phrases and their relation to
one another. The blurred distinction between these words becomes apparent when we
compare bilingual inscriptions that translate both iuris studiosus and iuris prudens into
νομικός.231 Although the iuris studiosus and the iuris prudens are considered distinct
from one another in modern scholarship, where the prudens tends to signify an older,
private legal expert, the Greek term νομικός is used as a catchall to describe assessors,
iuris studiosi, and iuris prudentes. As such, we should be hesitant to read iuris studiosi as
a simple equivalence to the assessores. The plurality of funerary inscriptions suggests
that the title studiosus could be widely appropriated; nevertheless, the plurality also
suggests that the individuals using the title were trying to advertise or create a public

230

CIL X 569 C(aius) Calpurnius M(arci) f(ilius) / Quirin(a) Sermius / iuri(s) studiosus / vixit
annos XXXIX / hic situs est.
231
CIL 03, 14188, 2 A(ulus) Servilius Maximus / iuris prudens // Α(ὖλος) Σερβείλιος Μάξιμος /
νομικός
AE 2002, 1455 VV(ivi) // L(ucius) Malius Flacus / et C(aius) Malius Maxi/mus fr(atres) sibi et
suis et L(ucio) Malio Maxi/mo i(uris) s(tudioso) fil(io) dulciss(imo) et / parentib(us) suis in
sol(acium?) // Λ(ούκιος) Μάλιος Φλάκος / καὶ Γ(άιος) Μάλιος Μάξιμος / ἀδελφοὶ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ /
τοῖς ἰδίοις καὶ Λ(ουκίῳ) Μαλίῳ / Μαξίμῳ νομικῷ τέκνῳ / γλυκυτάτῳ καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις / γονεῖσι
μνήμης χάριν.
119

perception of their expertise in the field of law.232 The activities outlined by Paul reflect
an individual who, supported by his claims to legal expertise, assisted a governor in his
judicial responsibilities. Governors as judges were responsible for hearing cases,
receiving petitions, pronouncing provincial edicts, decrees, and letters. As mentioned
above, governors were not chosen for their own legal expertise, so the assessor may have
been responsible for bringing at least some self-professed legal knowledge to the
governor’s court. When viewed together, Paul’s statement and the inscriptional evidence
depict the assessor as an individual claiming some degree of legal expertise, who assisted
governors and judges with a wide range of judicial responsibilities. The work the assessor
performed merited him financial compensation in the form of a salary.
By the third century, assessors, because they worked for the governor, received a
salary from the state.233 Ulpian, writing in the early third century, wrote vaguely that “if
comites seek payment (salarium), it is legal, just as it is for professors.”234 Comites, in
Ulpian’s formulation, have been interpreted as an umbrella category that would include
the assessor. The editors of the Digest interpreted assessors this way too because, under
the title “On the Office of Assessors,” they included a fragment from Papinian that states
that “When an imperial legate dies, the members of his staff (comites) are entitled to
payment of their salary for the rest of the time of their appointments as made by the
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legate, provided they have not since then been at the same time members of someone
else's staff.”235 The categorization of comites under the heading of assessors suggests that
the two titles were related at some point and that both could be paid. Further evidence can
be drawn from Paul quoting a constitution of Antoninus Pius in the Digest: Divus
Antoninus Pius responded that iuris studiosi, who were seeking salaries (salaria), are
able to claim them.236 Some equivalence between the studiosi and assessors is operative
here because the noun salarium refers to a long-term payment like the English salary or
pension. Prolonged payment for legal experts in the private sphere would seem
inappropriate because, as we saw, payments to private legal experts were usually tied to
discrete individual activities. To add to the juristic discussion about assessor pay, we may
turn to a constitution of Honorius and Theodosius II from 422 CE, which granted
assessors rights over the money they have made even while under their father’s power.237
According to classical Roman law, a son under a living pater familias could have a
peculium, a semi-independent property, that in reality belonged to the father and would
theoretically revert to the father’s estate if he died. In the constitution, the emperors
granted assessors the right to retain their peculium, which must have contained their
salary, after their fathers died. The juristic and constitutional evidence depicts assessors
receiving a salary sometime in the early third century. Although the earlier evidence uses
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opaque equivalences, the fact that the editors of the Digest described assessors as salaried
comites suggests that at some point, if not immediately at the time of their composition,
the juristic fragments and imperial constitutions were understood to refer to assessors
being paid.
Literary evidence concurs with the legal discourses that experts were paid a salary
sometime in the early third century.238 The anonymous author of the Historia Augusta
follows a similar pattern of payment to assessors but attributes the payment and other
administrative policies to a mysterious and villainous character named Aurelianus. In the
life of Pescennius Niger (emperor from 193-194 CE), the author writes that Pescennius
Niger would never have made an attempt at the throne if it had not been for Aurelianus
who deceived and goaded Niger onto the throne.239 Other than the villainous
characterization, the author gives us no other details of this Aurelianus. To flesh out the
characterization, the author describes—ironically—the equally villainous administrative
changes Aurelianus coerces Pescennius Niger to effect.240 First, governors should hold
their positions for five years to create a more effective, stable administration. Second,
administrators, governors, and their assistants should not control the provinces they are
unfamiliar with, but instead assistants, specifically assessors, should be promoted to rule
the same provinces that they served in previously. Third, no one should serve in the
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province where he was born (more on this below) and governors should be from the city
of Rome. Finally, Aurelianus recommended that the governor’s council should be paid
from an imperial salary so that they do not become a financial burden on the governor,
who should abstain from taking or accepting anything (bribes) for a fair judgment. After
describing Aurelianus as villain, the author of the HA says that later emperors, such as
Septimius Severus, continued some of his plans. Regardless of the depiction of
Aurelianus as a corrupt advisor, much of his advice, specifically that assessors be paid a
salary, was implemented by later emperors in a narrative of justice and accountability.
Although the Historia Augusta is an infamously problematic historical source, its
narrative about financial compensation to assessors fits with the discourse found in the
juristic sources and imperial constitutions.
A more prominent component of an assessor’s compensation was the social
capital the individual earned by performing the role of assessor. This capital is derived
from a discourse of justice that suffused the position of assessor. First we will look at the
discourse around the assessor in two forms: praise of the assessor and laws mandating
their fair practice. Then we will turn to the public access the assessorship afforded and
how that access could lead to promotion or recognition. Finally, we will consider
funerary inscriptions that proudly display the assessorship. Such display suggests that
deceased assessors or their families recognized the honor and prestige inherent to the
position.
The assessor’s honor derives its value, in part, from the fact that assessors were
supposed to act as defenders of justice. The Expositio Totius Mundi records such a
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position in stark terms. The author of the Expositio describes the graduates of Beirut’s
law school as the men who “assist judges throughout the whole world and, by knowing
the laws, defend the provinces.”241 The author imagines assessors as legally educated
individuals who ensured fairness and justice across the Empire. Specifically, the
assessors defended the provinces from injustice by insisting on an authoritative and
informed version of a Roman legal discourse. The author of the Expositio was not the
only one to imbue the assessor with the responsibility of defending justice. In fact, the
administrative reforms mentioned in the Vita of Pescennius Niger and repeated later in
the Vita of Alexander Severus rely on the same point. The administrative reforms,
principally granting assessors a salary, were all geared toward creating administrative
stability and curbing corruption: “In addition, he (sc. Aurelianus, the source of the
reforms) suggested salaries for advisers, so that they would not be a burden to those
whom they assist (adsidebant), all the while saying that a judge ought not to give nor
receive.”242 When the author of the HA mentions the pay of assessors in the Vita of
Alexander Severus, he wrote that the Emperor grumbled that judges should not need an
assessor. Rather, judges should be sufficiently competent in civil matters to govern.243
The Emperor’s complaint rests on the understanding that the assessors perform a valuable
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role of ensuring justice; this role, ideally, would not be necessary if the judges were as
knowledgeable as they should be. The Expositio and the HA both rely on the notion that
the assessor was a source of reliable legal guidance in an otherwise unreliable world. The
assessor became a symbol of justice in the sense that his presence seemed to promise that
a judge or governor would have to conduct a case according to the highest ethical
standards and in line with an imagined sense of Roman law. The expectations of legal
expertise placed on the assessor were a form of social capital, because they imbued the
assessor with honor and respect.
Once assessors gained the reputation for safeguarding justice, a second question
arose: who makes sure that assessors are reliable? Emperors and jurists contributed to the
discourse of the assessor as a guardian of justice by creating hypothetical rules governing
an assessor’s work. In the ideal world of the Roman jurists, assessors would not serve in
the province of their birth, presumably to guarantee that they did not supervise cases in
which they were implicated.244 The jurists, possibly reflecting second and third century
practice, argued that if an assessor served in his own province, he could be thought to be
acting not on public business, which meant that he would not have certain legal
immunities available to him. This means that in the jurists’ eyes, assessors could serve in
their home provinces, but it would not be ideal. The ideal assessor was free of possible
sources of corruption from their own pasts. Two imperial constitutions, Theodosian Code
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1.34.1 and 1.34.3, from the late fourth and early fifth century and both given in
Constantinople suggest a similar concern. These laws, however, were directed toward
controlling a governor’s selection of his assessors. Both laws prohibit the governor from
selecting and then retaining assessors. The earlier law, 1.34.1 from the late fourth
century, allows a governor to take a chosen assessor for up to four months whereas the
later law, 1.34.3, threatens the judge with the charge of infamy if he should try to do even
this. Both laws display a concern with judges using possibly corrupt assistants. Assessors,
according to these laws were ideally appointed publicly and then forced to remain in
imperial service for three years in case any provincial wanted to charge them with
malfeasance. These laws try to stop another source of possible corruption: the governor
himself. The jurists and emperors augmented the discourse of the righteous assessor by
discussing how the ideal assessor would be someone unconnected to the province in
which he was working and he would be appointed publicly, not a stooge of the governor
chosen to do his bidding. The jurists and emperors, though their laws might suggest some
degree of control, augmented the discourse of justice by imbuing the assessor with a form
of imperial assurance which contributed to the assessor’s accrual of social capital.
While serving as assessor, an individual sat publicly in the court as a sign of legal
accountability. As we saw with the teachers with an imperial salary, working in public
accrued honor. The assessor observing and assisting sat below the judge.245 Leanne
Bablitz has argued explicitly that the assessor would not have fit on the magistrate’s
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tribunal, but just below the judge.246 Her argument is in part derived from a collection of
references to
Tiberius acting as
assessor. In these
examples, the
Emperor sat
uncomfortably
close to the judge.
Bablitz analyzes
evidence from the
ROSSANO GOSPEL. 8R. PONTIUS PILATE SURROUNDED BY
ASSISTANTS. WIKIPEDIA.

second century, but
later iconographic

evidence suggests her conclusions—that the position of the assessor close to the judge—
were still valid in the fourth through the sixth centuries. Two images from late antiquity
suggest that the judge was flanked by advisers. First, the image from the Rossano
Gospels, dated to the 6th century, show Pontius Pilate presiding over Jesus.247 As
Hoerken has shown, this depiction of Pilate is an amalgamation of late Roman judges.248
The late Roman Pilate in the image is flanked by two individuals who may be assisting
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the governor. The use of possible assessors in the Rossano Gospels suggest that, like the
specific references to multiple kinds of judges in the depiction of Pilate, assessors were
still visually paired with the judge
to give an impression of a just
judge, although this time overruled
by his unruly audience.249 The
second image is an ivory diptych
displaying Probianus, newly
appointed as Urban Prefect in the
year 400 CE.250 Two scenes on the
diptych show Probianus proudly at
work as judge with two orators
either pleading their cases or
DIPTYCH OF PROBIANUS. 400 CE. IMAGE FROM
AGE OF SPIRITUALITY, ED. BY KURT
WEITZMANN (NEW YORK: THE METROPOLITIAN
MUSEUM OF ART, 1979), 55.

praising him from below.251 Beside
Probianus stand two slightly
smaller individuals who write and

point to texts. These smaller individuals complete Probianus’s iconography as a good
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judge because he is surrounded by competent assistants. These assistants are probably
best identified as Probianus’s assessors. If these scenes, from second century literature
and later iconography, depict assessors as we know them from other sources, then they
suggest that the assessor, whose name is literally derived from “sit beside,” sat in full
view of the public eye next to the judge.
By working in the gaze of his contemporaries, the assessor earned their praise, an
important form of social capital. Exceptional legal experts, like the great jurists Papinian,
Ulpian, and Paul, served as assessors and eventually were promoted all the way to
Praetorian Prefects in the early third century. These assessors displayed their knowledge
of law and dedication to justice at the right times and to the right people to earn
promotion all the way to prefect. The public power of the assessor was not confined to
the high Empire, however, but continued well into at least the fifth century. A law
published in 413 CE by the Emperor Theodosius II elevated select individuals, one of
whom was an assessor, with title of comes primi ordinis in rank.252 The offices he
selected were: tribuni scholarum, counts of the military who have led armies, assessors of
illustres, chief physicians, governors of provinces, and generally masters of various arts.
Since the law is concerned with elevating those who are both comites primi ordinis and
serving in various offices, Theodosius II was probably trying to correct a situation where
there was ambiguity about the statuses of the various officials.253 Although individuals
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held the prestigious title “count of the first order,” they may have been serving in an
office that was below their title. The law addressing assessors shows how their title and
service deserved higher rank:
We order that after their retirement from imperial services, those assessors with
the rank of count of the first order, who in council have assisted or who shall
hereafter assist illustres in service, either in the provinces or in the sacred court,
shall be ranked among those who have obtained the title of vicar by serving in
the administration, since it is absurd that those persons who are decorated with
the countship of the first order should be inferior to vicars of the exalted office,
whose dignity is increased if, when they have the power of vicar, they are
decorated with the insignia of a count of the first order.254
The law raised assessors who served in the most important courts of the Empire: courts
run by illustres (ie. Praetorian Prefects, Urban Prefects, etc.) and the imperial court. The
law targets individuals who already hold a prestigious rank, and grants them further
standing by labeling them as former-vicars. The various offices chosen by Theodosius
were all public-facing offices in which individuals could attract attention, honor, and
further promotion, just as Ulpian and Paul did in the third century. Further, by addressing
assessors in the same category as tribunes scholarum, military counts, and governors, the
Emperor recognized assessors as an important component of the imperial system. His
recognition was possible because of the public role assessors played in powerful
courts.255
Assessors and former assessors recognized the honor derived from serving in a
public position that was so closely connected to the defense of justice. We can tell that
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assessors prized the honor because they and their families exploited the position as a
mark of honor in their funerary inscriptions. Over time, however, the inscriptional habit
changed. Whereas up to the third century inscriptions attesting the position of assessor
were more common, after the third century, inscriptions become vaguer.256 Instead of
using the term assessor, individuals or their families inscribed phrases that invoked the
broader discourse of assessor as justice by using phrases such as “preserved the laws and
expertly defended rights.”257 It is unclear what motivated the change in the inscriptional
habit, but it is clear that references to both the assessorship and the justice discourse
around the assessor suggest that the assessor was a socially significant person in his
community.
The funerary inscription of Floridus is a good example. Floridus had a long career
serving as assessor, governor, and teacher of law in the fourth and early fifth century.
When he described his assessorship, he chose a vague periphrasis “lateris socius” a
companion at the side of a judge.258 Although the inscription is fragmentary, we can
surmise that Floridus described himself as one sat next to the judge and as one who knew
law well enough to teach it.259 Floridus’s description emphasized his assessorship through
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its public aspect and his own legal knowledge. This description suggests that the
assessorship was an efficient path to accruing social capital. Claiming to be the
companion of the judge, defending justice, and teaching law all align with the attributes
associated with the assessor. Floridus’s inscription exemplifies how assessors directly
employed the discourse surrounding their position as a defender of justice operating in
the public eye.
Imperial salaries were a single part of the complex phenomenon of compensation
for legal experts working for the administration. Experts also benefited from their public
positions by being visible working in public. If that work were teaching, then they were
accorded special rooms, they received gifts from grateful students and their families, and
they received pay from students and the state. But we should not become overly focused
on the state-endorsed positions of legal experts. Legal education could happen in
municipal settings or in private homes, as well. Whereas assessors as legal experts could
have the same questionable credentials as the legal experts we saw in the first section,
both the public assessor and the private legal aide relied on strategies of naming and
authority construction to obtain and execute work. Assessors, like some teachers,
received a salary, and this salary was part of a larger discussion of securing
administrative regularity and stopping corruption. In the battle against corruption,
assessors became a beacon of justice by assuring some semblance of legal knowledge and
impartiality. By providing some semblance of fairness or justice in the courts, assessors
also gained a public position that enriched them in a way similar to the teacher of law.
Working in public gave assessors an opportunity to show their skill and dedication to
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justice; these in turn could lead to promotions to positions like governor or even
praetorian prefect. The public role in turn could accrue benefits such as being bestowed
an honorary title rich with social prestige. Legal experts recognized this honorary
compensation and chose to highlight it as a fitting description of their life for the rest of
eternity.

4. Elites, Social Capital, and Legal Favors
Legal experts in the late Roman Empire could gain another form of honor or
social capital by employing their expertise for aristocrats. The social elite of the late
Roman Empire relied on one another for legal advice. Their reliance was part of a wider
network of exchange that knit elites closely together.260 By assisting aristocrats, legal
experts traded legally authoritative objects, like legal documents or arguments, for an
exclusive form of social capital, away from the wider, uneducated public. Here, again,
Bourdieu’s symbolic capital is heuristically useful because it helps us identify the labor
of experts, even among the aristocracy, as accruing a form of rarefied capital. Although
elites and their legal experts—who may also be members of the aristocracy—transacted
their cases, they abstained from discussing money. Compensation, instead followed a
different format, in which experts were rewarded with culturally significant objects (like
poems) or socially significant objects (like friendship and reciprocity). Though these
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objects are removed from the purely financial aspects of compensation, they nevertheless
were valuable forms of compensation in the late Roman world.
We can see an example of this sort of exchange of legal expertise for exclusive
social capital in the Letters of Sidonius Apollinaris, a powerful nobleman of the fifth
century Gallic aristocracy.261 Sidonius’s social position in the aristocracy can be seen in
the roles he served in: in the fifth century, Sidonius served as Urban Prefect in Rome and
later as Bishop of Clermont. Sidonius’s family was a stalwart institution in the Gallic
nobility: his grandfather served as praetorian prefect, his father as consul, and Sidonius
even married the Emperor Avitus’s daughter, Papianilla.262 Sidonius maintained his
position in the aristocracy through masterful displays of learning in his poems and
allusive letters.263 Sidonius collected, edited, and published his letters, following the
format set by the master epistolographer, Pliny the Younger.264 The curation of
Sidonius’s nine books of epistles puzzles scholars because he refrained from publishing
his letters in chronological order, according to recipients, or according to topic.265 Each
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letter, regardless of where it falls in Sidonius’s life, displays Sidonius expertly operating
in elite society, calling in favors and ingratiating himself with other members of the elite.
The letters construct an image of a sophisticated and powerful individual who denotes his
position in society with ostentatious displays of erudition.
When Sidonius sent someone a letter or poem, he used his erudition as part of the
complex system of relationships in his elite network. Sidonius used his poetic erudition
and his office holding as forms of social capital; he could leverage his social capital for
legal advice. In fact, in Sidonius’s Epistles, he wrote to four individuals known for their
legal ability and either commented on their legal prowess or asked them for assistance in
resolving legal disputes either for himself or for his friends.266 By incorporating his
requests for legal aid into his published letters, Sidonius signals the normative force legal
expertise had in his elite network.
One example of Sidonius leveraging his social capital for legal assistance can be
found in his letters to Petronius. Petronius too was part of the Gallic nobility and operated
in the same spheres as Sidonius.267 In Sidonius’s representation of Petronius, he was also
a man of letters. The first epistle of Book VIII of Sidonius’s letters begins with a letter to
Petronius, who supposedly encouraged Sidonius to complete another book after he had
promised to stop after seven books.268 Sidonius claims that he has no choice but to obey
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Petronius’s request for more letters, but recognizes that he will have to expect criticism
soon. Sidonius explains that criticism is inevitable: if Demosthenes and Cicero were
criticized for their work, then Sidonius will surely be criticized for his. By comparing
himself to Demosthenes and Cicero, Sidonius tries to make himself seem insignificant,
but he ends up—perhaps with a satisfied smirk?—making them his beleaguered peers.
Petronius’s position as the addressee marks him as a man who can discern a literary giant
as great at Demosthenes and Cicero even among his peers. Sidonius’s comparison may
redound well upon himself, but it also depicts Petronius as belonging to the learned elite.
In another letter, Ep. V.I, Sidonius combines his erudite compliments to Petronius
with a request for legal advice. The letter opens with Sidonius saying he hears that
Petronius “invests a joyful patience in perusing my letters.”269 Sidonius portrays their
relationship as one of mutual good taste. Sidonius further compliments Petronius by
saying that Petronius’s attention “is a great thing, and one most fitting for a man of
letters;” it is especially great “that the smallest things of others are embraced [by you]
since you yourself stand out in the greatest studies.”270 After depicting him as an erudite
aristocrat, Sidonius turns to asking for Petronius’s help. In return for this help, Sidonius
has only a few lines to offer, a little ditty in place of a small gift.271 Sidonius offered his
letters and poems as a symbolic capital for Petronius’s aid. The payment revealed
Petronius’s position in the aristocracy by showing the repeated correspondence between
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the two men and further strengthened the bond between them by means of the trading of
gifts: letters and poems for legal help.
The legal problem concerned Sidonius’s friend, Vincidicius, whom Sidonius
immediately characterizes as worthy of aid: a pious man and one who is very well suited
to the deaconate, which he recently attained.272 Vindicius’s introduction suggests to
Petronius that assistance would benefit the legal expert because 1) it would strengthen his
bond with Sidonius by creating a debt from the favor and 2) it would put Vindicius,
possibly a future leader of the Church in Gaul, in his debt as well. Petronius’s legal
expertise gave him the tools to maintain his elite standing in the Gallic aristocracy by
helping both Sidonius and Vindicius.
Vindicius’s problem arose after the death of his paternal cousin. Sidonius tells
Petronius that the cousin died unmarried (caelebs) and without a will.273 Sidonius’s
description is legally significant because according to the Roman law of inheritance, the
inheritance of intestate men should go to the closest male relative agnatically. Agnatic
means that they are related through the male line. By describing the unmarried (celibate?)
cousin as paternal--that is, related to him on his father’s side--Sidonius understands that
Vindicius could inherit as the closest agnate. However, an unspecified force was
threatening to make trouble for Vindicius.274 This unspecified force could be one of a
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number of individuals who might ask for an intercession based on the belief that, though
they might not have been legally recognized (such as illegitimate children, spouses,
individuals who received promises of payment or bequests etc.), they still had a claim to
the inheritance. An unrecognized child or spouse could make a potentially damaging
claim by petitioning for an intercession from the governor. Such an intercession, known
as possessio bonorum as discussed above in the request of Marcus Aurelius Didymus,
would obviate Vindicius’s agnatic claim to the inheritance. Finally, there is also the more
unscrupulous possibility that Vindicius did not consider his cousin’s will as legitimate
and thus described him as intestate. A failed will was as forceful as no will. Vindicius
could reasonably ask for legal assistance, because the Roman legal theorization about
inheritance was complex: as Paul du Plessis points out, “about a quarter of the Digest and
the Institutes” was devoted to inheritance.275
Sidonius sought Petronius’s help and communicated his request through a shared
elite discourse. In the final line of the letter, he compliments Petronius again by saying
that after Christ’s help, Petronius’s legal aid is the next best thing.276 Sidonius makes no
mention of any payment, but says that “if his character is worthy, his case will result in
victory.”277 After having connected Vindicius’s victory to Petronius’s intervention,
Sidonius insinuates that Petronius will be the one deciding if Vindicius wins or not. If
Petronius does not help, Vindicius is doomed. With Petronius’s help, Vindicius is surely
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saved. Sidonius’s recommendation of Vindicius established the new deacon as an
important person in Gallic society while his request tested and, if successful, strengthened
the bond between Sidonius and Petronius. Petronius’s compensation can be seen in three
ways. First Petronius was asked to intercede in exchange for poems and letters. Secondly,
Petronius’s legal expertise was compensated with new and strengthened connections
within that society, particularly with Sidonius and a rising star in the Gallic church.
Thirdly, though there is no mention of it, if Petronius was successful, there was the
possibility of some financial form of appreciation from Vindicius. By asking for
Petronius’s help, Sidonius reveals a complex and aristocratic economy of legal
interactions and social practices that compensated legal experts in symbolic and
culturally significant ways that were, nonetheless, difficult to quantify.

5. Conclusion
Legal experts in the late Roman world were compensated in complex ways. They
could be paid in cash or kind for individual tasks, salaries for longer positions, honors for
working in the public gaze, and exclusive prestige for helping elites. As we saw in the
discussion of the compensation of private legal experts, individuals like jurisconsults and
translators or document writers could be paid for the services that they performed in a
case. These experts claimed a degree of legal expertise in order to construct an
authoritative and reliable persona. This persona in turn helped ensure the validity of the
documents the experts created. The strategies of authority construction were also
employed by experts who worked for the imperial administration. Individuals could teach
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law in imperial schools, in private settings, or in municipal schools. These teachers relied
on a network of reciprocity to augment their salaries, if they received them. Perhaps the
most important aspect of a law teacher’s compensation was his ability to garner public
attention for teaching in public auditoria. Public work earned honor, because it happened
in the gaze of the wider public and of administrative officials, like governors and
emperors. As we saw with the assessor, working in public view could lead to high
promotion. Working in the public also implicitly promised that the individual, whether
they were teaching law or advising judges, was doing so correctly and honestly.
Assessors especially benefited from the public gaze because they became beacons of
justice in the late imperial world when the judge could not be expected to have mastery
over the law. The final aspect of a legal expert’s compensation can be seen in the private
social capital the expert obtained in return for advising his elite friends.278 When legal
experts advised members of the aristocracy, the experts created and reinforced
connections among the elite. They traded their expertise for social capital as they advised
the highest echelon of Roman society. In all of these scenarios, legal experts transacted in
distinct economies of capital and deployed their legal expertise and personas to obtain
money, honor, and status.
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Chapter 3: Legal Lumpiness of the Late
Roman Empire
In this chapter, I examine the variability of legal practice throughout the Roman
Empire. Even though litigants took part in an Empire-wide discourse of law, local notions
of law and justice conditioned the practice of Roman law. A legal expert’s audience
depended on his position in the legal landscape of the Roman Empire. Here, we have to
shift from the discussions of legal pluralism, a concept which examines the coexistence
of multiple legal orders in the same place, and begin to explore the heterogeneity of a
single legal regime across space. How consistent was the practice of Roman law across
the Roman Empire? Lauren Benton’s discussion of “legal lumpiness” in modern colonial
empires acts as a fruitful model of such heterogeneity.279 Investigating the legal
lumpiness of the late Roman Empire shows us that legal experts operated in diverse legal
environments within the Empire and that their practice varied according to the contours
of local conceptions of legality.
My argument proceeds first by analyzing the discourse of legal universalism in
the late Empire in order to understand how Roman legal order, though heterogenous,
could be considered a single, shared entity. Next I summarize Benton’s concept of legal
lumpiness, which is characterized by a series of recurrent metaphors describing law and
space. Following Benton, I analyze similar types or connected concepts of law and space
as instantiated in the late Roman world that each represent a unique understanding of how
law is done, what its sources are, and how it should structure the world. Each of the
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spaces represents an aspect of law that can be emphasized in order to make an argument
about what is or at least should be legal or illegal. The Roman types of legal space
include law schools, imperial centers, islands, and provincial cities. These figures in the
legal landscape of the Empire had noticeable effects on the practice of law to the point
that each space determined how law might be practiced in that region. Each of these types
appears in the late Roman geographical text, the Expositio Totius Mundi et Gentium, the
“Description of the Whole World and Peoples,” in which the author considers legal
practice an important component for understanding spaces in the Roman world. The
types of legal space in the Roman world reveal that certain legal concerns and strategies
were endemic to particular geographies of the Roman Empire. I conclude that although
Roman law was an Empire-wide practice, this practice was highly contingent on its
specific instantiation in the various spaces of the Roman world.

1. Legal Universalism
In this section, I argue that there existed a complicated connection between the
idea of Roman rule and Roman law. Roman rule did not always entail the absolute
subjugation of the inhabitants of the Empire under the Roman styles of governance. On
the contrary, the direct rule of the Roman government was a historically contingent
phenomenon that came about in tandem with a totalizing discourse of Roman rule. This
discourse struggled with the messy reality of Roman rule: internal and external dispute
challenged imperial expectations of rule. The totalizing discourse inspired expectations of
an equally total Roman law. In this instance, the ideology of Roman law seems to have
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followed the imperial practice of law. Inhabitants of the Empire saw the Empire as the
absolute ruler of the world, and so they expected imperial law to be absolute too. While
jurists and Roman legal theory supposed a boundary between those entitled to Roman
law and those barred from it, both Roman judges and non-Roman provincials used
Roman law to solve their immediate problems. In response to this use of Roman law and
in accordance with the totalizing discourse of the Empire, the ideology of Roman law
expanded most famously in the Constitutio Antoniniana (212 CE). This constitution
enfranchised most free men of the Empire thereby sanctioning the use of Roman law
across the Empire. Roman law now, theoretically, covered the whole Empire. This
section shows how the complicated imperial concept of a total Roman law could exist
despite the heterogeneity of the Roman Empire.
Geography played a significant role in the construction of Empire. Enumeration
of Roman provinces, defeated peoples, captured kings, and lands and rivers all displayed
a geography of the Empire and, in turn, reified the Empire both in space and in
ideology.280 In the early Empire, it was not uncommon for the Empire to be described as
hegemony—that is, Roman rule transposed over other forms of community. Strabo’s
early imperial Geographica recounts the dizzying array of statuses cities could hold
under the Romans: some cities were ruled by kings, others were designated as provinces,
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some were free, and finally still others were ruled by various rulers.281 Roman rule as
hegemony was wide but not immediate. In the later Empire, hegemony gave way to a
more direct form of rule: provinces were redrawn in the administrative reforms of
Diocletian and Constantine, which resulted in smaller, more manageable provinces with
less room for alternate forms of community ordering.282
The direct rule of the Empire was conceptualized, publicized, and celebrated (by
some) as a totalizing discourse, in which Roman rule was imagined to cover the entire
Roman world. In 298 CE, a Gallic professor of rhetoric at Autun, Eumenius, delivered a
speech of praise in which he utilized the totalizing discourse in his request to the
governor. Eumenius asked the governor for permission to redirect his own salary toward
the restoration of the school of rhetoric called the Maeniana. The Gallic emperor,
Tetricus, destroyed the school in 270. Rhetorical instruction in the city had moved to
private buildings because only the edifice of the Gallic school still stood.283 The goal of
Eumenius’s speech was to reestablish the school in all of its grandeur.284 The methods by
which Eumenius convinces the governor are indicative of the totalizing discourse of the
Empire. To convince the governor, Eumenius described a Roman Empire that rules over
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its subjects directly and nearly everywhere. For Eumenius, the Roman Empire was a
totalizing force that covered the known world.
Eumenius set out to achieve his goal by select techniques. First, he addressed a
provincial governor, a man with the rank of vir perfectissimus, thereby setting the stage
for official, elite discourse.285 Secondly, he followed Cicero’s Pro Archia and the Pro
Rege Deiotaro; the literary mirroring between Eumenius’s and Cicero’s work shows
Eumenius’s audience that he is a man of consummate erudition.286 Eumenius praised both
the Emperors and the city and even quoted his letter of appointment by Constantius to the
position of professor, all of which showed the warm relationship between Eumenius, his
city, and the emperors.287 Finally, Eumenius mentioned his former position as magister
memoriae, a high position in the Roman administration.288 These techniques stressed to
the audience that Eumenius was powerful and well connected. He understood the
workings of the Roman elite and he had the rhetorical ability to manipulate his
understanding into achievable goals.
Eumenius utilized the totalizing discourse of the Empire in two ways.289 First,
Eumenius pointed to a map of the world that once stood in the school. Eumenius
described the map and exhorted the governor to “let the young men see and contemplate
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daily every land and all the seas and whatever cities, peoples, nations the unconquered
rulers either restore by affection or conquer by valor or restrain by fear.”290 Eumenius’s
exhortation shows that he thought of the map as a physical representation of the unitary
nature of Roman rule. The map of the Roman world would not show the multiple kings,
cities, and peoples ruling themselves. Rather, the map displayed the world as ruled by
Roman emperors. The map showed a single image of Roman rule, an uninterrupted
display of complete domination since the map included the current of the ocean which
showed the very edge of the world. Eumenius’s map showed the world as it was
controlled by the Roman Empire.
The second way Eumenius employed the totalizing discourse was by enumerating
the conquests of the tetrarchs. Counterintuitively, by highlighting the conquests of the
tetrarchs, Eumenius revealed the unstable reality upon which the ideology of empire
rested. The Roman Empire could not actually dominate the whole world, because there
were still peoples outside the Roman Empire and there were regions within the Empire
that attempted to throw off Roman rule. To counteract the problem posed by foreign
enemies and internal strife, Eumenius assured his audience that one expected news of
imperial conquest any minute now coming from the Tigris, Euphrates, the plains of
Libya, the Rhine and the Nile.291 Eumenius goes on to highlight areas of past and current
conflict. Some of these areas and their people, the Persians and the Moors, symbolized
the boundaries of Empire that the successful emperors would expand, thereby making
real the total subjugation of the whole world to Roman rule. The other areas, Egypt,
290
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Batavia, and Britain, symbolized rebellions squashed within the Empire.292 Eumenius’s
message was simple: “For now, now at last it is a delight to see a picture of the world,
since we see nothing in it which is not ours.”293 The success of the tetrarchs, here
symbolized by geographic references, epitomized the totalizing discourse of Empire.294
Each emperor acted as an agent of Empire either by expanding the boundaries of the
Empire or by quelling rebellion. Eumenius’s use of the totalizing discourse encouraged
his audience to rebuild the symbols of civility and learning throughout the Empire in light
of the newfound era of peace created by the military exploits of the emperors.
The totalizing discourse of the Empire also included ideas about administration
and law. In Menander Rhetor’s late third century treatise on epideictic oratory, he divides
the praise of a city into three categories: politics, knowledge, and ability.295 When
discussing the politics of a city, he mentions that it is important to consider how the city
is ruled, what form of government it has and how well the city behaves according to its
laws. Menander abruptly ends the section on a city’s laws by saying that “this last section
of praise, however, is virtually useless today, since all Roman cities are governed by
one.”296 Whereas previously, Roman rule could be described as a pixelated hegemony of
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multiple and distinct ruling structures, rhetoric of the later Empire imposed Roman law
on the cities and areas that the Empire controlled.297 Menander informs his audience that
it was useless to discuss the law of a place because Rome provided a homogenous system
of law and government. If one praised the Roman law or administration of one city, he
essentially praised every other Roman city as well.
The ideology of Roman law had not always presupposed the ubiquity of Roman
legal rule. Before the third century CE, jurists intended Roman law to govern interactions
between Roman citizens. Gaius, for instance, says that every people establishes a law for
itself, a law that is its own and that belongs to the civitas, or polity.298 Members of the
civitas were able to access remedies and were afforded the greatest protections according
to that law. Those outside a particular ius civile, the law of the civitas, had to rely on their
own ius or the ius gentium, which applied to all people by nature. Roman law also had
tools for adjudicating legal interactions between citizens and peregrini (those without
citizenship) and, therefore, methods for keeping the categories separate. The separation
can be seen most clearly in the peregrine praetor who acted as judge for disputes between
peregrines in Rome.299 Likewise, the careful language surrounding the enfranchisement
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of individuals and cities throughout the Roman world shows that thought was given to
how Roman citizenship should function in legally plural settings.300
Even prior to the third century, during the supposed classical period, adjudication
between citizen and peregrine revealed a conflict between reality and ideology. In the
provinces, Roman governors were so often confronted with problems involving nonRoman citizens that the prospect of administering justice along either local lines or
Roman became nearly untenable.301 In response, Roman jurists developed legal tools for
extending Roman law to non-Romans. These jurisprudential tools were fiction and
analogy; they were employed for the sake of expediency.302 Roman governors employed
the fiction of citizenship in order to apply Roman law to those who were theoretically
disqualified: cases could be resolved as though the litigants were Roman citizens. From
the Roman perspective, the particularity of Roman law could be overcome by including
peregrini into Roman justice through such tools.
When we consider the legal actions of non-Roman litigants in the second century
of the Empire, we can see that non-Roman provincials did not necessarily consider their
citizenship status as barring them from Roman legal technologies.303 In the Eastern
provinces, like Syria, Egypt, and Arabia, there is evidence of inhabitants using Roman
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legal techniques even though they were not citizens. Drafts of contracts in the Babatha
archive from second century Arabia use Roman stipulatio, a kind of Roman contract that
required both parties to use specific language of promising to make the contract valid.304
Babatha, like many other non-Roman provincials, interacted with Roman law often
enough to realize that Roman legal language and tools could be persuasive even in her
local situation. Although Roman law may have been intended specifically for the
interaction between Roman citizens, nevertheless interaction between Roman citizens and
peregrini taught both that Roman law could be a useful device for resolving disputes
outside of the strict confines of citizenship.
The ideological difference between citizen and peregrinus, which was already
challenged by Roman judges and non-citizens using Roman legal technologies, became
significantly less important after the promulgation of the Constitutio Antoniniana in 212
CE.305 The Antonine constitution enfranchised most free inhabitants of the Empire.306
Perhaps paradoxically, at least to modern audiences, the edict does not seem to have
ushered in a grand imposition of Roman law. Rather it brought the previous practice of
Roman governors and inhabitants of the Empire who entered into Roman court for
dispute resolution into line with the wider discourse of Roman rule.307 After 212 CE,

304

Czajkowski and Eckhardt, “Law, Status, and Agency,” 10-11.
Peter Garnsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1970) 266: Garnsey argues that the citizen/alien distinction was replaced after the
Constitutio Antoniniana with the new honestiores/humiliores distinction.
306
For a summary of the texts available for the reconstruction of the Constitution, see Peter van
Minnen, “Three Edicts of Caracalla? A New Reading of P. Giss. 40,” Chiron xlvi (2016) 205221.
307
See Ari Bryen for a study of the use of the Constitutio Antoniniana in P. Giss. 40 by litigant
who had the legislation copied. Ari Bryen, “Reading the Citizenship Papyrus (P. Giss. 40),” in
150
305

inhabitants of the Roman Empire could make a claim in a Roman court, before a
governor or praetor, and employ Roman law just as many had been doing before but now
they could do so by virtue of their Roman citizenship. The Antonine Constitution
validated the legal practices of both judges and non-Roman provincials by aligning legal
ideology with the totalizing discourse of the Roman Empire.
Through these mechanisms—the use of legal fiction, the adoption of Roman legal
technology by non-Roman citizens, and the grant of citizenship to most free inhabitants
of the Roman Empire—Roman law spread throughout the Roman world not by the
imposition of any imperial power but rather by the demands and conflicts of individuals
throughout the Empire. The totalizing discourse of Empire and the ideology of Roman
law intertwined to create a Roman Empire in which everyone could lay claim to the same
legal system. In this way, Roman law covered the Empire. That coverage, however, was
not actually uniform or consistent. Rather, the legal landscape of the Roman world was
highly varied, and there were multiple ways of practicing the same Roman law. In short,
the Roman Empire was legally lumpy.

2. Legal Lumpiness
“Legal lumpiness” or legal heterogeneity is the notion developed by Lauren
Benton in her book A Search for Sovereignty to describe the repeated legal cultures,
circumstances, and practices that were recurrent in the colonial empires of the British,
Spanish, and Portuguese from the fifteenth to the early twentieth century. These empires
Citizenship and Empire in Europe 200-1900, ed. By Clifford Ando (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2016),
29-45.
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created strands of legal authority across the world. The strands could coexist so that
multiple forms of legality—that is, communally shared conceptions of what constitutes or
at least should constitute law—inhabited the same place.308 This coexistence resulted in a
legally plural setting with multiple imperial fora of dispute resolution.309 A Search for
Sovereignty catalogues some of the various kinds of legality—that is, the social
construction of legal meaning—according to how they were described in geographic
language.310 Places described as riverine regions were thought to radiate law and
sovereignty so that the further one went down the river or the further inland one went, the
more tenuous the legal connection to the colonial metropole. The tenuousness of that
connection resulted in charges of mutiny and treason as expedition leaders claimed to be
representatives of a sovereign power to the dissatisfaction of those around them.311
Oceans were thought of as narrow passageways between ports that created thin bands of
colliding imperial authority. In these narrow ways, sailors often deployed legal language
and ritual on their ships to settle disputes between one another in the name of royal
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authority.312 Legal practice on the islands was characterized by practices of penal law and
martial law since islands were well suited to forced labor. The degrees of personal status
created in these insular legal environments gave rise to tensions between local authority
and imperial oversight as claims of despotic rule were sometimes hurled at island
officials.313 Finally, colonial legal authority struggled to reach into hill country and
highland where multiple legal strategies were used to contest legal authority. These
spaces of legal anomaly repeated throughout imperial projects to the degree that each
geographic feature may be understood as a representative of a kind of legal space. This
legal space was, in turn, characterized by distinct and prevalent microcultures of law. By
collecting a bricolage of legal spaces, Benton convincingly demonstrates that “empires
did not cover space evenly but composed a fabric that was full of holes, stitched together
out of pieces, a tangle of strings.”314 Furthermore the complexity created by such legal
heterogeneity did not result in lawlessness, but in legally complex zones.315 The legal
heterogeneity found throughout the colonial imperial projects is legal lumpiness.
The notion of legal lumpiness can be usefully employed as a heuristic frame to
describe legal heterogeneity in the Roman imperial project, especially in the late Empire.
In Benton’s study, certain strategies were more prominent in some regions than others.
These strategies were so prevalent that the geographic descriptions of the spaces were
used as metaphors for their legal qualities. The river lands were characterized by
accusations of mutiny and treason, the high seas became stages for legal disputes, islands
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were breeding grounds for despotic rule, and highlands lacked a strong imperial legal
presence. These strategies were so effective in their particular areas that they colored the
impression of the place. In the late Roman world, we can see a similar phenomenon
where legal landscapes were characterized by distinct features in the geography of the
Empire. For instance, places with law schools, like Beirut, were frequented by young
men who hoped juristic knowledge would grant them effective legal strategies and
successful careers. In the imperial capitals, like Rome, one’s social connections could
easily affect the outcome of a dispute, as one was more likely there to step on the toes of
senators or other elites in their daily lives. On small, Roman islands, there was a
persistent concern about how to reach judges other than the provincial governor. Finally,
in some provincial cities, the local conceptions of justice might differ from an imperial
Roman legal notion; this difference could result in violence. These four geographic
categories became types of legal space for legal practice in the late Roman world as each
was associated with unique legal characteristics. Granted, these characteristics could be
found in other areas or regions, but each one possessed a unique connection to individual
geographic features. Benton’s analysis of the legal heterogeneity of modern European
colonial empires is useful for Roman scholarship because her notion of recurrent legal
features and strategies in certain geographic spaces corresponds well to the Roman world.
The schools, imperial centers, islands, and provincial cities of the Roman world operated
as unique legal spaces under the broad umbrella of Roman law.
Benton’s discussion of legal heterogeneity offers a unique approach to Roman
legal history. Traditionally, scholars have considered juristic discourse and imperial
constitutions as the only or primary form of Roman law. This definition of Roman law
154

leads one to conceptualize law and legal practice as a stable heuristic system in which, if
there is any variation from the imperial expectation of practice, it must be the result of
corruption, vulgarization, or decadence.316 The resulting idealization of Roman law
privileges classical juristic texts over the changing legal world of the late Roman Empire.
In response to this kind of approach, there has been a wave of scholarship that attempts to
collect the evidence of legal practice as a social phenomenon within the wider Empire,
thereby focusing on the diverse range of legal strategies in the imperial system.317 Instead
of seeking to qualify or criticize legal practice, this wave of scholarship is focused on
why and how people utilized Roman law in the Empire to solve local problems. In the
end, however, both kinds of scholarship, the older juristic focused one and the newer
strategy focused one, are broadly concerned with law as an imperial phenomenon.
In response to these imperial-centric models of law, another distinct kind of
Roman legal scholarship has emerged that looks at legal practice within individual
regions or provinces.318 The specificity with which these legal provincial studies view
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Roman law has led to a more sophisticated understanding of the local machinations of
law and practice. This kind of scholarship, however, tends to lose sight of the imperial
nature of legal practice. We can think of the problem the provincial legal studies and the
imperial legal studies present in terms of identity. On the one hand, in the imperial model,
one loses focus on the local or provincial identities being employed in practice. On the
other hand, in the provincial studies, one devalues the imperial or cosmopolitan identities
in favor of more immediate or proximal concerns.319
It is at this intersection between imperial and local identities that Benton’s study
of legal heterogeneity is most useful for scholarship of the late Roman world. Benton’s
framework allows us to situate local legal practice within the wider Empire. This local
practice is far less structured or professional than legal practice in the sense of the
practice of jurists. Rather, local practice is the instantiation of a particular legality or
argument about what should constitute law and justice. This step from jurists’ practice to
broader, communal practice of law is necessary for Roman legal scholarship because
inhabitants of the Roman Empire too recognized the impact local situations could have
on the imperial practice of law. One text that clearly demonstrates the recognition of legal
heterogeneity within the Empire is the fourth century geographic text, the Expositio
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Totius Mundi et Gentium.320 The Expositio and its closely related, abbreviated text,
Descriptio Totius Mundi, describe the mid fourth century world.321 Much of the
beginning of the Expositio is lost, but the Descriptio can give us some idea of what the
text originally entailed.322 The first five paragraphs of the Descriptio promise the
prospective audience, here addressed as carissime fili, “my dear son,” to explain the
many wonderful histories of the world so that he might both know useful things and
adorn his own wisdom with great variety.323 The author of the Expositio draws together
identifiable written sources, some things that seem like fables, and his own autopsy to
describe the world, from east to west.324 The author enumerates various peoples of the
east until he gets to the Roman Empire. His description of the Eastern half of the Empire,
especially in the Levant region is fairly robust, but as he moves further and further west,
he begins to display some oddities. For instance, the final place the author describes,
Britain, is placed in the Mediterranean sea, next to Sicily and Sardinia. As strange as the
author’s worldview might seem, the text displays a geographic understanding of the
Roman world: it describes the physical location of places, their importance in the Empire
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both economically and politically, and the unique legal attributes of certain areas. As a
geographic document, the Expositio is a good candidate for an investigation into the legal
lumpiness of the Roman Empire.
I shall use the Expositio as a starting point for my analysis of the four types of
legal space of the late Roman world: law schools, imperial centers, islands, and
provincial cities. Legal experts operated in each of these areas by making their arguments
and by deploying Roman law, but each area also had a unique legal environment to which
those experts had to conform their practice of Roman law in order to operate
successfully. The Expositio catalogues the legal attributes of four places that correspond
to these wider types: Beirut and its famous law school, the imperial capital of Rome, the
islands of the Cyclades, and Alexandria, that famously unruly city. In addition to the
Expositio, we will consider how other inhabitants of the Roman Empire too recognized
and employed the types of legal space to accommodate local variation within the Empirewide legal practice. Just as the legal landscapes of modern colonial empires had multiple
legal attributes, so too the Roman Empire was characterized by landscapes with distinct
legal cultures, circumstances, and practices.

3. Law Schools and Bookish Justice
The first kind of legal space we shall consider is the law school. The most famous
law school of the late Roman period is undeniably the one found at Beirut.325 The
presence of the law school affected the practice of law in and around Beirut by
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contributing to a culture of law that emphasized a textually based legal practice. The
professors, students, alumni, and admirers helped perpetuate a belief that legal texts like
imperial constitutions and those of jurists offered an effective avenue to justice. While we
have little evidence of court room proceedings from Beirut contemporary with the
Expositio, we do know that the Eastern Roman Empire developed a preference for
jurisprudentially trained advocates throughout the period of the late Roman Empire. The
preference can be seen in the number of students from the Eastern Empire attending the
school at Beirut and from later, fifth century legislation that tries to mandate that
advocates at Praetorian courts have diplomas from law schools. The prevalence of
jurisprudentially trained advocates in the East should not be read as an indictment of the
Western Empire since, as we will see throughout this chapter, different strategies of legal
rhetoric were employed throughout the Empire.326 Rather, the emphasis on text-based
legal training found at Beirut helped shape the legal landscape around it by cultivating a
preference for jurisprudentially educated advocates. In the following, I will discuss the
passage on Beirut from the Expositio; then I will proceed to analyze how the law school
affected the legal practice of the surrounding area. From these considerations, we will see
that law schools inflected legal practice in the regions around them by augmenting the
preference for a formally juristic practice of law.
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A. Student Travel
In the Expositio, the author describes Beirut as a productive legal node: it
produces legal experts who bring their practice of law to the rest of the Roman world.
The author says of the city that it is “a particularly beautiful city and it has auditoria of
laws, on account of which all the courts of the Romans seem to stand. Indeed, from that
place learned men assist judges and by knowing the laws, guard the provinces, to which
the regulations of the laws are sent.”327 The auditoria of laws were the law school of
Beirut.328 The school empowered Beirut to be legally productive in the eyes of the author
because it sent its alumni across the Roman world. As we shall see, for the author of the
Expositio, no other space was as famous for its export of legal knowledge, practice, or
experts. As such, we can see the city exporting and importing law in two main forms:
alumni and their practice.
Beirut’s importance as a legal exporter was a sustained phenomenon. The school
had been exporting legal experts for at least a century by the time the Expositio was
composed. The earliest reference to the school was by Gregory Thaumaturgus, a third
century bishop who studied briefly at Beirut before moving to Palestine.329 The
significance of the law school as an exporter can be seen in the sheer number of students
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we know went to the school. Paul Collinet, in his foundational book, Histoire de l’école
de droit de Beyrouth, identified 51 students who attended the school.330 Of the 51, we
have record of at least six who worked outside of Beirut after their education. The six
alumni presumably found work in Arabia, Asia, Constantinople, Pamphylia, Illyricum,
and Phoenicia.331 Two of those six, Theodorus and Anatolius, even went on to hold high
positions in the government in the mid-fourth century. The defining force of the school,
however, must have been in the sheer number of advocates, jurists, and assessors who
trained at the school but left no trace in the evidentiary record. Alumni like Zenodoros,
Palladius, and Hermogenes left few traces of their work after studying at Beirut. All we
have are short references to them; these references comment on the alumni’s work as
advocates and assessors as though these were mundane facts to be passed over for their
ubiquity. The alumni were unremarkable in the eyes of their contemporaries, which
suggests to us that alumni from Beirut were probably common and therefore were likely a
powerful determining force in how law was practiced. Though it is difficult to compose a
comprehensive list of where students went after their education, the few examples we
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have of alumni throughout the Eastern Empire corroborate the author of the Expositio’s
observation that the school’s learned men spread throughout the Roman world.
Inversely, the school not only sent students out as the Expositio records, it also
imported students as well. The school attracted students from across the Eastern half of
the Empire. Collinet’s work shows that the school drew on students from the areas of
Arabia, Armenia, Asia Minor, Bithynia, Cappadocia, Caria, Cilicia, Egypt, the Euphrates,
Constantinople, Greece, Iberia, Illyria, Lycia, Osrhoene, Palestine, Pamphylia, Phoenica,
Pisidia, and Syria.
We can see the allure the school had for students in the East from the works of
Libanius as he responds in three ways to students traveling to Beirut. Libanius, a
professor of rhetoric in Antioch in the fourth century, left the largest epistolary corpus
from the ancient world. From his orations and letters, we can see three different responses
to students traveling to Beirut: complaining about the students traveling to Beirut, helping
the students get to Beirut, and trying to bring back errant young men who went to Beirut
without permission. The first response can be found in his Orations, where the rhetor
defends himself against accusations that he has failed his students. Libanius alleges that
the problem is actually the students who flee the rhetorical education they could receive
from him.332 The students flock instead to the Phoenician law school, Beirut. In Oration
62, “Against the Critics of his Educational System,” Libanius defends himself from the
accusation that his students are unable to secure good jobs after graduation.333 One of the
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reasons, he claims, that students might have difficulty is because they quit their rhetorical
education and move as “a mass stampede” toward the law school.334 In his eyes, students
make a fundamental mistake because they can’t retain both skills, law and rhetoric. If
they study the one, the other fades so it would be better for the students if they simply
stayed under Libanius’s tutelage. Libanius’s argument is not so much against the study of
law, but that his students lack the perseverance to master rhetoric under his tutelage. In
Libanius’s oration, we can see Libanius constructs his defense of his teaching around the
phenomenon of students moving to study at Beirut thereby emphasizing the draw of the
school in the surrounding areas.
The other two responses to students studying at Beirut can be seen in Libanius’s
letters. For someone who claimed that legal knowledge weakened rhetorical ability,
Libanius had a surprisingly robust correspondence with professors of law at Beirut. In
many of his letters to professors at Beirut, Libanius, quite contrary to his orations,
commends students to his legal colleagues. He introduces his students to law professors
and recommends the students to the professors’s care. Libanius’s letters of
recommendation were part of an epistolary practice of patronage; the letters suggest that
Libanius supported his students’ decision to pursue a legal education.335 In one letter,

problem, are discussed by Raffaella Cribiore, The School of Libanius in Late Antique Antioch,
(Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 2007), ch. 7 “After Rhetoric”; Wolf Leibescheutz,
Antioch City and Imperial Administration in the Later Roman Empire, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1972) 242-255.
334
Lib. Or. 62. 21; Humfress points out that this passage does not prove the demise of rhetoric
but is a response to accusations of failure of Libanius’s teaching. Caroline Humfress, Orthodoxy
and the Courts in Late Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 13.
335
See Hall, Roman Berytus, 204-206 and J.H.W.G. Leibeschuetz, Antioch: City and Imperial
Administration in the Later Roman Empire.
163

Libanius asks Domninus, a professor of law at Beirut, to take a student, Apringius, at a
discount. Libanius tells Domninus that “this fellow [sc Apringius] is good but poor; if he
is unable to pay you, he is indeed capable of remembering a favor.”336 Libanius
recognized the draw of the school and the career prospects it offered even if he also
complained of students leaving in his oration. Libanius took part in the elite practice of
recommendation and network building: he acted as Apringius’s recommender thereby
strengthening the bond between the professor of rhetoric and the student and he
suggested that Domninus, the law professor, likewise form such a bond with Apringius.
Contrary to his complaints in Oration 62, the letters to the professors of law at Beirut
show Libanius helping young men attend the law school at Beirut.
The third kind of response to the draw the school had is found in another of
Libanius’s letters. In this letter, however, Libanius disapproved of someone’s travel to
Beirut. In the letter to Gaianus, the governor of Phoenicia, Libanius recounts how the son
of a friend had run away to Beirut.337 The son, Theodotus, got on a ship and ran away to
Beirut after his father scolded him. Libanius asks for Gaianus’s help in returning the son.
Libanius tells the governor to be careful because the son will beg to stay: “whether he
praises the study of laws or says that he loves Berytus (Beirut) or pours forth tears or says
something else, do not let him persuade you to frustrate the efforts of his father.”338
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Libanius expected the son to use the study of law as a reasonable pretext for running
away to Beirut because the school held such promise for young men of the time. The son
would have had some idea what the school was like and what life after school could hold
because, as Libanius explains later in his letter, his older brother had been allowed to
study law. This son would have to study oratory, even if he preferred the law school.
Libanius’s three kinds of response show how individuals in the area developed
strategies for living in this unique legal terrain. While teaching nearby, Libanius saw his
students enticed by the prospect of a legal education. Although some have interpreted this
as the downfall of rhetoric and the rise of law, it would be wrong to interpret Libanius’s
behavior as the failure of a rhetorical education in a bureaucratizing society. In the
oration, it is imperative to note that Libanius’s complaint is couched in his own defense.
His tirade against the law school is simply a matter of blaming the school to distract his
detractors. When we look at the other two responses, we see that Libanius’s endorsement
of his students’ legal education suggests that he did not fear the failure of his profession.
On the contrary, getting the right students into the law school, i.e. those who first asked
for his help, could cement Libanius’s position in the elite world and help those students
become members of elite society. Libanius petitioned law professors on his students’
behalf because that is how the elite transacted their business and grew their social
networks. Students who failed to ask for his help or failed to earn it were called back with
vigor. While the Expositio emphasizes people leaving from Beirut, traveling the world to
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assist judges, evidence from Libanius’s corpus suggest that the school also pulled
students from across the Empire.339

B. Practice in the East
The presence of the law school affected the practice of Roman law by producing
students who could deploy legal texts, like imperial constitutions and juristic responsa, as
part of their argumentative practice. The author of the Expositio tells us that the learned
men of Beirut “guard the provinces by knowing the laws.”340 While the alumni of Beirut
guarded against injustice, they also championed their own textual approach to law. The
school and its alumni contributed to the formation of a legal culture that privileged legal
texts as the main vehicles for producing arguments of justice.341 It has long been posited
that Beirut preserved legal practice and thought in the Eastern Empire.342 The presence of
the school in the East and the creation of much of our legal evidence from the East (the
Theodosian and Justinianic Codes alongside the Digest, Novels, and Institutes) has led
many to suppose Beirut’s role in the formation of a uniquely textual legal culture. That
connection between the school and Eastern legal culture generally, however, is difficult
to prove. Although there is no contemporary evidence that definitively proves the effect
the school had on the legal practice of the Eastern Roman Empire, there is a marked
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preference for legally trained individuals in positions of power in the fifth and sixth
centuries some of whom must have been trained at Beirut. This preference seems like the
natural continuation of the Expositio’s comment that Beirut’s alumni served as assessors,
who were legal assistants to judges. Two primary examples show the preference for
legally trained individuals. The first example is the repeated calls for the
professionalization and licensing required to practice law in the Eastern Empire. The
second example is found in the production of imperial constitutions, which often bear the
telltale signs of a legal expert. The legal expertise on display in the standardized
expectations of legal training for advocates and in the imperial constitutions suggest that
the Eastern Roman Empire was convinced of the justice the legal experts of Beirut could
provide.
The presence of the law school allowed the imperial administration to require
legal education for advocates admitted to the Praetorian Bar in the East. Three
constitutions record the requirement.343 The first constitution is from the Emperor Leo in
460 and was written to his Praetorian Prefect of the East. It required that if one is to be
admitted to the group of 150 advocates allowed to argue before the prefect, he must first
be examined by the governor of the province of his birth. This examination would lead to
the creation of documentary evidence and have an audience present to act as witness for
the proceedings. Additionally, on the same document created by the governor, Leo
ordered that the aspiring advocate’s “teachers, as legal experts, certify under oath, that the
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person who wishes thereafter to be chosen has been trained in legal expertise.”344 The
advocates at the Praetorian’s court, however, were not the only advocates in the Eastern
Empire. The law goes on to stipulate that the number above 150 would still be allowed to
practice law in other courts throughout the Eastern Empire.345 These advocates, both the
ones serving in the Praetorian’s court and the ones who were not included in the150,
would have been the highest ranking advocates in the Eastern Empire so we should not
assume that this law meant that all advocates in the Empire were held to this standard.
The other two laws requiring legal education, CJ. II.7.22 of 505 CE directed at the
court of the Comes Orientis and II.7.24 of 517 directed at the Governor’s court of the
Second Syrian province, both repeat the same line: “nor in the future shall anyone
become a member of the above mentioned order before he is known to have applied
himself to the study of law for the prescribed time.”346 The two later laws were both
issued by the Emperor Anastasius. The editors of the Code and the fragmentary nature of
the manuscripts make it impossible to reconstruct the legislative contexts of the laws with
any great deal of certainty. If we look to the other laws of 505 CE, we find a law that
bears a striking resemblance to the law requiring legal education. In CJ. I.4.19 (also
copied at CJ I.55.11) dated to 505, Emperor Anastasius required that defensores, a
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position with judicial responsibilities, take oaths declaring their orthodox faith.347 Both
this law about defensores and the one about advocates may serve the same purpose of
setting an initial bar of credentials required for holding a position. Defensores were
powerful members of their community who received public funds. As such Anastasius’s
law might have been aimed at creating a tool by which members of the community could
control the appointment of defensores. In fact, the law ends with that very stated purpose:
“We order that defenders be appointed in such a way that they are installed by the
resolution of the most reverend bishop and clergymen, men of rank, landholders, and
curials.348” We might profitably think of these laws as being gatekeepers of the
profession rather than as positive recognition of either the applicants’ legal knowledge or
religious inclination.
These three laws of 460, 505, and 517 were collected by Justinian’s compilers
into the second book of his Code under the title, Advocates of the Various Courts, and we
should be hesitant to read them as simple proof for the legal expertise of the Eastern
Empire. When read on their own they seem like evidence of a rationally evolving legal
system that slowly developed a preference for legal expertise. When read in their
contexts, however, they suggest a world that is hesitant to change. Rather than bringing a
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sweeping change in 460, the law of Leo might have had only limited effects in the
highest court of the land. The later laws, of 505 and 517, may have used the same
technique of requiring legal education to depress the numbers of possible advocates in the
courts. In fact, Anastasius may have found this kind of requirement an effective tool for
keeping the rolls short when he required defensores to take oaths of faith. While these
requirements may speak to wider goals of religion and legal expertise in the Empire, they
could also simply be an additional impediment to office holding. Whatever purpose these
laws may have originally served, it is clear that requiring legal education would only be
feasible in a world where at least some could receive a legal education. Rather than being
simple proof of the legal expertise of the East, these laws suggest a complicated
relationship between law schools and legal practice wherein Emperors and litigants
increasingly found legal education to be a useful skill for legal practice.
The law school’s contribution to the legal culture of the East can also be seen in
the number of legally trained individuals who served as the quaestor and the juristic style
they employed in composing laws of the Eastern Empire. By the fifth century CE, the
quaestor was responsible for the task of leges dictandae, dictating the laws, and had other
legal responsibilities well before that.349 A temporary or even idealistic image of the
process of legislation is captured in CJ I.14.8, of November 7th, 426 CE.350 In the
constitution, legislation was supposed to begin when an idea or problem was brought
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before the Emperor’s council, the consistory. The idea was discussed and a response
would be formulated if necessary. Once a fitting response had been decided on by the
council, the quaestor drafted a provisional copy of the response, which would be
discussed one final time in the consistory. After it received its final approval, the
Emperor subscribed or signed the law composed by the quaestor and the law was sent to
an office to be dispatched to the appropriate recipients. In sum, laws were composed of
ideas brought before the consistory and, if necessary, recomposed by the quaestor to be
worthy of the imperial voice.351 Laws composed during the tenure of individual quaestors
could retain their idiosyncratic styles.
Tony Honoré suggests that these idiosyncratic styles can be indicative of whether
the quaestor who wrote the law was a lawyer or not.352 In his study of quaestors during
the Theodosian dynasty, Honoré argues that Eastern quaestors were more likely to be
trained in law and that their training is evident in the way they composed laws during
their tenure. Honoré argues that during the rule of the Theodosian Dynasty there were 30
Eastern quaestors and of that 30, 10 were definitely lawyers and 5 more were probably
lawyers (~50%). When compared to the West, of which Honoré identifies 19 total
quaestors with only 5 as lawyers (~26%), the East displays a greater concern with
employing legally trained bureaucrats to represent the Emperor’s voice.353
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Honoré’s methodology is problematic because, as he notes, sometimes the law as
it was originally suggested to the consistory would not require significant rewriting.354
The quaestor’s style would be absent from laws he did not rewrite.355 Other sources of
interference could come from debate within the consistory and imperial opinion.356 In
addition, Honoré’s criteria for lawyerly work relies on the idea that the lawyerly
quaestors wrote more legally exact laws while those without legal training tended to write
less precise laws. While it is reasonable to assume that one with a legal education could
write in precise legalese, the absence of such stylistic markers does not prove that
individuals lacked legal training. Rather, the absence of legalese simply suggests that the
person who composed the law decided not to write it in a legally precise way.
Even though one can criticize Honoré’s methodology, his investigation
demonstrates that the East had a robust legal culture that valued the use of legal language
in the formation of imperial constitutions. Furthermore, his criteria for lawyerly work fits
well with the kind of legality that was produced and practiced at Beirut. This legality can
be found in the laws Honoré studies because whereas he is attempting to associate legal
specificity with quaestors, he is also marking a profusion of distinct legal language in the
East. The abundance of the legal language suggests that, in addition to the requirement
for legally trained individuals as advocates, inhabitants of the East employed distinct
legal language in their legislation as well. The presence of the textual legality can be
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attributed to the legal experts acting as quaestors, as Honoré argues, and to the persuasive
power such legality had over inhabitants of the Eastern Empire. While Honoré’s thesis is
confronted by the possibility of multiple sources of legal language in legislation, we can
read the plurality of sources as a demonstration of the ubiquity of a preference for this
kind of legality. The fact that the legal culture of the East preferred the kind of legality
learned in Beirut’s law school suggests that the school affected the practice of law in the
Eastern Empire by creating individuals who represented a distinctly juridical or even
bookish legality.
The Expositio marks Beirut as a legally unique area. As we saw, Beirut acted as
an important distributor of legal experts and expertise. Beirut had a strong draw on
individuals throughout the Eastern Empire and then sent alumni to hold powerful
positions. Most likely, the greatest effect the school had was to be found in its
uncountable students who left us no trace but presumably went on to staff courts, give
advice, and write laws throughout the Eastern Empire. While we cannot trace these
students with ease, we can see a strong correlation between the distinctly textual legal
culture of the East and the sort of legality practiced by the school’s alumni. The presence
of the school most likely contributed to the recurrent insistence on legal training for
members of the bar in the Eastern Empire and the profusion of legal language in
legislation during the Theodosian dynasty. The law school at Beirut was remarked upon
by the author of the Expositio because of the powerful effect the school had on the legal
landscape of the Empire. The Expositio’s comments resonate with other late Roman
perceptions of the legal landscape and the prevalence of the textual legality practiced at
Beirut.
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4. Imperial Centers and the Complication of the Social Elite
In this section, we will consider a kind of legal space that was complicated by the
presence of social elites. In imperial centers, like Rome and Constantinople, social elites
could easily, and often times legally, manipulate cases to their advantage. Roman law had
multiple categories for people according to their social standing: for example, free and
slave, freed and freeborn, humiliores and honestiores (the more humble and the more
honorable), and a hierarchy of imperial titles, that is the titles awarded to those who held
high offices. For the most part, these social categories were not hard, closed categories.
Individuals could move between them. Judges and bystanders could choose to disregard
the categories or could impose their own understandings of what merited special
consideration on a case by case basis. Regardless of the social fluidity of the Roman
Empire, the juristic techniques of categorization allowed Roman legal practice to
differentiate the legal powers and penalties of litigants depending on their social standing.
Elites could make demands of the legal system based on their social standing, or, as they
might put it, their innate nobility. Their demands could make legal practice in the
imperial centers unpredictable, since one was never entirely sure what extra-legal
capacities one’s opponents possessed.
To illustrate the plastic character of legally recognized social division, I will
outline the honestior/humilior division and system of imperial titles awarded to those
who held high office. These two methods of categorization are complementary because,
whereas the boundaries of the honestior/humilior division was ambiguous, the boundaries
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of the system of titles was relatively well policed. Seen together, the two methods of
categorization show why and how elites received special treatment and offer us the
opportunity to consider social class in Roman legal practice generally. Next, I will turn to
the two cities in the Empire that had a senate, Rome and Constantinople. The senatorial
order was populated by the social elite who were clear recipients of legal privilege. I will
analyze two examples, one from each city, that display the meticulous workings of social
power in judicial practice. The two examples show how imperial centers were uniquely
treacherous legal spaces because of the presence of social elites.

A. Social Categories in Law
The honestior/humilior division in Roman law was most evident in criminal
punishments. Individuals of the honestior class were generally exempt from things like
torture and extreme punishments like working in a mine or execution. The worst
punishment an honestior could expect to face was relegation or deportation to an island.
Humiliores, however, were not so lucky. They could be tortured as part of the search for
evidence, condemned to the mines for hard labor, or executed. The major difference
between the two classes concerned to what degree was the convict was liable to bodily
punishments. Whereas in classical Roman law, Roman citizens were exempt from
physical punishments and could demand trials before the Emperor, these privileges were
reduced and held only by honestiores in the late Empire.357 The only charge that
357
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consistently obviated class distinction was treason, which could result in honestiores
being tortured and executed.
The division between honestiores and humiliores, for all of its terrible
implications, was unclear. Certain elite classes were undeniably honestiores. For
instance, those who held the highest ranks in the empire, senators, and high officials were
clearly entitled to special treatment.358 Individuals in the middle were a topic for debate.
Military veterans could be considered honestiores.359 Decurions, members of city
councils, were included but could still be subject to torture for certain crimes.360
Presumably, everyone below the ranks of decurions and military veterans were
considered humiliores. When jurists or emperors discuss punishments for lower ranks,
they often specify the sorts of people they intend to make subject to punishment. For
instance, slaves were often subject to the worst penalties. Sometimes, authors specified
the class to be punished as in CTh 9.16.11, where chariot drivers were considered
especially low.361 The specificity employed for these lower classes suggests that there
was some ambiguity about who would be considered equal to a charioteer and therefore
subject to the same penalties. To make matters even more confusing, emperors could
analogize certain crimes, like counterfeiting or divination, with treason, which obviated
the class division.
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Rolf Rilinger, in his 1988 book—Humiliores-Honestiores—argued that the
bifurcated social structure implied by the honestior/humilior division was not
representative of Roman social history though there was room for social consideration in
legal practice.362 Rilinger’s argument first dismantles the idea that the division between
the two classes was a persistent phenomenon. Instead, most of the juristic evidence for
the division comes from the early fourth century Pseudo-Paul Sententiae, a compilative
juristic work whose late date should bar it from “classical” law. Rilinger argues that the
juristic discussion of class was a generalizing technique that tried to reflect changing
penal practices found in imperial constitutions. Rilinger analyzed the imperial
constitutions on criminal penalties and found that the “dual penalty” system could more
accurately be described as a triple penalty system wherein penalties became progressively
harsh as they ranged from elites like honestiores to humiliores and finally to slaves.
These classes were not clearly divided and could be grouped depending on the legislative
contexts. For instance, slaves and lower classes could be assimilated separately from the
elite, or free people (that is humiliores and honestiores) could be juxtaposed against
slaves. Rilinger’s work illustrates how the honestior/humilior division suggests a
fictitious social structure, but class was still taken as an object of consideration.
Social considerations in Roman legal practice extended beyond criminal
punishments as is best illustrated by Ulpian’s discussion of who should be trusted for
safeguarding documents like wills. In Digest 22.4.6, on “Documentary Evidence and
Loss of Documents,” Ulpian says: Where the issue is with whom a will should be
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deposited, we always prefer the elder to the younger, the higher in rank to the lower, male
to female, and freeborn to slave born.363 Ulpian’s position concerning who would count
as a trustworthy illustrates the complexity of social considerations of Roman legal
practice. Age, class, sex, personal status all are taken into consideration to the point that
an old, elite, freeborn man would be considered a reliable figure because of those
attributes whereas a young, low, slave born woman would be the least reliable. While
there were other factors that one could consider (profession, whether or not the person
had been convicted of disreputable crimes), Ulpian’s hierarchy is confirmed by the
excepts in the following heading of the Digest, 22.5, “Witnesses.” In most of the 25
excerpts of “Witnesses,” social standing or relationship determines whether one is able to
act as a witness and how reliable the testimony would be.364 The reliability of a witness is
best summarized by Digest 22.5.3: The reliability of witnesses must be carefully
assessed. One must first inquire into their status. Are they decurions or plebeians? Do
they lead an honest blameless life, or has there been some mark of disgrace? Are they
well off or needy, so that they may readily act for gain? Are they enemies of those against
whom they give evidence or friends of those for whom they give it?365 Ulpian and the
jurists excerpted under the heading “Witnesses” considered social standing an important
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factor in practicing law. The vague and porous honestior/humilior division only begins to
approximate the complex influence social status had on the practice of Roman law.
The influence social status has on Roman legal practice is most apparent in cases
involving elite litigants as they behave in courts in ways that would normally be
unacceptable for other Roman citizens. An obvious group of elites was the senatorial
order. In the late Roman Empire, there was a hierarchy of senatorial status. Status could
be obtained in four ways. First, the senate could elect an individual into their order, a
process known as adlection. The second method by which one could obtain senatorial
status was by imperial nomination. The third method of obtaining senatorial status was
simply by inheritance. The final method of obtaining senatorial status, and probably the
most common, was by serving in an imperial office such as the governor or prefect of a
city. The multiple avenues to senatorial status meant that by the early fifth century, the
senatorial aristocracy had expanded considerably.366
Opportunities to serve as governor, and therefore obtain elite status, increased at
the end of the third century when Diocletian reorganized the administration of the Empire
by dividing provinces into smaller, more manageable sizes. More provinces meant more
governors. Additionally, the emperor made many of those governorships come with an
equestrian status, the perfectissimus, a status below that of the senate but undoubtedly a
member of the honestior class.367 The three other honorific statuses used in the late
Roman Empire designate members of the senatorial order; they are in ascending order:
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clarissimus, spectabilis, and illustris.368 From Constantine forward, there was a
noticeable trend in the administration to change the equestrian governorships (those
meriting perfectissimus) to senatorial positions with the result that the number of senators
(ie those with the rank of clarissimus, spectabilis, or illustris) went up significantly. In
fact, by the early fifth century nearly all provincial governors would attain senatorial
status and these newly minted senators would make their home in the Senate at either
Rome or Constantinople.369 More important provinces, either economically or militarily,
could come with a higher ranking governorship.
The multiple ranks of aristocratic standing, either equestrian or senatorial, allowed
for immediate recognition of elite status. Further, the ranks also allowed for direct
comparison of high ranking individuals. A clarissimus governor was outranked by a
spectabilis governor and he by an illustris. The recognition of elite status led to
competition between these elite as they jockeyed for prestige and respect in high society.
The competition between members of high status affected the practice of law most
clearly in cities with senates, where senators had to register their official domicile. In
cities rich with elites, legal practice became more unpredictable as judicial authority
could be challenged by social standing.
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B. Rome
The author of the Expositio recognized the influence of the senatorial order on
legal practice. When he described the city of Rome, he listed the features of the city: the
city is wealthy, has impressive buildings, is home to the Vestal Virgins, is well situated
on the Tiber, and, finally, is home to the illustrious Roman senate.370 The author of the
Expositio says that “Rome has, moreover, the greatest senate of rich men; who, if you
want to approve each one individually, you will find all either have been, or are going to
be, or are able to be judges (iudices), though not wanting to be on account of wanting to
enjoy their things in security.”371 The connection between senators and judges makes this
passage indicative of the unique legal terrain: the legal landscape was characterized by
the presence of rich and influential men, who did not want to undertake administrative or
judicial responsibilities. The author of the Expositio recognized the positive attributes of
the city (its wealth, decoration, religious and historical significance), but also pointed to a
final caveat: the wealthy senators of Rome could be as powerful or more powerful than
the judges of the Roman world.
When the author the Expositio used the word judges (iudices), he referred to a
complex set of individuals.372 The lowest level of judge, the iudex datus or pedaneus,
would be someone appointed by a governor to handle low level cases.373 The most
common kind of judge was the governor of a province. Even more important judges
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could be vicarii, prefects, or even emperors. The range of status governors held could be
problematic if a litigant outranked or held an equal rank as the judge. In the two cities
with a senate in the Roman Empire, Rome and Constantinople, any member of the senate
would either hold the same rank as most provincial governors (clarissimus) or would
even outrank them. The social status of senators, governors, and administrators was an
important component of their judicial responsibilities, should they have them, because
dispensing justice worked much more smoothly when the judge outranked the litigants.
One example of the conflict of status between litigant and judge is found in the
Relationes, or state letters, of Symmachus during his tenure as Urban Prefect in 384 CE.
This letter complains to the Emperor that even Symmachus could not coerce a fellow
senator to stand trial. Symmachus’s letter to the Emperor shows an individual of elite
status using his status to bend the rules of law.
Symmachus wrote Relatio 28 while he was serving as the Urban Prefect of Rome,
a position that awarded him with the highest status, illustris. Symmachus’s primary
responsibilities as Prefect were judicial as he adjudicated cases and heard appeals.374 In
Relatio 28, Symmachus wrote to the Emperor to ask him to decide a case. The story
began when a woman of senatorial class, Fariana, gave a property to a man, Theseus, her
freedman. Fariana used Scirtius, a man of equestrian rank, to deliver the property to
Theseus. There is some disagreement about whether or not Fariana’s wishes had been
carried out completely by Scirtius. The disagreement arose because Theseus’s children
claimed that half of the property was intended for Theseus and the other half was
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intended for them. Scirtius claimed that only half of the property was to go to Theseus
and his ilk, as one group. The rest was Scirtius’s property. Once Theseus died, Olybrius,
a man of the highest rank, illustris, acquired half of the property.375 The new
configuration of ownership, Olybrius, Theseus’s heirs, and Scirtius, was a volatile mix.
Scirtius was thrown off the property. Scirtius then asked Symmachus to intervene and
issue a praeiudicium, an injunction, that would allow Scirtius to return to the property
until ownership was decided. When Symmachus’s official went to carry out the
injunction, he was blocked by one of Olybrius’s agents. There seems to have been some
confusion because both patrons, Symmachus and Olybrius, were illustres; who was
supposed to budge first? Next, Symmachus ordered people living on the property to be
brought before his court so that he could ascertain who rightfully should have possession
of the property. Someone, presumably acting under the orders of Olybrius, detained the
inhabitants and took them away from Symmachus’s deputy. Symmachus tried again to
round up witness to attest to the rightful possession of the property and this time was able
to question a single freedmen of Theseus, who claimed that the inhabitants of the
property (here called mancipia Scirti, the slaves of Scirtius) had been carried off to
Olybrius’s villa. Symmachus instead tried to ask the town council of the city, Praeneste,
who owned the property. After interviewing the town council, Symmachus came to the
conclusion that Scirtius was the rightful possessor of the land since he had paid taxes on
it. Olybrius claimed that he owned half of the property and the heirs claimed they owned
the other half. Scirtius claimed that he owned half and that either Olybrius or the heirs
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owned the other half. Therefore, Scirtius had been unjustly ousted from his own property.
Symmachus decided to restore the property to Scirtius and as soon as he gave his
judgement, both Olybrius’s party and the heirs made a joint appeal, which was forwarded
to the Emperor.
Relatio 28 touches on many legal formalities as each of the litigants maneuvered
to obtain a preferential judgement.376 This case highlights the effect social standing could
have on legal practice.377 Olybrius and his agents had legal actions available to them
based on his elite social standing. There were few men in the Roman Empire who could
stand in the way of the deputy of the Urban Prefect or could take a train of witnesses back
to a private villa. We do not know how the case ended, but we can presume that if the
social disparity were differently arranged and Scirtius was the more elite litigant, this
case would never have made it to Symmachus’s court.378 Scirtius’s higher standing would
have been used as conclusive evidence of the validity of the claim: it would have been
remarkable if a man of equestrian status ejected a vir illustris from his property.
Additionally, we never hear of any punitive response from Symmachus for Olybrius’s
brazen tactics. Olybius was confident in the latitude his social standing gave him.
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Olybrius exemplifies the power of social standing when he used his standing to employ
legal tactics that would have been unavailable to other individuals.

C. Constantinople
The second example that exhibits the use of social status in law is found in the
Novel 15 of Theodosius II. It was written in 444 CE and given in Constantinople to the
Praetorian Prefect. The Novel was meant to respond to the actions of a vir illustris, named
Valerianus, who demanded first consideration in the court of the governor of Phoenice
Libanensis and barreled his way into the court with the help of a “horde of barbarians.”379
Valerianus also was accused of using a band of slaves to inhibit the collection of taxes.
Valerianus was apparently so displeased with the governor, a vir clarissimus, that he took
over taxation and conducted public accounts from his own home. Theodosius, in the
Novel, says he did this to defraud the state. Theodosius, however, did not respond with
the full force of the laws as he well admits and makes reference to “Our customary
mildness.” Valerianus, because of his high status, had put the administration in a difficult
situation. Had anyone else acted in this fashion, they would have been put to death or
relegated. Valerianus’s status as a vir illustris left even the Emperor unsure of how to
proceed. The punishment the imperial administration chose was to strip Valerianus of his
rank. Valerianus was downgraded to the municipal council of Emesa and was made
subject to the governor just as other decurions on the town council were. Valerianus paid
for his actions with his rank, but it should be noted that he still would have inhabited the
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very edge of the honestior class. While this case did not occur in Constantinople itself, it
was only possible because of the elite statuses produced by positions in the capital.
Additionally, the case could only be resolved by the word of the Emperor in the capital.
This example shows an elite trying to strong arm the judicial system with his social
status. While Valerianus would not have considered the outcome an unqualified success,
he certainly escaped, because of his high status, the worst punishments possible.
Legal practice in imperial centers was complicated by the presence of social
elites. Roman law had multiple ways of thinking about hierarchy and status in the
Empire, as is apparent in the phenomenon of the honestiores and humiliores. The
honestior/humilior division, however, fails to capture the complexity of the social history
of the Empire. Individuals obtained higher status through service in the government and
then used that status in competition with one another. As the case of Olybrius shows,
elites could behave in ways that would normally be unthinkable for other citizens of the
Empire. When Olybrius blocked Symmachus’s deputy, he relied on his elite standing to
validate his behavior. Senators in the Eastern half of the Empire too relied on their status
to behave in legally questionable ways. Valerianus, who held the rank illustris, went so
far as to take over the collection of taxes from the clarissimus governor. These sorts of
behavior were only possible because of the capitals where the senatorial elite garnered
their titles.
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5. Law on the Islands
Law on the islands of the Roman Empire had an intimacy problem. The smaller
populations and difficulty of travel for communities on the islands both actual and
metaphorical created a legal landscape where the insular communities would most likely
have to resort to indigenous dispute resolution tactics to solve legal quandaries.380
Indigenous tactics could come in the form of multiple kinds of fora and referees who
could offer judgment. In the Roman Empire, as discussed above, the most common judge
was the provincial governor. On the islands, however, travel between islands could be
difficult for litigants to approach the governor in the provincial capital or for the governor
to visit each island under his jurisdiction. As a result of this difficulty, inhabitants of
islands would have to rely on indigenous dispute resolution tactics more often than their
continental or cosmopolitan contemporaries. In what follows, we will first see that travel
to and from the islands was recognized as a unique judicial impediment especially in
processing appeals which required litigants to approach more powerful judges in major
cities. The author of the Expositio seems to have considered the unique legal landscape of
the islands when he remarked on the islands of the Cyclades by saying that each island
had its own judge. Clearly, the judge referred to in the Expositio could not be the
governor since he would have resided in the provincial capital of Rhodes. If the judge
was not the governor, then we need to consider next the plethora of other fora and
referees that were operative on the islands of the Roman Empire. The difficulty of travel
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and the small communities of the islands fostered a legal landscape in which dispute
resolution was achieved through various judicial fora.
Evidence for the difficulty or, rather, the complaint of difficulty of travel from
islands is found in the one of the Novellae of Justinian. Although the Novellae were
published in the 6th century, the difficulty of travel from the islands of the Mediterranean
was a permanent feature of their geography. Novella 49 is response from the Emperor
Justinian in the year 537 CE; the Emperor was trying to address delays in the appeals
process. Appeals were an important part of Roman legal ideology and practice and any
impediment to pursuing an appeal was taken seriously.381 In the preface, Justinian first
remarks how changeable human affairs are, even after he has already made laws
concerning those affairs. A tone of exasperation is nearly palpable. He proceeds to
outline how his laws were meant to restrict the abuses of the appeals process, which
would deprive the winning side of its judgement by negating favorable decisions.
Nonetheless, Justinian concedes that there are some instances in which the duration of an
appeal (one year with an additional stay of a second year) would be insufficient and
therefore would deprive an appellant of justice. Justinian attempted to respond to the
perceived injustices of abuses of the appeals systems while balancing the difficulty of
scheduling proceedings. In the preface of the Novel, he enumerates some of the reasons
one might be unable to attend a court date to decide an appeal:
But many have beset Us by saying that they indeed gave notice to those
seeking an appeal and wanted the case to be examined, though they have
381
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not been able to obtain a hearing before the same judges on account of,
perhaps, some inevitable pre-occupations; others also have blamed the
power of the winds and because they would have been unable to sail
from their province with contrary winds blowing, truly they would not
have been able to come over land because of poverty, or certainly
because those inhabiting islands were not able to come any other way,
and therefore they were not able to litigate the matter to the very end nor
in the second year, and certain people blamed the bitterness of storms,
others an incurable illness: we acknowledge all these things from those
which have been brought to our attention. Hence, these things justly
move us; we are both unwilling to overstep the law and desirous to give
possible protection to those who are wounded through so terrible a
defrauding of fortune.382

Justinian outlines the myriad excuses brought before him for missing an appeal:
unavoidable business, winds, poverty, storms, and disease. Justinian admits that these
were all valid reasons for missing an appeal. As a solution for missing the appeal, in the
first body section of the Novel, Justinian allows for a case to be reheard even though the
litigant seeking the appeal is absent.383 His reasons were especially pertinent for those
living on islands, like the inhabitants of the Cyclades. The difficulty of appeal was a
perennial issue for those living on the islands. Storms and headwinds could easily hinder
one appealing their local judgement.
The permanent difficulty of travel gave rise to a unique legal landscape in which
justice might be sought from fora other than the governor. The description of the legal

382

Nov. XLIX Pr. 2: Sed plurimi interpellaverunt nos dicentes se quidem denuntiasse
appellantibus et voluisse litem examinari, non tamen ab ipsis iudicibus impetrare valuisse propter
quasdam forsan inevitabiles occupationes; alii vero etiam ventorum inmensitatem accusaverunt et
quia navigare non licuisset de provincia contrariis flantibus ventis, per terram vero venire non
valentes propter inopiam, aut certe quia in insula commanentes aliter nisi per mare venire non
poterant, et propterea non valuerunt examinare usque ad finem negotium neque secundo anno, et
quidam tempestatum acerbitatem, alii langorem inevitabilem: quae omnia ex ipsis agnoscimus
rebus nobis insinuatis. Unde nos haec iuste moverunt et legem transcendere nolentes et his qui per
talem quandam fortunae circumventionem laeduntur dare praesidium possibile cupientes.
383
Nov. XLIX 1
189

landscape in the Expositio suggests that, though inhabitants of the Cyclades—a group of
islands in the Aegean—may have had difficulty in reaching their governor, they
nonetheless had indigenous dispute resolution fora available to them. The author of the
Expositio remarks that each island of the Cyclades has a judge. The text reads:
Then there are those (sc. islands) which are called the Cyclades, they are
many islands, 53 in number, each of which has its own judge.384

The use of the term “judge” or iudex here gives some pause. As we saw in the earlier
passage about Rome, a iudex was a common name for a provincial governor; however,
governors were not the only individuals with state sanctioned judicial responsibilities in
the Roman world. There were, of course, more senior judges like vicarii, prefects, and
emperors. There were also lower judges, iudices pedaneii or iudices dati. Additionally,
there were other individuals, like the defensores civitatium, who performed judicial
functions but had an ambiguous place in relationship to the more regular judges of the
Roman world. Here, unless there is a textual error, the author of the Expositio must be
referring to a judge below the governor, because the Cyclades were part of the Province
of the Islands, which only had one governor.385 The governor of this province would have
stayed in the capital city, Rhodes, and would have appointed lower judges to handle cases
elsewhere. Traditionally, our understanding of the lower judges is that they were
appointed on a case by case basis, but the Expositio suggests that each of the islands had
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a standing judge.386 The jurisdictional structure of the Cyclades is an anomaly within the
Empire, because if one were unhappy with the decision of his or her judge on the island,
one would have to travel to Rhodes to appeal or even further to Constantinople. In this
instance, we can see that the author’s comment on the jurisdictional structure of the
islands has far reaching implications for dispute resolution on the islands. In order to
comprehend these implications, we need to understand the kinds of judicial structures
possibly referred to in his comment.
There are three kinds of legal decisors or fora we will consider: the iudex
pedaneius, the defensor civitatis, and the possibility of unofficial dispute resolution fora.
The iudex pedaneius, also sometimes referred to as the iudex datus, was a lower judge
typically appointed by a governor who felt a case did not require his attention. A
governor would consider a case as beneath his attention that if it seemed tediously
straightforward or if the case was too low in economic value to merit the full court of the
governor. Governors of the Roman world had demanding judicial responsibilities so the
ability to appoint lower judges would have considerably lightened their burden.387
The editors of the Justinianic Code collected laws on the iudex pedaneius in CJ
3.3. The collection gives the appearance of being an Empire-wide institution, as it
probably was, but epigraphic remains of one of the laws, CJ 3.3.5, published in 362 CE,
roughly contemporaneous with the Expositio, suggests that the iudex pedaneius was an
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immediate concern for those living on the islands.388 The epigraphic remains of the law
were found on the islands of Amorgos and Lesbos in two complementary copies.389 The
inscriptions record a copy of a letter of Julian to the Praetorian Prefect Secundus, which
must have in turn been published by the governor of the Province of the Islands. The
inscription says:
Some cases are accustomed to arise which do not require examination and
nevertheless are in lofty courts; moreover there is business in which it would be
necessary to wait for the governor of the province.390
Julian’s letter first posits that there are cases that do not merit the attention of the
governor. For these cases, the emperor continues to say that it is right for the governor to
appoint iudices pedanei to resolve these cases.391 The fact that the only remains of this
law are found on these islands suggests that there was some concern about devising and
employing alternate judicial structures. While the iudices pedaneii were thought to be
appointed for particular cases, one cannot help but wonder if the governor of the Province
of the Islands established someone permanently who fulfilled a judicial function, or at
least favored certain individuals who would hold the office on each of the islands.
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Another kind of judicial referee found in the period was the defensor civitatis. A
defensor was a late Roman judicial officer who catered primarily to those who could not
afford the burden of pursuing justice before a governor or who feared approaching the
governor because rich and powerful litigants would quash any case. As Robert Frakes has
shown in his study on defensores, the institution was widespread throughout the Empire
and probably predates the mid-fourth century.392 Although the defensor appears in other
legal landscapes, it is interesting to note that one law that empowered the defensor to act
as a judge was sent to Tericum, a town on island of Sardinia.393 In the law, the Emperor
Valentinian empowered the defensor to decide minor cases, specifically those under 50
solidi. Minor cases could include, of course, all those under 50 solidi, the reclamation of
debt, reclaiming an escaped slave, or restitution for overpayment on taxes.394 Although,
the office of the defensor was used throughout the Empire to address all kinds of minor
cases, the presence of this law in Tericum suggests that people on Sardinia might have
been seeking or experimenting with alternate judicial offices.
The final judicial forum we will consider is unofficial. While most the inhabitants
of the islands of the Roman Empire would have been Roman citizens after the Constitutio
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Antoniniana of 212 CE, they did not necessarily have to disavow other, local dispute
resolution fora. Local fora would have left few traces, since they would have been meant
for addressing minor problems in a small population. We could consider institutions like
tribunals, strong men, self-help, or even common sentiment as other possible sources of
justice in the small communities on the islands. These often-times unspoken institutions
likely existed on the islands of the Roman Empire as one part of a set of dispute
resolution strategies.
The islands of the Roman Empire were legal spaces that often had to resort to
indigenous dispute resolution strategies in order to address their local problems. As we
saw in Justinian’s Novella, islands were characteristically problematic for the Roman
legal system because the litigant’s travel to and from the islands could be difficult.
Trouble in transportation, however, did not result in the islands being a lawless space.
Instead, as the author of the Expositio noted, the islands likely developed their own
methods of dispute resolution and had their own judges. In fact, evidence of alternate
judges, the iudex pedaneus and the defensor, is especially strong on the islands. These
alternate judicial officers suggest that the legal landscape of the islands was characterized
by difficulty of travel and unique judicial solutions.

6. Provincial Cities and Popular Justice
In this final section, we will consider how provincial cities and their local
conceptions of justice affected the practice of Roman law. One way that provincial urban
communities expressed their beliefs about law and justice was by rebelling. When Roman
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imperial and local conceptions of law and justice conflicted, communities might choose
to communicate their dissatisfaction and disagreement about law by rioting. We will
consider three examples of provincial riots that were caused by the difference in belief
about what constituted law. The first two examples are taken from Alexandria. First, the
author of the Expositio discusses Alexandria in glowing terms and alleges that the
Alexandrians alone stand up for what they believe. The other Alexandrian example
comes from 261 CE when the urban population of Alexandria expressed their
dissatisfaction with the Roman government after a slave was killed by a Roman soldier;
the population of Alexandria felt so strongly about the injustice of the murder that they
rioted. Alexandria and Egypt, however, present their own complications because the
region is so rich in literary tropes that it is difficult to discern whether or not the legal
eccentricities were literary creations peculiar to Egypt alone (though this too would be
significant). To fill out the picture offered by Alexandria, we will consider a final
example taken from Augustine’s Letters. Augustine’s literary corpus—his letters,
sermons, and treatises—chronicle myriad conflicts between local and imperial
conceptions of justice. Augustine’s account of the riot at Calama in 408 CE serves as a
representative of the sort of legal dispute created in provincial cities when there was a
conflict of ideas about law. Augustine tells of the riot at Calama in 408 CE, where
Christians of the city tried to stop a harvest festival because of its non-Christian
connotations. The proponents of the festival burned down the local church and killed a
slave in response to the demands of the bishop, Possidius, that the festival should
immediately cease. These three examples—two from Alexandria and one from Calama—
show how provincial cities could have their own conception of justice and that this
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conception could be communicated through violence, specifically rebellion. Local
conceptions of justice in the provincial cities of the Roman Empire affected the practice
of Roman law by forcing imperial legal practice to negotiate local circumstances and
situations.
It may help to think about the interrelated notions of violence, law, and
community abstractly or theoretically to understand how they can be read as affecting a
particular kind of legal geography. The role of violence—particularly in North Africa—
has received a considerable amount of scholarly attention, especially after Brent Shaw’s
Sacred Violence.395 Without going into too much detail, one major analytical technique
developed in this scholarship has been the discussion of violence as a communicative
act.396 Here, modern scholars draw on Habermas’s idea of “speech act” to think about
how violence and violent acts can be part of a wider discussion between disputing
parties.397 Habermas’s “speech act” allows scholars to interpret speech as a kind of
action, but by inverting the formula, one can also read action as a form of speech or part
of a discourse.398 A major theme from the scholarship on North African violence is the
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discussion of the ethical claims that violence was both illegal and non-normative.399 The
ethics of violence is manifest in claims made by individuals who often times denounce
certain behaviors as “violent” or gratuitous. We should not be led astray by these ethical
claims to the conclusion that late antiquity is more violent than any other age because of
the profusion of such claims.400 Rather, their presence in late antiquity could suggest that
such claims could be successful in persuasion.401 As such, we should be wary of any
direct causal relationship between violence and ethical claims about violence. Stepping
away from the causal relationship, we instead can read claims about violence as part of
the wider discourse of acceptability; i.e. what is legal or just or right and what is not. The
resulting paradigm allows us to read both violence and claims about violence as attempts
to define what constitutes law within a given community.

A. Alexandria
The author of the Expositio lists the wonders of Alexandria. The city is famous
for its wise men and for having an expert in every sort of philosophy and doctrine.402 The
city abounds in riches like fish, spices, and foreign goods; ancient temples adorn the
city’s topography.403 Alexandria and the surrounding region also produce papyri, on
which the author alleges that the entire Empire runs and without which, nothing would be
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possible.404 Finally, the city also, along with its wise men, has the best doctors.405
Juxtaposed with these unqualified goods is the description of the city’s judicial system.
The persistence of praise throughout the description of Alexandria suggests that the
author of the Expositio was fond of the way justice was done in the city.
The author describes the legal landscape of Alexandria thus:
Finally, you will find the city ruling well over the judges; only the
people of Alexandria move with utter disregard for them: in the city,
judges enter their courts with fear and trembling because they dread the
justice of the people; for a volley of stones and flame does not wait to
fly at those erring judges.406

The description of Alexandria’s legal landscape emphasizes the power that “the people of
Alexandria” have to disregard the imperial judicial administration. The people’s
conception of justice, the iustitia populi, is so prominent in the city that it intimidates the
judges tasked with administering justice. When the people communicate their own
conception of justice through violence, they cause the judge’s trepidation. The author
tells us that the people throw stones and flaming projectiles at the judges they deem to
have made a misstep. The author has subverted the usual claims of Alexandrian and
Egyptian riotous behavior to lay the blame for violent behavior at the feet of the imperial
administration. The problem, so the author would have us believe, was not that the
Alexandrians were naturally wild, but that the judicial system, specifically the judges and
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perhaps also their imperial conception of law, failed to comprehend their unique, local
conception of justice.
The role of local conceptions of justice is often overlooked in studies of riots,
rebellions, and violence. A prominent historical lens for riots and rebellions is provided
by an examination of the leaders of the participating groups.407 Focus on an individual,
however, tends to occlude or at least devalue the role of any communal sentiment that
may be driving these events. Communal violence can be precipitated by many factors
aside from individual agitators. I argue here that one of the possible driving factors found
in Alexandria is a popular conception of justice. This conception is evident when
individuals trespass it, which gives rise to the communal event. The ensuing violence,
then, is perhaps a frustrated form of communication and a continuation of a discourse on
justice.408 A riot or rebellion can be a community’s attempt at communicating its desires,
grievances, and conceptions to opposing parties, all of which can revolve around what
one group thinks what is the right thing to do.
One example in which popular legality was vitally important is the possible
accession of L. Mussius Aemilianus in 261 or 262 in Alexandria.409 To understand the
kind of evidence the accession of Aemilianus presents us with, we first have to reckon
with the events leading up to his elevation. The mid-third century, from 235-284, is
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commonly known as the third century crisis, though this perception is probably
compounded by the unusually sketchy evidentiary remains from the period.410 An
undeniably traumatic event that colors this period, however, was the defeat and capture of
the emperor, Valerian. Valerian had been proclaimed Emperor in Rome in 253 CE and
immediately made his son, Gallienus, his colleague in the imperial college. In 260 CE,
Valerian led an army against the Persians and was defeated by the Persian king, Shapur I.
Gallienus was either unable or unwilling to ransom his father, who, perhaps
apocryphally, was kept by the king as a footstool until the king had him flayed alive.411
Inhabitants of the Empire lost confidence in Gallienus’s ability to rule without his father
and a series of failed attempts at the throne followed.412 With the help of effective
generals, Gallienus was able to maintain power throughout this period until 268 when he
was killed by a rebelling general. It was in this imperially chaotic period that Mussius
Aemilianus possibly rebelled.
I qualify the rebellion as possible, because while we have two literary attestations
to it, the Historia Augusta (abbreviated as HA) and the Epitome de Caesaribus, there are
no corroborating testimonia from coins, papyri, or ostraka on which Aemilianus claimed
the imperial title.413 This is all the more surprising given the fact that Mussius Aemilianus
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is comparatively well attested. Not only are there a handful of papyri that attest his
position, but there is also evidence of an inscription in his honor in Italy.414 The
inscription suggests that Aemilianus was an equestrian who rose quickly through the
ranks to eventually hold the position of prefect in Alexandria.415 While Aemilianus was
serving in Egypt, two contenders for the throne in Syria, Macrianus and Quietus, were
successful enough to garner some recognition from Egyptians, as can be seen from the
papyri dated by their regnal year and a few other papyri that suggest some confusion
about who counted as the real emperor.416 Shortly after Macrianus and Quietus were
defeated, Mussius Aemilianus may have laid claim to the throne, but he was quickly put
down by Theodotus, his successor as Prefect of Egypt.417
It is difficult to ascertain whether and why Aemilianus proclaimed himself
emperor. We have no papyrological material suggesting that he claimed the throne nor do
we have any epigraphic remains explaining his justification for becoming emperor. Some
have made the argument based on chronology that Aemilianus attempted the throne
because of the capture of Valerian. This argument suggests that the capture of Valerian
was at least a proximal cause for the accession of Aemilianus because the capture created
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the chaotic conditions for a series of failed emperors.418 A more common argument is that
Aemilianus was a supporter of the two Syrian emperors, Macrianus and Quietus, so he
rebelled either out of support for the two or out of fear of being killed for his former
support. This argument is largely based on two pieces of evidence: firstly, that
Aemilianus did not try for the throne until after the Syrian emperors had been defeated;
secondly, that the use of the Syrian emperors for the regnal years and confusion about
who was emperor in Egypt during Aemilianus’s tenure means that Aemilianus must have
endorsed their bid.419 A loyal prefect would have set the situation straight about Gallienus
being emperor. However, Aemilianus’s retention of the position of the Egyptian Prefect
during the Syrian emperors’s attempt does not mean that he had to be an ardent supporter
of those failed contenders. For instance, it was possible for a prefect to retain his position
throughout an “usurpation.” Mantennius Sabinus retained his position as Prefect of Egypt
even though he held the post when Egypt seemed to support Pescennius Niger instead of
Severus for the throne. After Severus defeated Niger, Sabinus was able to keep his
position.420 Furthermore, one might compare the events of Symmachus’s life when he
supported the usurper Magnus Maximus in 387 over the emperor Theodosius. Although
Symmachus was tried for treason, he was able to preserve his life and eventually return to
politics, holding the consulship of 401. These examples suggest that Aemilianus’s
position as prefect did not mean that he would automatically be marked an enemy by
Gallienus and his supporters. Finally, the chronology of Aemilianus’s supposed ascension
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likewise does not prove his support for Macrianus and Quietus. At best, the series of
failed imperial claimants suggests a weakened impediment to laying claim to the throne.
In fact, the only ancient narrative that attempts to ascribe causation to such an accession
is found in the later Historia Augusta.
In the story of Mussius Aemilianus in the Historia Augusta, an Alexandrian
conception of justice is a direct cause of Aemilianus’s frustrated ascension. To frame
Aemilianus’s story, the author plays with the familiar trope of the riotous Alexandrians.
The author opens his account of Aemilianus’s accession with “the Egyptian people, just
like madmen and crazy people, are whipped up to the greatest dangers of the Republic on
account of the most frivolous things.”421 The author goes on to describe the extent of the
frivolity: they often rebel “on account of neglected greetings, a place in the baths not
being conceded, meat or vegetables being withheld, servile footwear and other such
matters.”422 The author of the Historia Augusta portrays the rebellion of Aemilianus as
being a “trivial and angry incident.”423
Having constructed his frame, the author goes on to give an example of his
characterization by telling of a wrongfully killed slave and an unsatisfied public. The
author of the HA tells us that a slave of the administrator (curator) in Egypt had been
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killed by a soldier because the slave said that his shoes were nicer than the soldier’s.
Frivolity encapsulated. A crowd gathered and came to the house of the prefect (dux),
Aemilianus. There, they pelted him with projectiles, presumably for failing to punish the
soldier.424 And so, fearing for his life either immediately at the hands of the Egyptians or
later when Gallienus should come and try to put him down, Aemilianus proclaimed
himself emperor in the hope that he would then be able to control the mob.425 Instead of
looking to imperial politics, the author of the Historia Augusta ascribes the cause of
Aemilianus’s rebellion to a fight that broke out between a slave and a soldier over shoes
and Aemilianus’s fear of being killed in that fight.
The author of the Historia Augusta describes how the Alexandrians rioted when
the local ruler failed to conform to their expectations. It is easy to dismiss the
Alexandrians as outlandish—just as the Historia Augusta deliberately portrays them.
Nonetheless, even the Historia Augusta gives an initial reason for their rebellion: the
murder of a slave. Perhaps tensions were running high between the troops in the city and
its citizens, but Roman law already had a tool for dealing with a murdered slave. The Lex
Aquilia was the law under which one could sue for damages for the destruction of a
424
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slave.426 But the Alexandrians were not satisfied with Roman legal remedies. It is not
even clear if any Alexandrian would have had standing in such a suit since the slave
belonged to a curator or administrator, who is described as “ruling the city.”
Nevertheless, the Alexandrians were clearly discontent with their situation and the
murdered slave represented the final blow before they wreaked havoc on the prefect,
Aemilianus. The rebellion in the Historia Augusta is similar to the sort of discontent
described in the Expositio: both result in the regional administrator, either a nondescript
judge or prefect, suffering at the hands of the Alexandrians for his failure to conform to
the local conception of justice. While it is perhaps more useful with the Empire-wide lens
to focus on the several attempts on the imperial throne after the death of Valerian, to do
so would be to gloss over any and all local motivating circumstances. The Historia
Augusta shows us one striking example of how a local conception of justice, which gave
rise to a riot, could propel an administrator all the way to the purple.
The communal violence visited upon judges in the Expositio and the Historia
Augusta reveals that ancient authors witnessed varied forms of communication in the
discourse about justice. Although these authors would have different appraisals of
Alexandrian riots and rebellions, both recognized that even one of the most notorious
populations in the Roman world could be motivated to come into confrontation with the
Roman legal system. The local conception of justice, which when trespassed against
serves as the trigger for these rebellions, could be used by legal actors either to frustrate
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the legal system into near calamity or, perhaps more elusively, to pressure a judge or
opposing party into accepting one’s argument. In the legal landscape of the Roman
Empire, Alexandria seemed to be particularly affected by popular legality, at least in the
eyes of the author of the Expositio.

B. A Riot in Calama
Popular ideas of justice were not the exclusive purview of Alexandrians. In fact,
the tension between multiple understandings of Roman law and justice was prevalent
throughout the provincial cities of the Empire. In North Africa, we are particularly well
served for evidence of disputes at law concerning different conceptions of justice. I do
not mean the competing legal fora or legal systems that populated the imperial landscape,
but rather the persistent heterogeneity of what Roman law should signify in provincial
cities. In urban centers with strong civic identities, populations constructed their own
conception of what is right and Roman. They communicated their conception in
celebrations, inscriptions, speeches, and confrontations. One such celebration and
confrontation took place in the North African town of Calama. A dispute over the
celebration of a harvest festival led to the death of a slave and the conflagration of a
church. The bishop of Calama, Possidius, attempted to stop a parade and drew a
protracted response of stone-throwing and arson from the festival goers who thought their
parade worth celebrating. The bishop pursued legal remedies against the people of
Calama for the destruction of the church. During the proceedings, a member of the local
elite, Nectarius, wrote to the more senior bishop Augustine to ask for his intercession.
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Nectarius implored Augustine to have mercy upon the citizens of Calama and to cease
any attempt at pursuing legal recourse. The dispute between the citizens of Calama and
Possidius and the correspondence between Nectarius and Augustine were predicated on
the difference of belief about what is right. Each party was motivated by a different sense
of law and made arguments about what is true justice. In what follows, I will describe
how the riot at Calama unfolded. Then I will analyze the arguments of the rioters of
Calama and of Possidius as they can be reconstructed by later correspondence and
legislation. In these arguments, there is a palpable tension between what constitutes
justice from a local and from an imperial perspective.
Before the riot at Calama, the feud between Donatists and Catholics, two sects of
the North African Christian community, seethed in North Africa. In 407 CE, the year
before the riot, a Catholic envoy had been dispatched to Rome to procure legislation
against local adversaries like Donatists and pagans.427 In mid-November, the Catholics
received an imperial response that strongly endorsed their position.428 The imperial
response did not officially reach Africa until June 5, 408 when it was posted as the text
preserved as Sirmondian Constitution 12. Since the laws were in response to a North
African Catholic delegation, it is reasonable to assume that the Catholic community, with
its robust epistolary network, knew about the November 407 laws before they were
published in June 408, about eight months later. The imperial legislation can be tedious.
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For our purposes, the important fact is the probable inequality of knowledge between
Possidius (who probably knew about the 407 laws) and the population of Calama (who
were probably ignorant of the laws since they had not yet been published in Africa).429
On June 1, 408 CE, the citizens of Calama were celebrating a harvest festival.
This festival would have been the culmination of spring planting and the first fruits of
summer.430 The festival may have had some religious significance since, according to
Augustine, the parade may have displayed a silver cult image.431 Even though there was
legislative precedent for local officials and judges restraining pagan festivities, the
festival at Calama seems to have been firmly ingrained in the local culture such that no
one, up to that point, thought it necessary to stop the celebration.432 The events of the day
can be reconstructed from the four letters that passed between Augustine and Nectarius,
especially from Augustine’s account in Epistle 91.8. The parade seemed harmless enough
until, in the telling of Augustine, such insulting (tam insolenti) behavior was
undertaken.433 The insults came in the form of dancing directly in front of the church
(petulantissima turba saltantium in eodem prorsus vico ante fores transiret ecclesiae).434
Augustine’s outrage is palpable when he says that this was a deed so outrageous that not
even in the time of Julian was such a thing done.435 When the local clergy tried to stop
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the festival, the crowd threw stones at the church. Eight days later, when Possidius the
bishop brought the imperial laws to the local council to prove that the festival must be
disavowed, the church was again assaulted with a hail of stones. On the next day, at a
public trial, there was a hail storm, which both parties took as a sign of divine favor.
After the storm, the church was assaulted a third time, set on fire, and a Christian was
killed (unum seruorum dei). The people of Calama were restrained by a passing stranger
(unum peregrinum) and the dust settled.436 Later, Possidius went to court to have the
rioters punished capitally. In an attempt to save the population, Nectarius, a native of
Calama, wrote to Augustine to ask for help.
Who was in the right? First, the rioters. If the laws against pagan festivities had
not yet reached North Africa, then the people of Calama might reasonably be able to say
that their celebration was perfectly acceptable.437 They could argue that the festival was a
time-honored tradition that had more to do with civic engagement than religious worship.
In such an instance, Possidius’s intervention would appear as that of an overbearing
clergyman who was looking to kill their good-time. The provocation gave rise to the
violent responses of stone throwing, church burning, and murder. The people of Calama
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enjoyed their festival and resented the clerical interference. Their conception of law and
justice was predicated both on the absence of any law outlawing their festival and on the
long communal expectation of celebrating the festival.
Second, Possidius. If Possidius had access to the imperial legislation, then the
abundance of material would impel him to intervene in the festival. In fact, one of the
laws from the assemblage delivered in 407 CE empowered bishops to intercede in certain
ceremonies. The law is preserved in both Sirmondian Constitution 12 and CTh 16.10.19.
It reads: “It shall in no wise be permitted to hold convivial banquets in honor of
sacrilegious rites in such funereal places or to celebrate any solemn ceremony. We grant
to bishops also of such districts the right to use ecclesiastical power to prohibit such
practices.”438 The law goes on to threaten judges, primarily governors who most likely
had no legal training, who failed to follow the letter of the law in all ways with a penalty
of twenty pounds of gold. Possidius, as bishop of Calama, could have thought of the
dancing parade at Calama as a “convivial banquet” and, therefore, he would have felt
compelled to intervene “to prohibit such practices.” From Possidius’s perspective, he was
following the letter of the law.
Although we lack any argument made by Possidius, both Nectarius’s intercession
on behalf of the people of Calama and the later imperial response recorded in Sirmondian
Constitution 14, suggest that Possidius relied on the powers outlined in Sirm. 12 to
vindicate his intercession. Since Sirm. 12 threatens judges with a hefty financial penalty,
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ecclesiasticae manus tribuimus facultatem.
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Nectarius may have felt compelled to beseech Augustine for his intercession. Nectarius
makes his case to Augustine, asking for there to be some differentiation in guilt so that
the innocent are shielded from punishment. The grounds for making his case, Nectarius
claims, are his great love for his home, Calama, where he has always been a dutiful
member of the community.439 While Nectarius makes his case for all of Calama,
Augustine’s account of the riot emphasizes the guilt of all involved when only the
passing stranger restrains the crowd. Surely one of the local officials could have done the
same. In sum, the threat of the judicial fee could further have encouraged the local elite to
put together their own case for not supporting Possidius.
Sirm. 14, published in January of 409 CE, was an imperial response to Possidius’s
complaint of his treatment. The law again threatens judges and demands that those who
are guilty, even if they are many, of invading a church, inflicting outrage on the clergy, or
inflicting outrage on the place of worship, should receive capital punishment. Since Sirm.
14 has such strong language against those who damage a church and the judges who fail
to stop or punish them, it seems that Possidius took his complaints of both the rioting
people of Calama and the local elites to the imperial consistory, where he got the answer
he was looking for.440 We can reconstruct Possidius’s idea of justice from these imperial
responses and situate him in Calama as he watched the parade that, in his mind, flagrantly
disobeyed the law of the emperor himself. Possidius had pit the local conception of
justice against the imperial.

439
440

Aug. Ep. 90.
Harries, Law and Empire, 88-91.
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Provincial cities were places thick with local politics, local identities, and local
conceptions of justice. These phenomena were intertwined in such a way that when the
cities practiced Roman law, law and justice were conceived of along local contours. We
can see the discomfort Roman legal practice endured when Empire-wide law was
invoked in complex local situations. As parties made their arguments about justice,
communities in the provincial cities could communicate their own conception of justice
with force. Rioting or mob violence could interject a strong position held by a community
into the wider discourse of law and justice. We can read some of these skirmishes
between mobs and elites as conflicts between conceptions of what should constitute law.
Members of the elite failed to comprehend or appreciate the local situation. Their failures
reveal where local conceptions of justice differed from an imperial conception. These
local conceptions made a strong impact in the legal landscape of the Roman Empire.

7. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted to analyze the legal heterogeneity found in the
Roman legal landscape. Such heterogeneity is difficult to conceive because much of the
discourse and ideology of the Roman Empire posited a legally homogenous Roman
world. The Roman idea of Empire projected an uncomplicated, homogenizing legal
landscape. There were clashes, however, between the idealized version of the legal
Empire and the practices of the Empire’s inhabitants. These clashes suggest that we
should investigate how different regions instantiated their peculiar practice of law in their
local environments. In fact, the phenomenon of differences across the same legal system
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is something that has been discussed in modern scholarship, especially in colonial
studies. Lauren Benton’s study on legal heterogeneity in the colonial empires of the
English, Spanish, and Portuguese is an illuminating model for the Roman world. As I
have argued, the connection between the discourses of geography and law in the Roman
world were intertwined enough to make Benton’s work a productive heuristic model. I
investigated four recurrent types of legal space across the Roman landscape: law schools,
imperial capitals, islands, and provincial towns. Law and legal practice made each type of
space a unique place. Places with schools, most famously Beirut, were visited by students
in search of a legal education. Students then left to secure legal work throughout the
Empire. Imperial centers, like Rome and Constantinople, were unpredictable places to
practice law because Roman jurists and Roman legal practice was strongly affected by
the social standing of litigants. In places populated by many social elites, legal practice
was often complicated by members of the elite who could make special demands of the
legal system. The islands of the Empire could produce legally claustrophobic spaces. To
overcome the problems produced by law in small communities, inhabitants of the islands
experimented with alternate judicial schemes, employing multiple and indigenous forms
of dispute resolution. Finally, in provincial cities, local populations could challenge
imperial ideas of law and justice with their own conceptions about what constituted law
and justice. The different notions of law could lead to calamity since urban populations
had few ways to communicate their dissatisfaction with imperial legal practice other than
by rioting. As such, riots and communal violence can be read as a community’s attempt
to communicate its notion of justice. These four types of legal space in the late Roman
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Empire suggest that although Roman law was an imperial-wide phenomenon, the location
of its instantiation inflected its practice.
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Conclusion
This dissertation opened with the presentation of three composite images of the
late Roman legal expert. These images displayed an expert as immoral, greedy, and
confusing; they showed experts who labored under tyrannical emperors; and, finally they
showed a scholar locked away in an early ivory tower. Now, in conclusion, let us
consider the alternate image this dissertation endeavors to provide.
“Disputatious Practice in Late Roman Legal Education” presents a purposeful and
intelligent legal expert. Previous scholarship, in pursuit of a continuity of Roman legal
texts and doctrine, imagined that the legal expert of the late Roman Empire trained in law
by meticulous study of central legal texts. The focus on text and doctrine, I argue, leads
one to overlook the formation of practical aspects of law. If we analyze late Roman legal
texts as reflective of their practice, we find that there were recurrent techniques of legal
argumentation found throughout the period. I call these techniques “disputatious
practice” because they work together to inhibit dispute about arguments in law. The
techniques of disputatious practice—compilation and framing—might be thought of as
extra-legal; however, I hope to have demonstrated that these techniques were actually
integral to Roman legal practice. The prevalence and continuity of disputatious practice
throughout the late Roman Empire suggests that it was a central component to the
practical education of legal experts.
When we imagine the sort of legal expert who wielded the techniques of
disputatious practice we are confronted with an individual who used contemporary
aesthetics in the formation of legal arguments. This legal expert knew at least some of the
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normative sources of Roman law, but also adeptly drew on rhetorical modes of
condescension, religion, and apprehension in order to fortify his argument. The
superabundance of legal material that experts drew on to make arguments left
contemporaries with the impression that the law was as dense as a thick fog. These
contemporary complaints were the result of legal experts creatively and persuasively
weaving together legal arguments and, in a sense, were borne out of the the ubiquitous
potential for the formation of legal arguments.
“Compensation for Labor in Law” investigates the multiple forms of labor in law
in order to demonstrate how legal expertise manifested throughout the Empire in distinct
forms. The multiple forms of labor met a likewise diverse set of compensations. Legal
experts were paid in cash and kind for performing tasks such as giving advice and
creating legal documents. These documents, as legal objects, were imbued with an
authenticity derived from the legal expert’s standing in the community. The community’s
recognition of a legal expert’s labor played an even larger role in a form of public cultural
capital for those who performed in the eye of the public. Certain offices such as teachers
of law or assessors were awarded a profound respect for appearing to do law in the public
eye where they presumably demonstrated just legal practice. That these public legal
experts were not rebuked in their public practice meant that they were generally seen as
reliable sources of legal knowledge and fairness. The final form of compensation in the
second chapter is an exclusive social capital. Whereas public legal experts were honored
widely, legal experts in the social elite were honored within small, powerful
communities. These elite experts used their expertise as part of a sophisticated economy
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of exchange with other elites, transacting in culturally significant objects and
strengthening the bonds of their society.
The image of the legal expert offered in the second chapter depicts a multitude of
individuals who knew how to communicate legal meaning within their communities. In
each of the activities surveyed for this chapter, we see experts creating and relying on
their community’s recognition of their legal prowess. Rather than being constantly
ensconced in a legal text or working exclusively for the administration, legal experts were
common features of late Roman communities. It is also apparent that experts employed
their expertise to transact in multiple, complex economies. The economic practices
deployed by legal experts allowed them to access multiple markets of legal labor and gain
other valuable goods and services in exchange for their knowledge.
“Legal Lumpiness of the Late Roman Empire” analyzes the legal heterogeneity of
the late Roman Empire. In contrast to the rhetoric of a legally homogenized world, I
argue that the multiple geographies of the legal landscape emphasized unique aspects of
law. Places with law schools were hubs of travel for students who sought to obtain
training in law. That training, in turn, inflected legal practice around the school as alumni
brought their textual legal expectations to courts and to their careers. Imperial centers,
such as the capital cities of Rome and Constantinople, were populated by members of the
social elite, who could expect special treatment before the multiple courts of the Roman
world. Senators domiciled in these capitals had actions available to them that were denied
to socially inferior coevals such as ignoring a judge’s orders or even trying to replace the
judge when one thought he performed poorly. The islands of the Empire, and probably all
small communities constrained by difficulty in travel, experimented with multiple
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indigenous legal fora and referees because they were unable or unwilling to invoke
Roman administrative decisions. For instance, instead of going to the governor on a
distant island, inhabitants of small islands experimented with indigenous dispute
resolution strategies such as the defensores civitatis or non-state recognized forms of
settlement. Finally, in provincial towns, robust, local conceptions of justice and law
clashed with imperial conceptions when cosmopolitan judges or litigants pursued
resolutions through official Roman legal channels. Instead of simply accepting the
arguments and narratives of governors and bishops about what constituted law, local
populations rebutted with their own idea of justice, communicating it sometimes in
violent demonstrations such as rebellions and riots. The four landscapes of law in the
Roman Empire demonstrate that Roman law as an imperial phenomenon was a dynamic
set of social practices that varied across space.
The heterogeneous nature of Roman legal practice suggests that we have to
imagine experts utilizing the unique aspects of law emphasized in their spaces. The first
two chapters argue for a conception of Roman legal expertise that filled the different
social and economic positions of the Empire, in which experts constructed reputations for
creating legal meaning. When seen against the heterogeneous landscape we can imagine
that the tools of disputatious practice and the complex economies of law reverberated
throughout the Empire, filling those landscapes of law. The legal experts that populated
the late Roman Empire were not distant, imperial agents, but rather were nearly
ubiquitous makers of legal meaning.
Roman legal historians have argued for the demise of legal experts at the
beginning of the late Roman Empire. This dissertation reveals the powerful forms of law
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and legal experts that existed throughout the Empire. When viewed from a critical legal
pluralist perspective, legal experts of the late Roman world were sophisticated and
influential actors. They created law for their communities through arguments. They
participated in complex economies and garnered social standing for their expertise.
Finally, when imagined in the heterogeneous legal landscape, we can surmise that legal
experts mastered the disparate aspects of law to create legal meaning that was at once
specific to its environs, but also communicated in an imperially intelligible language of
law. The legal experts of the late Roman Empire were not the incompetent inheritors of
the classical jurists nor the forgettable forefathers of Justinian’s compilers. The legal
experts of the late Roman world were the little men of law who created legal meaning
throughout the Empire.
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